

ANTIDISCOURSE: FROM THINKING TO CONSCIOUSNESS

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Human life is made for inquiring about the Absolute Truth



In service to His Divine Grace A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Srila Prabhupada,
Founder-Acarya of the International Society for Krishna consciousness

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About this work

This work is an excerpt from a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of ontology and theory of knowledge. Approximately a quarter of the original dissertation is present here, the topic of which was: "Intentional reasoning and musical thinking: a phenomenological description."

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Thesaurus

Consciousness and Thinking - in order to avoid terminological confusion in frequently used by many authors (in different contexts and interpretations) concepts of consciousness and thinking, we will single out these, considered by us exclusively in the phenomenological semantic content, categories of knowledge in italics and with a capital letter - *Consciousness* and *Thinking*: *Consciousness* is a pure “stream of experiences” (Husserl), free from “cover” of individual psychological thinking; *Thinking* is an individual rational reflection of the psychological subject, based on the logic of relative facts (psychological thinking).

Husserl - Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl 8 April 1859 Proßnitz, Margraviate of Moravia, Austrian Empire (present-day Prostějov, Czech Republic) - 27 April 1938 Freiburg im Breisgau - German philosopher, founder of phenomenology. The leitmotif of Husserl's philosophy is the achievement of the sphere of pure *Consciousness*, the region of absolute (apodictic) truths that lie at the basis of truly scientific cognition, “truly rigorous science.”

Phenomenology of Husserl - the doctrine of phenomena of reality given in the direct “living” experience of *Consciousness*, that is, in the first person (from a truly subjective point of view vision). According to Husserl himself, phenomenology has nothing in common with any theory, but only describes the subject in its essential structure. It is not a theory, but simply a certain method of perception and vision of the object. Phenomenology, so way, involves an appeal to the experience of the cognizing *Consciousness*, where *Consciousness* is understood not as an practical experience of mental activity, but as a “transcendental I”, “formation of pure meaning” (intentionality).

Intentionality is the direction inherent in the act of *Consciousness* towards some object, associated with giving it the meaning of existence. Thus, in the immanent structures of the *Consciousness* of an intentional subject, there are not only acts of experiences, but also those objects, which these experiences are directed to.

Natural attitude of cognition is an attitude of *Consciousness* in which it is “naively” identifies itself with *Thinking* and, as a result, recklessly delegates its cognitive potential of true eidetic meaning genesis to the power of dubious *Thoughts*.

Eidetic reduction - as if bracketing the psychophysical “I” and its objecthood - empirically perceived world.

Linguistic-psychological reduction - as if bracketing the linguistic subject and his objecthood - linguistic meanings (discursive dynamics of the region of a priori categories of sensibility and understanding of Kant's transcendental subject).

Intentional, transcendental-phenomenological reduction - as if bracketing Kant's transcendental reason and the objecthood corresponding to it - the principles of the ideas of the soul and the world soul, ethics and noumenal theology. The stage of the final release of the pure intentional “I”

Transcendental epoché is an anti-discourse or contemplation of pure essences before any symbolic “embodiment” of them, followed by a “translation” of the language of experiences into the

language of a “discursively conditioned” communicative intersubjective world. In other words, the epoche is a refusal to react in the way that the naive *natural attitude* requires.

Apperception is the conscious perception by the senses of new impressions, which thus become knowledge.

Mental representation is a mental image, a mental representation of an event.

Constituting is the establishment of meaning and at the same time its discovery (description). Establishment is the equivalent of the word “constituting”, which means that we establish something, but not in the way we want. For example, a good state constitution is not established arbitrarily, but in accordance with positive experience (discoveries) of the socio-cultural practice of the people of this state.

Noesis and noema are the terms of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy related to the theory of cognition. In Husserl's phenomenology, noema and noesis act as complementary (correlative) aspects of intentionality.

Noeza (from *noeim* - to perceive or think, comes from the ancient Greek “nus” - mind) - acts-experiences belonging to the stream of consciousness, noetic “singularities”. From the side of experiences, phenomenology explores [quasi] real (reele) aspects, consisting of two interconnected structural levels: the hyletic moments of particular experience, or “materials” (Stoffe), or formless matters; a set of interrelated, “flowing” further acts that give form and meaning (morphe) to the “matters”. Through them, experiences become “meaningful” (sinnvolle).

Noema is the conscious as such, including the “objective objecthood meaning” (the core of the noema) and the subjective ways of giving the objectively perceived (the characters that connect the noema with the noetic, but are not identical to it), the “objecthood” moment of intentional unity, which is singled out in opposition to the [quasi] real level and at the same time as a correlate of the noetic, is an unreal moment of experience (irreell). The noematic meaning is different from the real (real), quasi-real (reell) and from the ideally isolated or objectified essential unity (entity), it is inalienable from the essence of experience (for example, perception) subjected to phenomenological reduction.

Immanence - in the general philosophical sense means inherent, characteristic, inalienability. The opposite of transcendence.

Transcendence - in the general philosophical sense means being beyond boundaries, ultimate detachment, incomprehensibility.

Apodictic truths are undeniable knowledge, “Absolute Truth.”

Equivocation is dubious knowledge, the contradiction of a logical vicious circle.

Congruence - consistency, coherence, adequacy of the elements of the system to each other, the state in which the words of a person correspond to his actions.

Analyzing appresentation - the ability to understand another “living body” by analogy with one's own sensations. By appresentation, Husserl implies the act of analogizing assimilation, which should not be confused with inference by analogy. Through appresentation, an actual experience is related to another experience that is not actually given. That is, what is appresented never acquires an actual presence in the present, just as we never see the other side of the moon, although we are convinced of its existence by virtue of appresentation.

Kinaesthesia is the “dominant action of the soul”. Due to the fact that “soul” dominates over body, and can rule over different sense organs separately (see with the eyes, feel with the fingers, etc.), the perception itself, and then all other experiences in relation to objects of the world are generally possible, according to Husserl. Consequently, the act of domination of the “soul” over the body mediates the universal correlation of the “I” with the world. Practically this domination is carried out in the modes of movement - “kinestheses”: “I move”, “I push”, etc.

Episteme - (from the Greek. *επιστήμη* - knowledge) the main notion of the concept of “archeology of knowledge” by M. Foucault. In the philosophy of science, the concept of episteme is sometimes used in a sense close to that of the concept of paradigm, however, while maintaining a certain difference between them, due to different mental contexts of the formation of these concepts. Both concepts emphasize the originality and discreteness of large-scale intellectual formations characteristic of various historical eras.

Negation - (from Lat. *negatio*) a dialectical term meaning denial as opposed to confirmation.

Clause is a minimal (elementary) meaningful unit, a linkage.

Apophatic description - is aimed at expressing the essence of the object by denying its all possible definitions, as incommensurable with its true nature. The object of description appears as fundamentally inexpressible.

Kataphatic description is aimed at arriving at affirming knowledge by enumerating the features and properties that characterize an object. The object of description appears as fundamentally expressible.

Ideation - contemplation (discretion) of the essence of the object.

Description (from lat. *descriptio*) – a visualization using the language of the content of experience.

Telos - in ancient Greek philosophy: the ultimate goal of something.

Entelechy - in the philosophy of Aristotle: purposefulness, the realization of any possibility of being, as well as the driving factor of this realization (for example, the soul as the entelechy of the body).

Reference - in semantics: the relationship between a word and a thing (an object of non-linguistic reality), which is indicated by this word (which is its referent).

Eidos is pure essence as opposed to fact.

Introduction

Consciousness is the ultimate category of cognition. There is already “no one” to cognize consciousness: there is no point of observation and investigation external toward consciousness. Consequently, the cognition of consciousness is always self-consciousness - universal experience of a person that in Western culture has been called philosophy.

Philosophy therefore is an extremely subjective branch of cognition, and as soon as philosophy decides to recognize its own authenticity, it becomes a phenomenology - self-awareness methodology. It would not be an exaggeration to say that philosophers of various historical and cultural epistemes and predilections, directly or indirectly, in their philosophical axiomatics have something in common with the priority for each phenomenologist apodictic truth about the essence of “philosophy as a study of the experience of consciousness, from which all types of spiritual experience grow, in which all possibilities of the spiritual are rooted”¹.

Not so with *Thinking*. The astonishment with which, according to Aristotle, philosophy begins, is not *Thinking*. On the contrary, *astonishment* - “out of the limits of the mind” - the essence of the act of experiencing (phenomenon) the same *Consciousness*. Philosophy is not reduced to *Thinking*, but is only mediated by it. Consequently, one can philosophize even without thinking (as for example, in Husserl's “solitary life of a soul” *einsames Seelenleben*), but it is impossible outside of *Consciousness*. The first experience of *Consciousness* is to distinguish oneself from *non-Consciousness*². And *Thinking* first of all falls into the category of *non-Consciousness* in the process of complete phenomenological reduction, as the closest “cover” of pure *Consciousness*. However, in *natural attitude* the perception of oneself and the world, in which, according to Husserl, *Consciousness* naively identifies itself with “psychological apperception”, *Thinking* always “accompanies” acts of self-consciousness with its own “interpretations”, revealing tendency to attribute direct knowledge of the original essence of experience (*Consciousness*) on account of “mental representation”. Therefore, every awakened phenomenologist begins with a call for a “return back to things” (in the well-known rhetoric of the founder of phenomenology), that is, for the return of the *Consciousness* of a thing, “taken away” by the *Thinking*.

In this sense *Consciousness* opposes *Thinking*. The phenomenological experience of the philosopher, who overcame the naive perception of the *natural attitude*, confirms that the *Consciousness* awakened as a result of the phenomenological reduction *experiences a protest against its own Thinking*. In the *phenomenological attitude*, *Consciousness* throws a natural *challenge* to *Thinking* as a kind of “prison of the conceptual framework” (K. Popper), from the clutches of which it freed itself with great difficulty.

The most intriguing riddle of the *Consciousness* lies precisely in the fact that the essential comprehension of the surrounding reality that it masters, which allows the individual to successfully feel himself in the “Life World” (LebensWelt), is not carried out in the metaphors of “copying” or “reflection” mechanically imagined by discursive *Thinking*, but exclusively in the specific “*belonging to Consciousness*”, “internal-structural” intentional objecthood. It is precisely for unraveling this

¹ Molchanov V.I. Research on the phenomenology of consciousness. M., 2007. p. 233.

² *ibid*

fundamental mystery of *Consciousness*, that is, for releasing in the purest form the irreal content of *Consciousness* “as it is”, it is indispensably required the most conscientious accomplishment of a complete phenomenological reduction of “all individual and universal objecthoods”, corresponding to all kinds of subjectivities, “covering” pure intentional subject of contemplation of irreal noematic essences of *Consciousness*.

The racing game of *Thinking* in relation to *Consciousness* in Western philosophizing has led to the notorious vagueness and extreme uncertainty of the definitions of both “*consciousness*” and “*thinking*”, as a result of which “serious” philosophers even try to avoid such “scholastic” problems. It is exactly from *Thinking* a bright palette of the most diverse, often contradictory views on the category of *Consciousness* has manifested in philosophical science. The following areas of search can be singled out: a description of *consciousness* as something inseparable and even identical with the immediate reality of life (the philosophy of life, the concept of the vital reason of Ortega y Gasset); fixing the life of *consciousness* at the phenomenal-corporeal level (Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty); revealing the determinations of *consciousness* through linguistic (hermeneutics, Wittgenstein) and other structures of the unconscious order (psychoanalysis, structuralism)”³. The category of *Thinking* has historically been entrenched in Western philosophical thought as a “necessary part” of *Consciousness*.

The generic conceptual and logical status of *Consciousness* to *Thinking* as a species is also preserved in modern philosophy, despite the shift in the problems of *Thinking* “from the plane of correlation of an individual’s thought with universal forms of intelligence into a multidimensional space of interaction of human thought with various methods of practical and spiritual exploration of the world, classical and “non-classical “objects characterized by their own logic of being”⁴. At the same time, an even more voluminous concept of “*psyche*” is often been *Thought*, in relation to which “the concept of *Consciousness* is narrower” and can only be understood “as a level of the psyche, as a set of mental abilities that ensure the inclusion in self-regulation and self-orientation of a person of social and cultural schematisms of activity, natural connections and cosmic rhythms mediated by them”⁵. But after making the “linguistic turn” to a rigid relationship between the concepts of consciousness and thinking with linguistic structures, Western, again, *Thought* comes to the construction of the idea of a whole psychological conglomerate in which consciousness, thinking and language become three hypostases of a single mental-lingual complex (MLC)⁶.

However, phenomenology as a methodology of the original philosophy (that is, the philosophy of *Consciousness* itself) is based on a directly opposite attitude to the “totality of mental abilities”, namely: the psychic being of *Thinking*, full of rational interpretations of everything that exists (including the same “consciousness”), in fact, is in a tough cognitive “competition” (understood exclusively phenomenologically) with the existence of true pure *Consciousness*. The so-called “consciousness” inside a certain MLC is just a “fiction” of the *Thinking*, trying in vain to cognize something, it does not have onto-gnoseological powers on. In practice, the psychological subject of the *natural attitude* “naively”, but categorically denies the existence of an independent and inaccessible for him *Consciousness* (which happened in postmodernism with “outright” maximalism).

³ The problem of consciousness in modern Western philosophy / ed. T. A. Kuzmina. M., 1989. p. 7.

⁴ Kemerov V. E. *Thinking* // Modern Philosophical Dictionary. M., 2004. p. 412.

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Morkovkin VV *Language, thinking and consciousness* // Russian language: encyclopedia. M., 1998. p. 664.

Therefore, phenomenological science begins with a positively constructive exposure of the dubiousness of the “knowledge” of *Thinking*, which (in the case of a claim to a “truly rigorous science” of undoubted reliable apodictic truths) must necessarily be reduced (put out “out of brackets” of the objecthood field of cognition).

Attempts by Western philosophy to establish the legitimacy of the priority of cognition of *Consciousness* can be traced throughout its more than 2.5 thousand-year history, however, it must be admitted that they have always been declarative in nature without any serious scientific and methodological justification. The absence of a strictly scientific method of self-consciousness and even the formulation of the corresponding problem is an obvious reason for the peculiar drama of the genealogical scenario of Western *Thinking* from antiquity up to Husserl's phenomenological project of “truly rigorous science”, which originated only at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. Indeed, only in the phenomenological rationality of Husserl, which is fundamentally different for Europe of the 20th century, does *Thinking* receive a serious challenge to its unshakable “power”, encroaching on doubts in its very foundations (authority of theoretical knowledge), and does it by its own most powerful weapon — logic: “Husserl conducts a sharp and clear boundary between the objective ideal-logical content of thinking” (the logic of the essences of *Consciousness*) and the “subjective, real-psychological process of thinking” (the logic of the facts of *Thinking* of the traditional sciences of *natural attitude*)⁷.

In this study, we will discuss the restoration of the essence of the idea of the founder of phenomenology, primarily in the development of “new phenomenological thinking” - the phenomenology of “Consciousness of reason”, or intentional reason⁸, with the aim of further developing the phenomenological “rigorous science” in accordance with the context of modern “life” philosophical knowledge. The unacceptably weak description of fundamentally anti-psychological phenomenological thinking⁹, in our opinion, is still the fundamental reason for the suppression of the cognitive potential of the intentional rationality of pure *Consciousness*, which cannot withstand “unequal competition” with the rational-theoretical methodological potential of psychological *Thinking*, which has been excellently developed over the past millennia.

On the other hand, modern philosophizing is reaping the fruits of a fundamental revision of “all its foundations” under the influence of a truly revolutionary “linguistic turn”, which showed philosophy the way to “prosper” on discursive “soil”, though at the cost of being biased by the almost absolute “power of discourse” (M. Foucault). Discursive analysis is increasingly acquiring the status of a kind of “spiritual mathematics”, contributing to the worthy self-affirmation of the “exact” humanities along with the “exact” natural sciences. Accordingly, the *Thinking* in the spirit of the times interprets itself as an “internal discourse”, projecting a new understanding, of course, onto the nature of the *Consciousness* “supervised” by it.

⁷ See: Frank S. L. Preface // Husserl. E. Logical research. M., 2000. p. 7.

⁸ Landgrebe L. Phanomenologie und Geschichte. Gutersloh, 1967: “The phenomenological reason does not establish everything once and for all, it is not limited to the objectified a priori, it is an open reason ... - an intentional reason that, as an intention, is always on the way and steps over itself.”

⁹ Phenomenological thinking fundamentally differs from the psychological-discursive thinking we have singled out, therefore we do mark it out in any special way, but designate it, as usual, with a lowercase letter. Accordingly, musical thinking, which we consider below as a kind of phenomenological thinking, is similarly denoted with a lowercase letter.

First of all, in accordance with modern methodologies of discursive analysis, the philosophical “tree” from the very birth in the wisdom of the era of the “seven wise men” and the thoughts of the “pre-Socratics” can be divided into two discursive trunks: *ontology* and *gnoseology*. The core range of issues of discursive analysis is the study of the structure of discourse, which, in the first approximation, is conventionally divided into a *macrostructure* (or superstructure), that is, a global structure, and a *microstructure*, or local structure. Ontological andgnoseological discourses are congruent in their macrostructures (therefore they are perceived as a kind of unified philosophical knowledge), but fundamentally different in microstructures (according to the so-called “clauses”)¹⁰. Here we are confronted with the dialectic of the unity and struggle of opposites: *the ontological andgnoseological discourses that fund integral philosophical knowledge are simultaneously in a relationship of initially irreconcilable competition or a fundamental difference in the specifics of their microstructures.*

The macrostructure, in fact, is a kind of “abstract” (“summary”) of the main content of the discourse, which is built by the addressee in the process of understanding the text (T. van Dijk). *The macrostructures of the ontological andgnoseological discourses* of the entire Western philosophical tradition can be reduced to several theses (which is practiced in philosophical dictionaries and textbooks):

Macrostructure of ontological discourse	Macrostructure ofgnoseological discourse
1) The main question of ontology: what exists? 2) Answers to the main question: a) there is a material, indestructible and perfect cosmos (naturocentrism); b) there is a single, motionless, unchanging Being; Being is that which is conceivable; what cannot be conceived - does not exist, Non-Being (Parmenides); c) there is an ever-changing matter (Heraclitus); d) the “measure” of existence/non-existence is a person (anthropocentrism, Protagoras); e) there are only atoms and emptiness (atomism, Democritus); f) there is only the world of ideas (idealism, Plato); g) there is the essence of being (form), the reasons for its material embodiment and God as the form of forms and the root cause (Aristotle); h) only God truly exists (patristics and scholasticism);	1) The main question is whether the world is cognizable in principle? 2) Answers to the main question: a) the world is cognizable and there are no boundaries of cognition (gnoseological optimism); b) the world is in principle incognizable, and what is called knowledge is a virtual world created by sensory experience and rational thinking (agnosticism); c) knowledge of the true world is problematic, you can know only the world of one's own relative phenomena of perception (skepticism); d) the only object of true knowledge is I myself, the rest is a figment of my imagination (solipsism). 3) basic concepts and categories ofgnoseological discourse, for example: knowledge, cognition, consciousness, feeling, reason, understanding, truth. 4) the subject ofgnoseology: the problem of truth (truth and meaning), the problem of the method of cognition, the essence of cognition, forms of cognition

¹⁰ The theory of rhetorical structures by W. Mann and S. Thompson (1980s).

<p>i) existence is thinking (New time, Descartes);</p> <p>j) there is an objective (in relation to man) nature, identical to God (pantheism, Spinoza);</p> <p>k) there is the noumenal (the thing in itself) and the ideal-phenomenal (the thing for us), the transcendent and the transcendental (Kant);</p> <p>l) there is an object of activity of the spirit (Hegel);</p> <p>m) only will exists (Schopenhauer);</p> <p>o) there are several layers of being - inorganic, organic, spiritual (Hartmann);</p> <p>o) there is only human existential being (Heidegger);</p> <p>p) the question of existence - a kind of theory that postulates one or another object as an existing one (Quine).</p> <p>3) the main concepts and categories of ontological discourse, for example: essence, being, non-being, forms of being (material, ideal, existential), properties, structure, space, time, movement, substance, accident.</p> <p>4) ontology subject: being and existence, being as the fullness of realities: objective, physical, subjective, social and virtual; reality of matter (material world) and spirit (spiritual world, including the concepts of God and the soul); being and nothingness, human being (freedom and will).</p>	<p>(science, religion, art, ideology, common sense), levels of cognition (empirical, theoretical, intuitive), principles of cognition, the problem of faith and knowledge, criteria for scientific cognition, understanding and explanation.</p>
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In the above review of the macrostructures of ontology and gnoseology, their congruence and interdependence are obvious (therefore, most often we are dealing with complex, as they say, ontognoseological descriptions of a particular phenomenon or object). Unlike the macrostructure, the microstructure of any discourse consists of minimal discursive elements, which in most modern approaches are considered to be predications, or clauses that have several “layers” (predicate, argument, elements dependent on the predicate, “pre-central position”). From this point of view, discourse is a sequential chain of clauses, elementary sentences or semantic units. Perhaps the most important element of the structure of a clause is its informational structure, which includes two main elements:

- 1) Topic - a funding semantic a priori premise, accepted in the status of known knowledge; 2) Functional purposefulness (focus) - the level of pre-realization: how the text is planned and organized in accordance with its goal, and not by what means this goal is achieved. Connections or relations of semantic clauses have their own specifics, revealing the fundamental difference between ontological and gnoseological discourses, primarily in terms of the information structure, as well as belonging to the attitudes of cognition.

Ontological discourse	Gnoseological discourse
<p>The topic is a statement of the priority of the problem of being and being as an obvious, “self-evident” axiom: What exists and what does not exist?</p>	<p>The topic is a statement of the priority of the problem of obtaining reliable knowledge, recognizing as obvious only the fact that all obvious knowledge (as “for granted”) is doubtful: “what can a person know reliably and what cannot?”.</p>
<p>Focus is the search for the functional organization of the method according to knowledge of essence and being.</p>	<p>The focus is the search for a functional organization of a methodology for obtaining a method of direct perception of reliable (undoubted) knowledge about the essence of things.</p>
<p>Natural attitude (NA)</p>	<p>Partial overcoming of the NA with the prospect of moving to the position of the phenomenological attitude (PA) (anti-discourse)</p>

There are significant semantic “gaps” between the microstructures of ontological and gnoseological discourses and the heuristic content that in European philosophy is usually understood as “ontology” and “gnoseology”, especially this concerns gnoseological discourse, which, as will be shown in the historical review (“History of development of the discourse”), European gnoseology (epistemology) is by no means reduced.

The fundamental difference between ontological and gnoseological discourses means an important conclusion: the apparent unity of the discursive ontognoseological philosophical tree, in fact, has two roots, which means that, despite the macrostructural similarity, it is in fact an interweaving of two different trees, with different semantic load and target orientation.

Thus, we face the exposure of a serious *methodological error* that has crept into Western philosophy almost from the very beginning in the ancient version, the essence of which is the *mixing of two “discursive programs” that are different in meaning and purpose, which have shown their “program incompatibility” and, as a result, heuristic inconsistency precisely when the “philosophical matter” reached the phenomenological reduction.* The reason for this still lies in the *opposition “fact-essence”*, funding the Husserl's method. Phenomenological science, as already mentioned, begins with a radical delimitation of essence and fact and tries to describe the method of returning “to essences”, moving away “from facts”, which inevitably confronts the practical application of phenomenological reduction with a naive illusory attitude to their identity, rigidly fixed by the “power of onto-gnoseological discourse” (the discursive basis of the *natural attitude*). Only by mixing facts and essence, as happened in European science and philosophy before Husserl, can one painlessly fail to distinguish between the “two different roots” of the philosophical episteme, falling into the trap of the prejudice of the “common root” of the philosophy of being and cognition in the position of *natural attitude*. Therefore, it is precisely here that the essence of the solution of the problem of phenomenological discourse that we have posed lies.

The discursive scheme of *Thinking* forces the subject in the subconscious to first accept non-existence as a “fact”, in order to immediately reject it, - to reject something that “essentially” never existed, does not exist and cannot exist. And this is the “vicious circle” of the illusory covering of

the *natural attitude*, and, as is now obvious, it is rooted in the discursive conditionality. But as we know, it was thanks to the purification of *Consciousness* from psychological *Thinking* through *transcendental-phenomenological reduction*, Husserl discovered “new thinking” (*intentional reason*) “within” *Consciousness*, the description of which is the *priority goal of this work*.

Husserl and phenomenological reduction

By the beginning of the 21st century, we can confidently state the worldwide renaissance of scientific and philosophical interest in the legacy of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), observed primarily in Europe, but also in Russia.

It is unlikely that anyone will dispute the result of N. V. Motroshilova's “thought experiment”¹¹, according to which the founder of phenomenology undoubtedly falls into the ranks of the ten most prominent philosophers of the past century.

Phenomenology, as the only possible methodology of strict scientific and philosophical self-consciousness, must receive a discursive justification for its fundamental ontological and gnoseological demarcation of *Consciousness* and *Thinking* through a radical overcoming of the *natural attitude* of cognition through *phenomenological reduction*. Husserl repeatedly insisted that the phenomenological method begins to “act” only after the simultaneous implementation of two stages of reduction, corresponding to the sequential “bracketing” of the cognitive data of two levels of the *natural attitude* - first, the empirical perception of the physical world (*eidetic reduction*), and then the a priori-given ideal world of the transcendental subject (*transcendental-phenomenological reduction*)¹².

Husserl himself gives the example of a knife to distinguish between acts of the first and second order¹³. “Knife on the table” causes acts of experiences of two orders:

1. An act of perception, the objecthood of which is some thing (“knife”) or some position of a thing (“knife on the table”) [objecthood of *gnoseological-discursive Thinking*].
2. The act of *reflection*, which is secondarily experienced (realized) as the perception of the perception of a thing (“a knife on the table”) [the objecthood of pure *Consciousness*, free even from *gnoseological-discursive Thinking*].

Thus, the act of the first order, the perception of the knife on the table, acts as the objecthood of the acts of the second order. According to Husserl, *apodictic obviousness* is achieved only in the reflexive act.

In Husserl's work, there is a complex theme of distinguishing *transcendental phenomenology* from *phenomenological (eidetic) psychology*, which directly concerns the categories of *Consciousness* (the only subject of transcendental phenomenology) and *Thinking* (the subject of psychology, including phenomenological) that we oppose to each other. Even phenomenological psychology,

¹¹ Motroshilova N.V. Ideas I of Edmund Husserl as an introduction to phenomenology. M., 2003. p. 14.

¹² Husserl E. Main problems of phenomenology. Lecture course of 1910 // Razeev D. N. In the networks of phenomenology. SPb., 2004. pp. 239–245.

¹³ Husserl E. Logical research. Volume II. Research 5, § 17 / trans. V. I. Molchanov. M., 2001. p. 375.

which makes an eidetic reduction, is, according to Husserl, “transcendentally naive,” because it does not achieve the “Copernican turn” from the meaning of the world as a “positive” given, which is characteristic of any, even eidetic psychology, to the purely transcendental meaning of “the world as intentional noema” corresponding to an absolute or transcendental phenomenology, possible only as a result of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.¹⁴

In the context of the task of phenomenological separation of the categories of Consciousness and Thinking, we can also define the essence of Husserl’s natural attitude of cognition as the attitude of Consciousness in which it “naively” identifies itself with Thinking and, as a result, recklessly delegates its cognitive potential of true eidetic meaning genesis to the power of dubious Thoughts. Therefore, it is the overcoming of the natural attitude that is the functional target program of Husserl’s true phenomenology (which he eventually called “transcendental phenomenology”), once and for all leaving the “region of being” not only of traditional empirical science, but also of transcendental philosophy and even phenomenological logic and eidetic psychology.

What “*natural thinking*” means and why it is necessary to “move away” from it, Husserl explained in detail in the conceptual article “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (1911): “All natural science is naive by virtue of its starting point. The nature into which it wants to inquire is simply there for it. Physical things obviously exist, exist as resting, moving, changing in infinite space, and as temporal things in infinite time... To know these obvious givens in an objectively valid, rigorously scientific way is the goal of natural science... all sciences are imperfect even the exact sciences that cause such delight”¹⁵. As for philosophy, Husserl does not even speak of it as an “imperfect science”, moreover, he generally denies it the status of a science - philosophy, according to Husserl’s very bold statement, “has not yet begun as a science.”

In his last works, Husserl laments that, to his deep regret, “phenomenology is understood as the lowest rung of empirical psychology, as the sphere of “immanent” descriptions of mental experiences. From my objections to such an understanding there was little use and the attached reasoning, clearly delineating ... the differences, were not understood or were left without attention”¹⁶. In reality, Husserl concludes, his “pure phenomenology” is “not psychology, and that its reckoning with psychology is excluded not by any accidental delimitations of the field and terminologically, but by *fundamental* grounds ... all this requires a new one, *completely changed* in comparison with the *natural attitude* of experience and thought *method of attitude*”¹⁷.

From the very first step, insists the founder of phenomenology, the philosopher must distance himself from the *natural attitude*, that is, from understanding himself “in the usual sense - as this human person living in this world among other personalities”¹⁸. If, however, one remains simply a psychologist, then the first and most important step for advancing to phenomenology does not take place: the psychologist is aware of “being and life” in the “I” mode, that is, he accepts “man in connection with the soul” as an object of research. Husserl firmly believes that many who consider themselves phenomenologists are in fact deviating from true phenomenology from the very

¹⁴ Husserl E. Selected Works. M., 2005. p. 321.

¹⁵ Husserl E. Philosophy as a rigorous science. Novocherkassk, 1994, p. 137.

¹⁶ Husserl E. Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book. 1. M., 2009, p. 18.

¹⁷ Ibid p.19

¹⁸ Husserliana: Husserl E. Gesammelte Werke. Bd. V. Die Phanomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften / Hg. v. W. Biemel. Den Haag, 1953. S. 144.2005. S. 321.

beginning, when, like psychologists, they simply work with “psychological subjectivity.” The phenomenologist, on the other hand, is obliged, according to Husserl, to “lose ... the meaning of the being” of the judgment about the “soul of the body, existing in the pre-given spatio-temporal nature”, typical for the simplified and naive *natural attitude*, because “thanks to the phenomenological epoche, nature with body and soul, the world in general, loses its existential meaning... for me, the existing”¹⁹. As Husserl explained many times before in his early works, instead of the reduced spatio-temporal world, the phenomenologist receives “the world of consciousness [of our *Consciousness*] purely as such” (“Bewußtseinswelt rein als solche”), and with it the phenomena of “the existing for me world”, which turn into the scoping of “a new type of theoretical experience and experimental research”. The phenomenologist must then surrender to these pure phenomena, allowing “them to behave as givers in a consistent phenomenological attitude.” As a result, he will discover “the realm of being, closed in itself, absolutely peculiar - the realm of pure, or transcendental, subjectivity”²⁰.

Thus, Husserl once again confirms that it is impossible even to begin to approach this “realm” (Reich) apart from “direct” experience, that is, the experience of cognition in a different attitude: phenomenology begins with changing the *attitude* from *natural* to *phenomenological* through a variety of specific techniques. Thanks to the conscientious implementation of the latter, the realm of pure phenomena is “opened” to the phenomenologist, and only then does he become a “true phenomenologist”, a “phenomenologist as such”, that is, he enters the sphere of “transcendental subjectivity”.

Accordingly, Husserl believes that the reason that many of his followers could not break out of the naive pre-phenomenological, or natural, attitude is that they did not fully understand the full seriousness and depth of the phenomenological transformation of their own “I”: “Within my field of transcendental phenomena, I am no longer the Man-I (Menschen-Ich) in the theoretical sense [i.e., *Thinking*]; I am no longer a real object within a world that is significant for me as being, but I am located exclusively in representation as a subject for this world. And the world itself is given, one way or another, perceived by me, appearing to me, accepted on faith, taken in a predicative judgment, evaluated, etc. Therefore, in such a way that its being-certainty itself belongs to the “phenomenon”, and not otherwise than as another mode of possession on the part of my consciousness (meines Bewußthabens) and its “contents” [that is, from within *Consciousness*]²¹. So, Husserl categorically insisted on a radical change of the *natural attitude* of identification *Consciousness* with *Thinking* to the *phenomenological attitude* of pure *Consciousness*, free (reduced) from the power of *Thinking*.

The most intriguing riddle of the *Consciousness* lies precisely in the fact that the essential comprehension of the surrounding reality that it masters, which allows the individual to successfully feel himself in the “Life World” (LebensWelt), is not carried out in the metaphors of “copying” or “reflection” mechanically imagined by discursive *Thinking*, but exclusively in the specific “*belonging to Consciousness*”, “internal-structural” intentional objecthood. It is precisely for unraveling this fundamental mystery of *Consciousness*, that is, for releasing in its purest form the unreal content of *Consciousness* “as it is”, it is necessarily required the most conscientious accomplishment of a complete phenomenological reduction of “all individual and universal objecthood”, corresponding to

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Husserliana: Husserl E. Gesammelte Werke. Bd. V. Die Phanomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften / Hg. v. W. Biemel. Den Haag, 1953. S. 144.

²¹ Ibid.

all kinds of subjectivities covering the pure intentional subject of contemplation of unreal noematic essences of *Consciousness*.

E. Husserl, in an attempt to explain the key position of his method - the procedure of phenomenological reduction - took three main approaches or paths: Cartesian, ontological and psychological:

1. The Cartesian way. The founding provision of this approach is the reducing principle of Descartes' "methodological doubt", which serves here as a specific "censorship filter" for the radical delimitation of problematic (doubtful) and apodictic (reliable) sources of knowledge. Husserl literally follows Descartes when, on the way to the goal of discovering undoubted absolute truths, he categorically establishes the only means - a conscious renunciation (reduction) from "doubtful truths". In other words, Husserl explicitly admits that Descartes' method of doubt is the immediate precursor of phenomenological reduction.

Like Descartes, Husserl builds the foundation of his new "rigorous science" primarily by introducing the gnoseological-discursive thesis of the *obvious possibility of doubting everything, except for one thing: that I doubt at the moment*.

But, when Descartes understands by "doubt" some "way of thinking", Husserl expands the understanding of doubt to the "act of experiencing" of *Consciousness*. Accordingly, Descartes' maxim *cogito ergo sum* - "I Think, therefore I exist" is expanded by Husserl to "I undoubtedly exist only as my *Consciousness*", and the concept of "cogito" implies not just *Thinking*, but "experiencing thoughts" (*Consciousness*) and, of course, not only thoughts, but also all possible spheres of conscious human activity (experiencing perceptions of physical sense organs, imagination, speculation, desires, volitional efforts, emotions, etc.)²². We must pay tribute to Husserl's constructiveness in the implementation of the project of phenomenology as a science that claims the right to be "the first truly rigorous science": the reliability of the data of self-analysis of the acts of experiencing one's own *Consciousness* really satisfies the testability requirement that the science of the New Age imposes on the knowledge obtained. After all, any scientist is able to conduct an experiment of Descartes' methodical doubt or Husserl's phenomenological reduction and obtain a verifiable result of the certainty of his own *cogito*.

Within the generally accepted "consciousness", at least two "regions" can be distinguished: "pure *Consciousness*", the data of experiences of which cannot be doubted, and empirical "consciousness", designated by experimental psychology as "psyche" and studied by natural science methods. Obviously, the existence of the psyche must be doubted for the same reason that we are forced to doubt the existence of the body, with which the psyche is directly connected. According to Husserl, if we claim to be a "rigorous science", we are obliged to doubt the objective existence of the so-called psychophysical structure in general.

Consequently, the border of doubtful and undoubted knowledge does not pass between the body and the soul (psyche, Thinking), but between pure and empirical consciousness, and more precisely, between the intentional and empirical (psychophysical) subject. It is difficult to disagree, therefore, with Husserl that it is necessary to carry out a phenomenological reduction, "bracket", that

²² Husserl E. Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book one. M., 2009. p. 92.

is, it is necessary to question not only the physical body, but the entire psychophysical “irreducible system” as a whole.

2. Ontological path. The second path of phenomenological reduction was the so-called ontological path, which Husserl preferred in the early 1920s, faced with serious criticism and a total misunderstanding of the essence of the method of phenomenological reduction by most colleagues and followers.

The difficulties that arose during the Cartesian path are largely due to the fact that it “leads to the transcendental ego, as it were, in one leap ... This ego itself - due to the absence of any preliminary explication - appears to the gaze in an apparent meaningful void” (Husserl). The ontological path, in comparison with the Cartesian one, is made “in the opposite direction”. If the Cartesian path begins with an ontologically “empty ego cogito, a static essential type of pure subjectivity, where every eidos is indefinite in its horizon” (an obvious gnoseological topic), and therefore “a universal egology is required that specifically considers the ego and everything connected with the Self (Ichall), as the universe and interprets it in a universally scientific way”, then the ontological path starts from “given in the contemplation of the world (gegebene Welt)” (an explicit ontological topic), the universal ontology of which, according to Husserl’s plan, should guide us to a universal view of the world from the eidetic side: “the axioms of a universal ontology must become an essential consideration of a possible world.” At the same time, subjectivity is declared “world-constituting and transcendently absolute,” respectively, “every being acquires the status of a correlate of transcendental subjectivity, which embraces everything objective as a correlate of subjective constitutions” (Husserl). In other words, after the phenomenological reduction, any being is considered in an ontological way already transcendently, that is, being within the limits of the universal subjective genesis.

Here one can clearly see Husserl's fundamental deviation from the gnoseological-discursive topic of the Cartesian path (doubt about the need for priority cognition of any being) in favor of the existence of at least something “that must be acquired” expected by the “traditional philosophical community”, an a priori requirement which is a typical manifestation of the “discursive power” of the topic of the ontological microstructure.

It is in this imposition of the “existent” that the founding of the ontological-discursive science by the naive “for granted” dogmas of the *natural attitude*.

In his proposal of the ontological path, Husserl removes one of the main prohibitions of the phenomenological approach - the prohibition to take “given” for “for granted”. And this is precisely the essence of his discursive substitution of the gnoseological topic of Cartesian doubtfulness in something “for granted” with the ontological topic of a priori “givenness” of something.

The ontological path sins with semantic duality: first it leads from the world as reality to ontology, and then from the “facticity” of ontology through reduction to the phenomenological space of “pure” subjectivity.

3. The psychological path of reduction is a movement through phenomenological psychology, carried out already to please psychologists. The psychological subject becomes the “starting point” of the process of gradual “turning off” of the world, thus overcoming himself as the subject of *natural attitude*. In this procedure, we do not have a fundamental difference from the “phenomenological disconnection” that occurs in the Cartesian path, it’s just that the focus of the search for a “meeting”

with the intentional subject is predominantly shifted towards “working with thoughts”, more precisely with cogito, so that “ego cogito does not remained an empty word.

In terms of the discursive paradigm, the ontological-discursive *Thinking* of a psychological subject is oriented towards a consistent transformation into gnoseological-discursive *Thinking*, and then to a radical transition into a “region” of extralinguistic *Consciousness* transcendent to any discursive *Thinking*. As a result of this preliminary procedure, the psychological “I”, naively performing all kinds of psychological acts (ontologically-discursive *Thinking*), and the reflective “I”, standing above the first and having a “special nature of pure reflection” (gnoseologically-discursive *Thinking*) are separated from each other. Awareness of the specifics of this pure reflection in comparison with the reflection widely used in traditional psychology, based on the psychologism of the *natural attitude*, is the most important methodological point of reduction and the phenomenological method in principle.

However, here Husserl is not satisfied with the “pure psychological” result of the psychological epoche, which is only partly revealed, obtained at the eidetic level of reduction, carried out, as we found out, thanks to gnoseological-discursive thinking. He goes further and insists on the need for additional “processing” of this “inner character of the psychological soul” in order to identify “intentional implications”, which is possible only with the help of a special method of transcendental epoche, that is, the second stage of phenomenological reduction, bracketing even gnoseologically - discursive thinking. Returning to the phenomenological “seeds” of knowledge of the nature of consciousness, sown by Husserl in the second volume of his *Logical Investigations*, we can recognize here Husserl's key semiogenetic discovery of “the birth of meaning in a solitary life of a soul (einsames Seelenleben), where words do not yet serve as a sign.” In other words, we are talking about a unique “third” discourse (in contrast to the common two - oral and written), which the science of discursive analysis prefers to call “mental discourse”, although, in linguistic essence, here we are dealing with anti-discourse.

While staying true to the goal of creating phenomenology as a rigorous science, we must recognize that the transcendental-phenomenological reduction implies the “purity” of the transcendental subject from being conditioned by any sign system (including linguistic). The transcendental epoche of the phenomenological attitude is the realm of “pure meanings” of *Consciousness*, that is, meanings that have not yet been “defiled”, metaphorically speaking, by binding to any sign. The “defilement” of meaning during communicative contact with one sign or another is inevitable, because it limits the fullness of this meaning, diversifying it in endless conflicting interpretations (P. Ricoeur) imposed by the semiotic conditions of this or that communicative contract (discourse). Consequently, in the “solitary life of a soul” following Husserl, we enter the sphere of anti-discursive self-knowledge, in the sense that we are faced with a precedent of meaning genesis in circumstances of absolute freedom from the discursive power of any kind, including the power of gnoseological discourse freed from the dogmas of ontological clauses.

All three considered paths to phenomenological reduction, developed by Husserl throughout the entire period of his work on the formation of phenomenological science - *Cartesian, ontological and psychological* - have a common goal, and are also fundamentally similar in methodological procedures. In this sense, they are, as Husserl pointed out, “equally possible”, although each of them has corresponding advantages and disadvantages. At the same time, from the point of view of discursive analysis, we must recognize a significant difference in the discursive structures that funds these three paths, which, in our opinion, was the hidden cause of the problem of the “misunderstood

Husserl". The Cartesian and psychological paths are built overwhelmingly on discursive clauses of the gnoseological type, which ensure the stable growth of the discursive "tree" of the phenomenological attitude. In direct "opposition in meaning" with them, the ontological path, from the very discursive "root" of it, is given away to the ontological algorithms of traditional *Thinking*, which literally from the sphere of "subconsciousness" lead Husserl's thought away from the essence of the original idea of phenomenology, generating with necessity and even, more to say, forcedly many conflicting interpretations.

7 criteria for natural attitude

Based on the legacy of Husserl, a detailed description of the natural attitude can be reduced to the following 7 theses:

1. A certain "I", which everyone calls himself, reveals himself to be the center of this or that *environment (Umgebung)*, due to the specifics of which "I" means something different for everyone: a person different from others with a certain own name, special experiences of perception, memory, fantasies, desires. This "I" is also distinguished by special predispositions, innate inclinations, acquired skills, etc. This also includes statements, opinions, beliefs and assumptions based on finding oneself in the so-called experience that this "I" lives through. Thus, the "I" predicates [that is, first of all *Thinks*] that "I" am a person with such and such name, qualities, beliefs, etc. On the other hand, in this attitude, possession (*Haben*) is realized, which is something different each time, depending on what is possessed: pain is endured, a judgment is made, but fidelity and truthfulness are possessed as "personal" properties, etc. It turns out that even if the "I" reveals itself as possessing all these possible objects of manifestation in various ways, then, on the other hand, it does not find itself as something homogeneous to this possessed. For example, the "I" itself is not an experience, but an experiencing one, not an act, but a performing the act, not a characteristic feature, but having a characteristic feature in the form of a property, etc. It is important that, by analogy with the awareness of the spatial environment of the "I", in the same way, the position in relation to time is realized: the "I" reveals its "I"-experiences not only now, knowing itself as existing and possessing this and that, but also has memories in which it reveals itself as that the same one who "just" had certain experiences. Thus, the "I" itself is something identical in time and occupies a certain position in time.

2. The "I" finds itself as possessing an organic body, which, in turn, is not the "I", but a space-time "thing", one of many other things surrounding it, which are currently perceived and remembered in retentive memory. In this sense, the "I" has a limited *spatio-temporal environment (Raumzeitlichkeit)*. On the other hand, every "I" is sure that this immediate environment, perceived as an existing environment, is only a fragment of some *total environment (einer Gesamtumgebung)*, which is infinite in space (many things one after another) and time (*chains of existence, Daseinskette*, in the infinite past and infinite future). The "I" knows that things that are present (*da sind*), are in themselves, have always been in themselves (not only when perceived) and will always be *in themselves* (*an sich*). The same applies to material properties (rest, movement, dynamics or static of qualities, etc.). The described attitude implies that the "I" imagines everything discovered with certainty: the "I" knows that in each individual case it can be wrong, while the universal exists or can become obvious to it. "I" not only experiences, perceives, etc., it also has some kind of knowledge (clear or intricate), therefore it *Thinks*, predicates, and if it is a scientist, it does science. At the same time, the "I" knows itself as sometimes judging correctly, sometimes as deluded, confused. However,

at the same time, it is always sure that, despite this, this world of being exists, and it itself is in the midst of this world. "Immersion" in mastering the "world-possession" in *natural attitude* increases infinitely, creating an almost insurmountable obstacle to returning "to oneself", that is, to contemplating the immanent sphere of one's own *Consciousness* "I". Husserl, therefore, understands by "itself" the intentional subject (*pure Consciousness*). Accordingly, to return "to oneself", according to Husserl, means to free the intentional *subject of Consciousness* from "immersion" in "naive possession" of everything that is transcendent to the sphere of one's own *Consciousness* "I", that is, the total substantiality of the psychophysical and transcendental-linguistic world (total *Thinking*).

3. The thing that every "I" reveals as "its own body" stands out from all other things precisely as its *own body (Eigenleib)*. This thing is perceived in a special way and is a *constant central point* of the comprehended material environment. Everything that is not a body seems to be related to the body, which, with the conviction of evidence, is placed at the center of spatial orientation. "I" perceives something "to the right" or "to the left", "in front", "behind". Similarly, with the orientation in time: "like "now", "before", "after"". It is very important that in this case also the "I"-experience, in general, everything specific in one's "I", everyone correlates with the body. Husserl calls this effect of the *natural attitude the localization* of the "I" in the body, which happens either on the basis of direct psychological "experience", some kind of contemplation, or on the basis of indirect knowledge, consistent with experience or analogies with other experiences [that is, both in the first and in the second case, on the basis of the same *Thinking*].

4. Every "I" finds in its environment things that are perceived as bodies, but clearly opposed to the "own" body - these are *other persons' bodies*. A certain "I" also belongs to alien bodies, but this other "I" is *alien*. Alien bodies are "carriers" of alien "I"-subjects (*Ichsubjekten*). Each "I" does not "see" other "I" in the same way as it discovers itself in experience. It posits them in the mode of "empathy": "the perception of the alien and the experience of the alien (*Fremdwahrnehmung und Fremderfahrung*)". This means that it also "discovers" other people's experiences, other people's properties of character, but they are not "possessed" in the same sense as the experiences of one's own "I". This alien "I" is equally the "soul" of its body, also has its own actual consciousness, innate properties, it also reveals its material environment, and "sees" its own body as a special thing, etc. According to Husserl, such an alien "I" is "in the sense of perception of alien, in general the same", which creates the possibility of an intersubjective common field of existence of different "I". Therefore, he introduces here one of the central concepts of phenomenology - *intersubjectivity*, which implies the *conjugation* of the environment of my "I" with the environment that reveals an alien "I" that opposes us, *as if* to the extent of perception, but is generally *the same as our environment*. The body that we perceive in our environment as the body of another's "I" is the same one that in his environment is perceived by him as his own body. What applies to the actual environments of the various selves, which thus mutually discover each other and mutually fit into their environments, also applies to the whole world. *The world, according to Husserl, is intersubjective*: each "I" grasps itself as a relative center of orientation ("zero point of the coordinate system") of the same space-time world, which in its indefinite infinity is the total environment of any "I". For any "I" other "I" are primarily given *not as centers, but as points of the environment (Umgebungspunkte)*, to the extent of their corporeality, they occupy different spatial and temporal positions in the same universal space (Allraum) or, respectively, in the same world time.

It is even difficult to imagine how far the "mixed" personal "I" moves away from itself, that is, from its own immanent world of the intentional subject of *Consciousness*, when it takes the next step into "natural" life, that is, it enters into communication with another "I". After all, penetrating

through acts of “empathy” into someone else’s experience of the *Other* (Alter Ego), the “I” immediately at least doubles its already extremely “restless”, “fluid horizontality”, now due to all sorts of “significances” of the experience of the *Other* (in accordance with specific acts of empathy). The internal “chaosmos” of the “consciousness” immersed in the *natural attitude* is further complicated by the limitation of the freedom of inner will after the implementation of intersubjective empathy of the intentional worlds of many other personalities. If at the first stage of empathy in the Alter Ego (Husserl called it *the primordial sphere*), the “I” still retains a sense of legitimate, guaranteed dominance in primordial acts located inside its sphere of “possession”, then already when entering the intersubjective world through analogous appresentation (empathy with the intentional world of another by analogy) “I” is forced to empathize with a lot of other people’s “significances”, which, by definition of their alienation, are no longer amenable to its volitional activation, because they are located outside the “I-possession”. Here the “mixing” of the personal “I” is strengthened by the “intrigue” of penetration into the acts of someone else’s “sphere of possession”, outside of one’s own possession, which promises to enrich one’s immanent world by touching the “mystery” of the inner life of another person. As a result, a strong incentive is awakened for an even deeper involvement of the “I” in the exciting sphere of “natural” life, filled with now intersubjective “chaosmos” with many personalities and so in infinitum.

5. If we continue the description of the position of the “I” in relation to other “I” of the general intersubjective world in *natural attitude*, Husserl notes the idea of normality (Normalitat) dominating over every “I” with the next interesting observation. Despite the fact that any “I” “naively” reveals itself as the center of the world, so to speak, the zero point of the coordinate system, at the same time it grasps this center as something relative. For example, each time saying “here”, “I” at the same time well knows that this “here” in a different spatial situation turns out to be a different “here”. In other words, the “I” in *natural attitude* distinguishes the fact of the existence of objective space as a collection of objective places from the fact of the existence of some spatial phenomenon as a way of this space appearing to us as “here and there”, “ahead and behind”, etc. Similarly, this distinction is also made with respect to time. Now, if we apply the same reasoning to things, it is obvious that despite the fact that everyone has the same world of things around him, at the same time the same thing appears to everyone in accordance with his position in space, which, usually different for everyone. For example, my “in front” of a thing for another may turn out to be “behind” the same thing, etc. In this case, each thing can change its current spatial position to any other, and different things cannot occupy the same spatial position, although they may change these positions with each other (in continuous motion). This means that this also applies to the body: if one body changes its objective spatial position with another body, then the “I” corresponding to these bodies continuously change the phenomena of surrounding things belonging to them (comprehended in experience), moreover, in such a way that these phenomena, after the exchange of bodily positions in the ideal case are exchanged. This is where the idea of *normality*, which is characteristic of *natural attitude*, “works” [which can be born only in the logical mechanical constructor of *Thinking*, alienated from the living experiences of *Consciousness*]. In accordance with the idea of *normality*, each of two “normal” individuals, exchanging places (actually or in imagination), finds in his consciousness exactly the same phenomena that were previously realized in the consciousness of the other. For example, if I and the other have “normal” eyes, then we see the same thing, if the same unchanged things are presented to us from the same objective spatial position that can be occupied by us in turn. In other words, each “I” is assumed to have an approximate correspondence between its own phenomena and those of other people, and the deviations encountered are considered as “abnormal”, called illness, etc., are considered exceptions and are accepted at best as a possibility. It is important that in all these matters mutual understanding reigns between the various “I”. Despite the fact that everyone makes

his own experiments in relation to things, at the same time, everyone makes judgments based on these experiences, which he exchanges with other people, bringing them to *mutual understanding* (*Wechselseverstandigung*). If nothing prompts the “I” to reflect on phenomena, if in direct experiential comprehension this “I” is turned to the object, then it judges not about the phenomenon, but about things. If the “I” describes a thing, then this thing is always the same for it, despite the fact that when moving in space with its head, eyes, and whole body, it receives more and more new phenomena of this thing (“from afar”, “near”, “front”, “rear”).

6. Next, Husserl draws attention to the important characteristic of the *natural attitude* as the *attitude of experience* (*Erfahrung*). What was described above as “discovering” something around the “I”, which precedes inferential thinking, is nothing else than exactly what is called “experientially comprehend” (*erfahren*). Animal and pre-scientific man, being in *natural attitude*, have only the fact that they experience themselves, all things, bodies and other people's “I”. Moreover, the statements describing the givenness of the attitude of experience claim the *absolute obviousness* of a “taken for granted” (*selbstverständlichen*) truth. In *natural attitude*, with undoubted truth, I express and see that I reveal myself as possessing this and that, as the center of some environment. With the same obviousness, I am sure that there and there I will certainly find such and such, and that “I exist” and that the world exists, etc. In other words, experience has its validity (*ihr Recht*), or rather, every act of judgment (*ein Urteilen*) in the *natural attitude* “on the basis of experience” has its self-evident legitimacy. It is precisely because of this power of the phenomenon of the evidence of experience that man engages in the science of experience. This science, in accordance with Husserl's firm conviction, is the science of *natural attitude*, which includes, first of all, physical natural science, but also empirical psychology. Just as natural science describes and explains the physical world with the help of the law of causality, so psychology, in the same spirit of the law of causality, explains and describes human persons with their changing states and acts and with their changing predispositions (properties of character, etc.). At the same time, psychology ignores phenomena in which individuals appear to themselves and others. In other words, there is no difference between the thing and the appearance of the thing. The thing is physical, not mental. But since the experience [of *Thinking*] knows only one world, since souls are precisely the souls of bodies, then psychology, based on the phenomenon of absolute evidence of experience, without the slightest doubt, builds the psychic “I” into the framework of objective time, that time, which also belongs to the spatial world, measured by means of clocks and other chronometers. This “I” is spatio-temporally attached to the body, on the functioning of which mental states and acts depend. So, the psychology of the *natural attitude* reduces the psychic “I” to some thing that has its place and duration of existence among other things of the spatio-temporal world [*Thinking*, thus, receives “naive” (that is, illegitimate) powers to “cognize” everything that exists, which with enthusiasm interprets as it pleases].

7. Finally, the most important aspect of the *natural attitude* described by Husserl, which is especially relevant in the search for the essence of true “rigorous science”, concerns the difference between at least two levels of “naive” knowledge: in the empirical (properly natural) attitude and in the so-called a priori attitude. Husserl draws attention to the undoubted fact that the natural worldview (*Weltauffassung*), which encompasses the empirically accessible being of nature, does not extend to objects that do not have a present being, such as figures of pure geometry or arithmetic numbers. Geometrical figures as possible forms (*Gestaltungen*) of pure space, as well as pure (puren) numbers of the arithmetic number series, are not things and in no sense are facts of nature. It turns out that along with nature, the world of actual spatio-temporal existence (the “empirical” world), there are also ideal worlds, worlds of ideas that are non-spatial, non-temporal, one might say, unreal from the point of view of actual empirical being. At the same time, these “unreal” ideas obviously

exist, just as there are numbers in a numerical series. The subjects of meaningful scientific statements based on ideal objects are in no way “worse” than the things of nature. In accordance with this, Husserl speaks of the need to distinguish between the natural or empirical attitude, on the one hand, and the non-empirical or *a priori* attitude²³, on the other.

Indeed, it is one thing to perceive, for example, a single sound of the “do” quality as the sound of a violin that has just sounded, and it is somewhat different to form, in a changed attitude, on the basis of this single sound phenomenon, the idea of the “do” quality, which will be one such in a number of ideal and unique sound characteristics. Another example is the difference between a digit and a number. The number, say 4, is perception in an empirical attitude (seeing several lines in a certain configuration), while the number 4 is an appeal in the act of contemplation of the same lines to another attitude of perception, namely, to the unique idea of the number 4, which “materializes” in this single copy in the form of the number 4.

However, Husserl states the “naivety” of cognition also in the *a priori* attitude of *Thinking*, pointing out the lack of *a priori purity* (die Reinheit des Apriori) of the ideal sciences, primarily mathematical ones. This means that the ideal sciences are not free from the existence of their *a priori* categories. Not to mention natural scientists, even mathematicians, according to Husserl, “like to put empirical meaning into mathematical propositions”, and thereby fall into the delusion that mathematics belongs to the realm of nature.

Husserl proposes a maximum program, that is, the most effective method of grasping pure essences, implying a cardinal overcoming of even the *a priori* level of a “naive” attitude to an attitude that has no analogues in European philosophy before Husserl, namely, an *essential attitude*, or an attitude of *intuitive ideation* (intuitive Ideation) [*Consciousness*]. He will call this *attitude phenomenological* and contrast it in his method with the *natural attitude*, which *implies both levels of Thinking: empirical and a priori*. The phenomenological horizon of contemplation, which opens up in a certain phenomenological chastity (epoche), acquired as a result of complete phenomenological reduction, does not even need to eliminate the “impurities” of the existence of *a priori* ideas, because from the very beginning it does not even deal with the ideas of the “essential objecthood” of *Thinking*, but directly with the “pure generalities” of *Consciousness*. Indeed, in a really conscious space there is no idea of space, the idea of a triangle, etc. Similarly, in a really conscious time there is no idea of time, real time in itself is a non-temporal being. Thus, according to Husserl's idea, the phenomenological reduction leads to a new sphere of direct knowledge of the pure essences of the world, free from existing being, that is, to apodictic truth. This transition from the impure *a priori* of limited mathematics to the rigorous *a priori* of pure mathematics is of great philosophical significance for Husserl and is the step without which the foundation of genuine philosophy and truly “rigorous science” is inconceivable.

Husserl finally puts forward the “*general thesis of the natural attitude*: the unchanging belief in the real existence of spatio-temporal reality, which is opposed to my “I”. This “reality” is acquired by me as “*being here and is also accepted by me as being - as such as it gives itself to me*”²⁴. For example, in *natural attitude*, the perceived tree necessarily always *exists in reality*. After all, the experience of

²³ Husserl E. The main problems of phenomenology // Razeev D. N. In the nets of phenomenology. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 240.

²⁴ Husserl E. Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book. Moscow, 2009, p. 95.

Consciousness (creating a sense of reality), due to the attitudinal identification with *Thinking*, “merges” with the corresponding mental perception of the tree and habitual judgments about it. Even if I doubt the accuracy of my perception of this tree, or even suppose that the tree may be different from what I imagine, in any case the general thesis of the *natural attitude* does not change one iota, namely: the tree is, in one way or another, real being. Similarly, with the values that determine my perception and behavior: in *natural attitude*, by power of the identification of *Consciousness* and *Thinking*, I am convinced of the *reality* of precisely these values. Therefore, consciously or subconsciously, in my life I rely only on these values and finally acquire “knowledge” in their effectiveness. Accordingly, *the goal of the sciences based on natural attitude* is to cognize this real spatio-temporal reality, constructed by *Thinking*, as fully as possible, more reliably, in all respects more perfect than “naive experimental knowledge” does.

The first research procedure of a phenomenologist is to find oneself in *natural attitude*, which is characteristic of all people in everyday life, but which turns out to be “naive” in relation to the cognition of reliable (apodictic) truths. Regarding scientific cognition, the *natural attitude* is defined by Husserl as a “dogmatic” (or “objective”) prejudice of the European (Galilean) model of science, which gives rise to a “naive” objectification of subjective perception, as in the case of physicalist objectivism (J. Locke type). Husserl himself describes the consciousness of the *natural attitude* in great detail, understanding the complexity of its mental fixation due to the “constant immersion” of a person in everyday existence, from birth “mixed up” with the *natural attitude* (a similar effect of the psychological collapse of a fish, which is not given to understand what people call water). Husserl has to perform, in fact, a psychologically “impossible” job, comparable, in essence, to the virtuosity of a literary character, pulling himself out of a swamp by the hair.

Husserl himself made no secret of the fact that in order to change the attitude of cognition, “considerable efforts would be required to see all this in the presently prevailing habits of *thinking*”²⁵ (which can also be taken literally in relation to the modern context of phenomenological discourse). However, as Husserl rightly remarks, “after all, no less is required” for the high goal set to penetrate into the world of pure phenomena of *Consciousness*.

“The main task is to find ways on which it will be possible, so to speak, fragmentarily, to overcome the too great difficulties of penetrating into this new world. We will proceed from a natural position, from the world as it opposes us, from consciousness as it presents itself to us in psychological experience... Then we will begin to put together the method of “phenomenological reduction”, in accordance with which we will be able to eliminate the limitations of cognition that are inseparable from any natural method of investigation, and to be distracted from its inherent one-sided orientation of the gaze - until we finally acquire the free horizon of “transcendentally” purified phenomena, and thus the field of phenomenology in our specific sense”²⁶.

Phenomenological work, as conceived by the founder of phenomenological science, *first* of all begins with the justification of its essential-intuitive nature: “pure, or transcendental, phenomenology will receive its justification not as a science of facts, but as a science of essences (as an “eidetic” science), which intends to state exclusively “cognitions of the essence” – not “facts” at

²⁵ Ibid. p.19.

²⁶ Ibid. p.20.

all”²⁷. Thus, from the very beginning, phenomenology makes a delimitation from the sphere of “world”, “natural” experience.

Secondly, a path is drawn from the natural “naive” world to the “pure” *Consciousness* as a special (constructed) field of phenomenology. Here the specifics of phenomenological analysis and its practical implementation are substantiated through the clarification of the method of phenomenological reduction, which Husserl divides into two levels. The first level will separate the mentioned “essences” (eidos) from “facts” (eidetic reduction): “the reduction of a psychological phenomenon to a pure “essence”, or in judgmental *Thinking*, the reduction of an actual (“empirical”) universality to an “essential” universality”²⁸. The second level is the “specifically transcendental” reduction. It manifests psychological phenomena already as *unreal*. “They purify psychological phenomena of what gives them reality, and thereby inclusion in the real “world””²⁹. As a result of the second transcendental-phenomenological reduction, Husserl hoped to obtain “an essential teaching not about real phenomena, but an essential teaching about transcendently reduced phenomena”³⁰. In the next (*third*) stage, Husserl, on the new phenomenological field of research obtained, is doing work on structuring the acts of *Consciousness* in accordance with noetic-noematic categories. Thus, phenomenological transcendentalism wins the status of a generalizing philosophical view that adequately corresponds to the initial provisions of the doctrine and leads to specific practical operations of scientific analysis.

Finally, as a result (the *fourth* and final stage), according to Husserl's plan, a transition is made to the general philosophical problems of the reason, which is solved in a special mode of the *phenomenological attitude* (that is, the reason immanent to pure *Consciousness* as an element of its internal structure). The phenomenology of the reason must provide a way to obtain discursive knowledge that corresponds to scientific rigor and seamlessly integrates into the general composition of already existing knowledge about the human reason.

Discursive-linguistic “trap” of cognition

First of all, let us recall what the Western philosophical tradition means by the now widespread concept of “discourse” and what is the scope of its “power” (Foucault) or, more specifically, what is its methodological status in relation to true phenomenological science.

The concept of discourse (French *discours* - speech) comes from the Latin word *discursus* - “reasoning”, “argument”, “conversation”, “talk”. In turn, the noun *discursus* comes from the verb *discere* - “wander”, “run back and forth”, “movement”, “circle”.

The term “discourse” initially receives scientific and philosophical sounding, as could be seen in the methodology of Descartes and in non-classical philosophy, to a greater extent, in the works of Paul-Michel Foucault (1926-1984). The French historian and philosopher, through the “archeology”

²⁷ Ibid. p.21.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

of knowledge, studied a priori norms and rules that govern scientific and cognitive systems, including the system of philosophical knowledge. Foucault believed that knowledge is historically determined by one or another social form of its organization and distribution, transmission (within the network of "episteme"³¹). Moreover, the main means of discursive genesis is the most radical - the direct power of social institutions, from which comes the control of the definitions of certain concepts, categories, and, in the end, the understanding of "truth" itself. In other words, "discourse" as a complex set of linguistic practices involved in the formation of ideas about the object that they imply is, according to Foucault, an authority that streamlines all the structures and forms of the socio-cultural activity of society. As for research activity, "discourse", respectively, is a tool of cognition, with absolute power setting the relative a priori principles (paradigms) of cognition, determined by the context of time and the circumstances of a particular historical and cultural "episteme". Consequently, scientific knowledge, including the "episteme" of philosophy (in the diachronic section of this concept), does not arise from the essence of things, and therefore does not reflect the truth inherent in them. Here Foucault directly echoes the criticism of European science by Edmund Husserl, undertaken in the final work "The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", where the founder of phenomenology states the "diagnosis" of the crisis as a substitution of true sciences about essences for sciences about facts. Facts, alas, by their nature do not reflect the essence of things, but, on the contrary, hide them. On the difference between fact and essence, Husserl builds his new science of phenomenology, which, unlike all the previous ones, according to the German philosopher, can only be called a truly exact science. After all, the logic of all traditional (experimental) sciences is based on facts that are in no way identical to the essences of things: "... truths about pure essences do not contain even slightest assertions about facts, and, therefore, it is impossible to extract even the most insignificant relating to facts truth from them alone"³².

Bearing in mind the presented extralinguistic nature of discourse as "an essential component of socio-cultural interaction" (T. van Dijk) in fundamental science, and also considering the existence of the most common varieties of discourse (oral and written), one should pay attention to the existence of mental discourse. The peculiarity of the communication that arises in this case is that the speaker and the addressee act in one person. Mental discourse, due to the lack of easily observable external manifestations, has been studied very little (for example, L. S. Vygotsky in the study of "inner speech"). It is especially important for us to single out this third type of discourse, since it was Husserl who first drew attention to the fact that in this form of seemingly "discursive practice", communication (meaning exchange) is carried out before any sign formation (including language). Husserl singles out this special discovery of the unique ability of human consciousness as a *key fact for substantiating his phenomenological method - the fact of the birth of meanings as acts of*

³¹ The episteme is like a kind of grid that permeates the real world. Episteme (Greek word επιστήμη - knowledge) is the basic category of Michel Foucault's "archeology of knowledge", developed in the work "Words and Things. Archeology of the Humanities" (1966). Foucault considers European culture as a succession of three epistemes: Renaissance, Classics, Modernity. Episteme is a cultural and cognitive a priori structure that forms specific forms of knowledge of a particular historical era. At the same time, the foundations of the epistemic structure are "hidden", but they determine the specifics of the inclusion of "things" in "words". Foucault rethinks the concept of the episteme in *The Archeology of Knowledge* (1969): here the episteme is not just a cultural a priori, formatting the "picture of the world", but already a kind of dynamic network of connections of diverse discursive practices.

³² Husserl E. *Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy*. Book. 1. M., 2009, p. 37.

experience in parallel with words “in a solitary life of a soul, where words do not serve as a sign”³³. In other words, meanings are born in the *Consciousness*, regardless of the signs by which they are already fixed at the “exit” to external communication, and therefore, regardless of any *Thought Form*, not to mention any linguistic construction. It is here that the phenomenological anti-discourse originates, giving the prospect of getting out from under the “power of discourse” of the *natural attitude*.

Therefore, it is immediately necessary to note that although Husserl would certainly agree with the discursive, historical-epistemic “engagement” of European science, he would nevertheless deny the absoluteness of the discursive “power” on which Foucault insisted. Here we come to the key point of the attempted discursive reflection on phenomenology. Recall that our task is to solve the problem of the discursive irrelevance of Husserl's phenomenological description. Our version of the cause of the problem is the superposition of discursive lines that are contradictory in their structure, which, as we will show in detail below, were used by Husserl in his texts and which we conventionally designated as “ontological” and “gnoseological” discourses. In this sense, in a comparative context with Foucault's discursive theory of cognition, it should be clearly understood that Husserl's entire phenomenological design is aimed precisely at overcoming the “power of discourse” over scientific cognition, which is implied in Husserl's famous call “back to things!” (that is, to the essence of things). In other words, phenomenological reduction implies the achievement of a kind of *anti-discourse* (a state of pure *Consciousness*), designed to overcome the historical discursive-epistemic conditioning of the *Thinking* of European science and philosophy. Foucault's “power of discourse” is valid only within the boundaries of that cognitive attitude, which Husserl called the naive *natural attitude*. Accordingly, the phenomenological reduction explicates the anti-discourse as a tool for getting out from under the “power” of any discourse into the free cognitive sphere of pure entities, that is, the sphere of the *phenomenological attitude*. Thus, our task on the way of overcoming the discursive problem of phenomenology is to understand the essence of Husserl's *anti-discourse* as a “phenomenological residue” of some unique procedure applied by the founder of phenomenology in relation to *ontological* and *gnoseological* discourses (that is, *ontological* and *gnoseological* types of *Thinking*).

Actually, the procedure of phenomenological reduction produces a “switching off” of the acts of interpretation of meanings for the simple reason that they are “fixed” within the boundaries of the plane of “language games”: in the phenomenological attitude, meanings are not interpreted, but obviously “ripen” in the form of specific *eidos* that implicitly preserve the potential to self-description. Here, doubt is natural: it is still possible to somehow admit the reality of embedding ready-made meanings in specific signs, bypassing the acts of interpretation, which is implemented by the subject of the intentional language of the *Consciousness*, but what about the reverse process of understanding this language by the *Other Consciousness*? In other words, how is it possible in practice that the addressee of a phenomenological description could extract from the sign an adequate meaning, known only to its author, the “owner” of *pure Consciousness* within his “monad”, which, as is known, and as Husserl himself confirmed, is “windowless”, that is, fundamentally inaccessible to the *Other Consciousness*? An exhaustive answer is given by Husserl himself, developing the idea of intersubjective communication based on acts of “analogizing appresentation” (empathy with the intentional world of another by analogy)³⁴: a special language of phenomenological description

³³ Husserl E. *Logical research*. Vol. II. Study I, § 8 / Per. V. I. Molchanova. Moscow, 2001, p. 46.

³⁴ Husserl E. *Cartesian Meditations* / Transl. V. I. Molchanova. Moscow, 2010, pp. 140-141.

translates meaning only within the communication of subjects who are both in a phenomenological attitude, that is “region” of phenomenological intersubjectivity.

On the contrary, in *natural attitude*, the subject of cognition is radically alien to the intentional-semantic world, therefore, by the cognitive position itself, he is alienated from the ability to adequately perceive the transcendental-phenomenological semantic content of the phenomenological description, although, at the same time, he continues to interpret it in accordance with its own “subjective history of experience” of *Thinking*, generating thus countless equivocations and false interpretations. The banal truth is that a person inadequate to himself (which is the subject of the *natural attitude* in relation to his true intentional essence) is not qualified to adequately enter into a relationship with the *Other*: his attempts to communicate and understand the *Other* only increase his own *inauthenticity* and, accordingly, increase the degree of “falseness” of the created relationships and so-called “mutual understanding”. Just as a bank teller, not being the true owner of banknotes, can only naively “create the impression” of a rich person who allegedly freely disposes of money through his own “reason”, so the subject of cognition, who has not reached the true private life of his semantic world, is only capable to naively create illusions of “mutual understanding” and “agreement” with *Others*.

Here one should firmly understand the advantage of the phenomenological attitude of Husserl's pure *Consciousness* - outside of it, reliable knowledge, free from any doubts, is in principle unattainable. Husserl is not satisfied only with the “pure psychological” result of the psychological *epoche* (corresponding to the linguistic reduction of Frege and subsequent analysts), obtained at the eidetic level of reduction, carried out, as we found out, thanks to gnoseological-discursive *Thinking*. He insists on the need for additional “processing” of this inner character of the “psychological soul” in order to identify the “intentional implications” of pure *Consciousness*, which is possible only with the help of a special method of transcendental *epoche*, that is, the second stage of phenomenological reduction, bracketing even gnoseologically discursive *Thinking*. In the phenomenological attitude, the objective meaning of the thing is directly comprehended (grasped, “ripened”) by the intentional subject of *Consciousness*, and it is this “moment of meeting with the truth” that establishes the apodictic obviousness of the resulting “phenomenological residue”, which gives phenomenology the legal right to the status of “rigorous science”. Thus, Husserl's *meaning* is always “outside” / “between” any symbolic configurations of *Thinking*. It is similar to the nuances of the experiences of human relations, which are always “outside” / “between” the communicative text, always, as it were, “between the lines” (as it is known, having an irrational character that is not amenable to subjective-logical modeling of *Thinking*, although they are subordinate to the objective logic of acts of experiences of *Consciousness*).

Husserl was the first to understand that the source of pure meanings cannot be found in expressions subordinate to the communicative function: in communication we tell each other what we *mean* (meinen) about our own experience of this or that psychological act (in the sense of Brentano), but another, as a rule, *implies* a different (his own) meaning about our statement. Therefore, Husserl, in search of a “life” of pure meanings, leaves the sphere of the communicative (linguistic) part of “consciousness” (that is, *Thinking*) and singles out a separate sphere of “solitary life of a soul”, referring to the part of consciousness that exists outside of communicative relations - our pure *Consciousness*. According to the deep and fundamentally defining conviction of the founder of phenomenology, expressions (including linguistic expressions) cannot be reduced to a communicative function, or the function of a “warning sign”. Of course, they perform the function of reporting something or pointing to something, but their main role is to give meaning not to the

listener (perceiver), but to the speaker (reporter). It is well known that long before Husserl, many philosophers pointed to *dialogicity* as a key characteristic of human *Consciousness*: even when we pronounce a monologue or silently “think” about something, in fact, there is some communication of *Consciousness* with itself. Most importantly, this “lonely” communication takes place through *something* that goes beyond the signaling function of any expression. To simplify the search for this *something - meaning without a sign (word)*, Husserl proposes to free from (reduce) the communicative context of the functioning of “consciousness”, drawing attention to our obvious ability to “get used” to the understanding of this or that expression, regardless of whether it is addressed to whom—either or not. On the other hand, is it reasonable to assert that even when a person in solitude says something to himself, then in this case the words also serve him as signs, that is, signs of his own mental experiences?³⁵ Husserl unequivocally rejects such an opinion: words serve as signs for notifying our experiences exclusively in communication with the *Other*, but when a person says something to himself, words *are no longer* signs. In a “solitary life of a soul”, experiences are endowed with an undoubted meaning, and words are recognized and acquire a “semantic form” (noema) *directly*, that is, without referring us to “something else”. Husserl rightly concludes that in “loneliness” for understanding the meaning of the internal dialogue, the word itself is not essential at all, because “the word appears to us as indifferent in itself” - the meaning reveals itself. Moreover, since the word becomes indifferent to us, we have the opportunity to direct our attention exclusively to the meaning and thus deepen our “pure thinking” (as an intentional mode of pure *Consciousness*), which is no longer connected with “inner speech”. It was this process of improving meaning without words that Husserl considered as the source of the deployment of “new thinking”, immanent to *Consciousness*, fundamentally indifferent to any sign systems.

The founder of phenomenology, in his own way, shares the deep intuition of the secret of the inner life of the “lonely soul” in the following words: “Each soul, reduced to its purely internal, has its own-for-itself and in-itself being, has its own original life. And yet it is peculiar to it in its own original way to have this or that consciousness of the world - *by means of the fact that it has the experience of empathy, the experienced consciousness of others as having the world, and having the same world.*”³⁶ This *empathy*, in our opinion, in fact, is nothing more than a cumulative flow of mutual intersubjective acts of embedding *common meanings* in certain sign structures generated in intentional *adjustments* of intersubjective communication. Once again, let us pay attention to the most important a priori discovered by the intentional reason: when we talk about the birth of meaning in a “lonely soul”, we mean the discovery of a *common meaning for all*. The extra-linguistic meanings of the “lonely soul” are fundamentally invariant, that is, “one for all.” Just as, for example, doubt is always experienced in the *same way*, regardless of the variety of “reasons” for doubt, in the same way the act of experiencing any thing is the *same* in the intentional “I” of the *Consciousness* of each subject, regardless of the fact of the difference in the perceptions of this thing by his *Thinking*, that is, the psychophysical, linguistic or transcendental (according to Kant) “I”. It would be strange to dispute the fact that Heraclitus, for example, experienced his belief in the exclusive reality of Movement, just as Parmenides experienced the completely opposite belief in the exclusive reality of the Still Being. As you know, Heraclitus and Parmenides were irreconcilable in defending their polar beliefs, however, in the context of phenomenology, the reasons for this irreconcilability are in the *same* content of experiencing sincere belief in these phenomena of belief, *different in theoretical fact, but identical in intentional essence*. So, Heraclitus and Parmenides differ fundamentally in their philosophical beliefs, but as subjects of phenomenological analysis they are identical in the nature of

³⁵ Husserl E. Logical research. Vol. II. Study I, § 8 / Per. V. I. Molchanova. Moscow, 2001, pp. 45–47.

³⁶ Husserl E. Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 336.

intentional (in this case, noetic) acts of experiencing certain beliefs, and in this every philosopher *is able* to understand his opponent, which, in fact, the scientific research's ethics of mutual respect of different thinkers is based on. Similarly, the objecthood of the intentional reason: the apodictic meanings explicated by the intentional language, are also invariant and identical in the content of the intentional fulfillment for all subjects of the *phenomenological attitude*. Therefore, the correlation of these meanings in acts of intersubjective communication is the basis for stabilizing the inner solitary life of a soul, the foundation for the stability of the truths of the region of apodictic knowledge.

In this vein, the example given by Husserl with a chess game is indicative: "Chess pieces are involved in the game not as things made of ivory, wood, etc., decorated and painted in such and such a way. What constitutes them phenomenally and physically is completely indifferent and can change at will. They become chess pieces, that is, pieces of the game we observe, rather due to the rules of the game, which give them a fixed value in the game."³⁷ One can continue the analogy on the subject of a hypothetical "scientific-philosophical study" of the essence of a chess game. In the case of choosing the *natural attitude* in the cognition of the essence of chess pieces, when "I acquire "reality" as being here and accept it as being as it is, as it gives itself to me", we "naively", that is, unaware of unknown to us rules of the chess game, will try, if we follow the Frege triangle, to do the following three steps:

- 1) We will give a proper name to this or that chess piece (for example, "knight").
- 2) We will determine the meaning (referent) of the name, for example, "a wooden figurine resembling a horse's head."
- 3) We will formulate the "objective meaning" in the mode of "given mode" (Darstellungsweise) (in our example, "a piece moving on a chessboard").

However, neither from the first name, nor from the second meaning, nor from the third meaning, is the reliable knowledge that the objective essence of the object of our analysis lies in the purpose of moving on the chessboard with the letter "L" directly and obviously explicated. For the true objective meaning of a chess piece does not come from its being given to our sense organs or even Kant's transcendental structures of understanding and reason (as is a priori implied by *Thinking* in *natural attitude*). In this illustration, obviously, the "objective meaning" of a chess piece is generated by intentional acts, immanent to the *Consciousness* of the players, which, by virtue of mutual agreement, gave a specific game meaning ("loan" - "Verleihen") to the intentional act, which constituted, in this case, the noema of "knight piece", which is completely indifferent to any linguistic interpretation.

In accordance with the basic conceptual position of Husserl, the phenomenological semiotics of the descriptive "language" of meanings begins its pedigree from the pre-social-communicative sphere of individual *Consciousness*, which, as noted above, the founder of phenomenology finds the metaphorical name of "solitary life of a soul "(*einsames Seelenleben*)³⁸.

Being a mathematician, Husserl drew attention to the well-known semantic work of *Consciousness* in the "solitary life of a soul" using the example of solving a mathematical problem: in this intellectual process, signs are not essential for us, we are focused on the meanings that unfold independently to the function of a sign as an indication.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

From the level of pure *Consciousness*, the intentional reason easily abandons the position of false individual dominance in favor of dependence on the reason of the *Other*, accepting “a priori that self-consciousness and consciousness of the alien are inseparable”³⁹. For an accomplished true phenomenologist, “it is impossible to think that I would be a man in the world without being one man among many [ein Mensch]”⁴⁰. The universality of the phenomenological reason must not be “misunderstood” as the result of a “separately carried out reduction”⁴¹. Although the individual “I” in its self-consciousness finds itself “affected” by separate things, the reduction of which produces separate acts, feelings, etc., at the same time, the awareness of individual things of the world with the accompanying “disturbances” is carried out against the background of constant awareness of the world itself, which is also subject to universal reduction as “the horizon of the whole world”. Of course, the world as a “horizon” is not recognized as a thing that has the same effect on my “I” as separate things, but I am always aware of my participation in “the whole world”. Every thing cognized in the experience of everyday life, including the experience of reflection of ourselves, is recognized as a “thing in the world” in one or another field of perception, which, in turn, is measured, regardless of whether we are aware of this or not, as a segment of the world as a whole. It is impossible, for example, to imagine a psychologist who studies the psychological existence of individual people in isolation from his own “consciousness” of the world of *Others*, himself in this world, the horizon of the world as a whole, etc. Therefore, when such a psychologist sets as a goal to become a phenomenologist, he is obliged to subject this world of his own and his independent idea of himself in this world to universal reduction, the result of which should be the universal intentional reason we are looking for: it is he who will discover a priori the identities of the experiences of his own *Consciousness* and the *Consciousness* of *Others* of the whole world.

The explicated intentional reason experiences with apodictic obviousness its intersubjective absolute participation in the general semantic field of the intentional being of other people in the open horizon of humanity, both in synchronic and diachronic time (in the relationship of the historical present with the historical past of past generations, their traditions, etc.). Therefore, when two phenomenologically mature intentional reasons, recognizing the interdependent commonality of the essential-semantic field of the region of apodictic knowledge, enter into an intersubjective communicative connection, a synergistically bizarre “meaning game” intertwined with each other’s intentionalities arises, tied to the acts of adjusting one’s own and someone else’s “set of significances” in the modes of “consistency” and “inconsistency”. As a result, the “meaning game” of the intersubjective intentional-communicative reason necessarily gives rise to the above-mentioned “coordinated consciousness of the same world common to all with the same things” - the very desired real world of real things.

This observation explains many paradoxical facts of mutual understanding of people of different linguistic affiliation in extreme situations of a common field that are obvious to each experience (during natural disasters, for example, people of different ethnic groups often understand each other “without words”). The “power” of a single semantic space of the universal phenomenological reason also sets the most interesting prospect for solving the problems of aesthetic anthropology concerning the secret of comprehending aesthetic knowledge “without words” and even “in spite of words” in the context of collective empathy for works of art (especially in music).

³⁹ Ibid. p.333.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid. p.333.

Therefore, “just as there is one and only universal nature as a single interconnection closed in itself, so there is only one and only psychic interconnection, the universal interconnection of all souls, where they are all united not externally, but internally, precisely due to intentional interpenetration in the course of formation commonality of their lives”⁴². And since the phenomenologist with mature intentional reason does not cease to “remain a person who does not change anything in the actual existence of the world, people and all beings,” he does not lose interest in the world, which is already perceived under the “title” of the “universal science of people in relation to their intentional being - individual and social”⁴³. Thus, having been enriched with a universal intentional reason that includes meanings common to everyone, the phenomenologist can afford to return “as if” to the *natural attitude* without the risk of returning to a naive perception of the world as “reality acquired as a being in the way it gives itself to me” (general thesis of naivety of *natural attitude*⁴⁴). Thanks to the intentional reason, the phenomenologist perceives the surrounding natural world “from the inside out”: by exposing the illusions of the naive perception of “reality” (the region of problematic knowledge) and at the same time correcting the apodictic semantic field in intersubjective social and communicative life (of the region of apodictic knowledge), he directly perceives the real essence of single things, phenomena and the world as a whole.

Let us return to Husserl's unfinished analogy with chess with focus of the mechanism of the “meaning game” of the intentional language, which implements the functional legitimacy of the “justice of the intentional reason”. We can now take Husserl's highly productive analogy to its logical intentional-rational conclusion. Indeed, the following should now be obvious: in order to understand the essence of the “knight” chess piece, one must abandon not only the empirical and analytical study of the chip as a thing given in fact, but also attempts at phenomenological ideation in the position of Husserl's subject-centered “disinterested observer”. The only way to the essence of a chess piece is direct communicative contact with the bearers of the “semantic chess game” around this particular piece, comparable to the intersubjective-intentional adjustment of endowing with meaning (“borrowing” - “Verleihen”) the experienced objectivity of the surrounding world.

Here, an interesting perspective of the phenomenological problem of the authority of the representation of apodictic knowledge opens up: just as a communicative exchange only with those who are initiated into knowledge (so to speak, authoritative representatives) of the rules of a chess game will lead to the true essence of the “knight” chip, the essence of the world is also revealed in an intersubjective intentional exchange with real “witnesses” of the phenomenological experience of the apodictic reality of *pure Consciousness*. In this sense, the interesting ideas of H.-G. Gadamer regarding the “rehabilitation of authority and tradition”⁴⁵ in philosophical hermeneutics, which intersect with the revelations of German romantics about “symphilosophy” as the cognitive basis of “correct philosophical conversation”. The principles of cognition of the essence of the world through authoritative evidence, as it turned out, were most fully developed outside the Western philosophical tradition: even before the ancient model of scientific cognition, Vedic thinkers followed the priority of the gnoseology of the authority of the text and the methodology of cognition through initiation

⁴² Ibid. p.336.

⁴³ Ibid. p.336.

⁴⁴ Husserl E. Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book one. Moscow, 2009, p. 95.

⁴⁵ For more details, see: Sokol V. B. Supersensory listening: comparative onto-epistemology, phenomenology and hermeneutics. Saarbrücken: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing GmbH, 2011, p. 223.

into the apodictic meanings of things and the world, transmitted along the “chain of disciple succession” (parampara) (D.B. Zilberman).⁴⁶

Thus, it is important, first of all, to establish ourselves in the understanding that the phenomenological discourse is also the essence of Thinking, however, the specificity of the phenomenological-discursive Thinking is in the special perspective of its own self-overcoming in favor of pure, that is, extra-linguistic (out-of-discursive) Consciousness, up to the comprehension of various kinds alternatives of self-consciousness in the intentional-intersubjective communicative space of the universal phenomenological reason. In this sense, the structural and functional distinction between ontological and gnoseological discourses (types of Thinking) that we are studying becomes a necessary preliminary condition for mastering the laws of genesis of not only philosophical knowledge in general, but also phenomenology in particular.

History of the development of discourse

In the history of Western civilization, the “philosophical episteme” is born against the backdrop of the “Greek miracle”, first on the model of ontological discourse. The search for the origins of the world, which the first Hellenic sages (VI-V centuries BC) were concerned with, proceeded from the premise of the obviousness of the existence of nature and an undoubted conviction in the possibility of its cognition (pre-Socratic natural philosophy).

Despite the diverse palette of opinions and the irreconcilability of disputes between numerous philosophical schools, ancient Greek thinkers were unanimous in their belief in the real “substantiality” of the nature of the world around them, although depending on the method of cognition that was emphasized (empirical experience, logical thinking or intuition), different philosophers “saw” different “realities”.

There are three main schools that are most alternative to each other on all issues of worldview: atomism (the teaching of Democritus as the logical conclusion of all previous natural-centrists from Thales to Heraclitus), Platonism (as a systemic completion of Parmenides' speculative insights into the world of “noumena” that gave birth to anthropocentrism of Socrates, and then the idealism of Plato and Aristotle) and Pythagoreanism. In atomistics, reality is exclusively “corporeal” (materialism). In Platonism, reality is already two-fold: corporeal and ideal. A thing includes a “body” and an “idea”. Accordingly, reality breaks up into two worlds - the “higher world” (the world of ideas) and the “lower world” (the world of bodies). In the teachings of Pythagoras, there are three realities: bodily, ideal and “spiritual” (more precisely, “psychic”, from the Greek “psyche” - the soul). No matter how reality was interpreted in these schools, each understanding was based on the unconditional premise of the undoubted existence of this or that reality as obvious, “for granted”, given directly from experience (empirical, intellectual or intuitive). The knowledge received about reality, which does not require re-verification, was called “dogma” by the Greeks⁴⁷. In this sense, atomism, Platonism and Pythagoreanism are dogmatic philosophical schools, and from the point of view of discursive analysis, they are predominantly “under the rule” of ontological discourse.

⁴⁶ Ibid. pp. 197-226.

⁴⁷ Kostetsky V.V. Introductory course of philosophy. Tyumen, 2000, p. 96.

It is important to note that these three dogmatic approaches to cognition, corresponding to the three main ways of obtaining knowledge (sensual, rational and intuitive), laid the foundation for traditional gnoseology, which finally took shape as a philosophical discipline already in modern times. Consequently, *gnoseology as a new European theory of cognition can by no means be reduced solely to gnoseological discourse; moreover, it is genetically and paradigmally even more conditioned by "dogmatic" microstructural clauses of ontological discourse than gnoseological*. The New European theory of cognition, in turn, substantiated the basic concepts of specific scientific rationality, which gave rise to a special kind of science called by Husserl "Galilean science", the crisis of which has to be noted by the middle of the 20th century⁴⁸. As will be shown in detail below, the transcendental phenomenology that Husserl puts forward as an alternative to modern philosophy and science that has come to a standstill is, from a discursive point of view, nothing more than a challenge to ontological discourse thrown by gnoseological discourse, on which the new, truly "strict" science is based.

Of course, it is by no means the case that prior to Husserl's phenomenology, gnoseological discourse was alien to Western philosophy. Husserl himself draws attention to the epochal significance for European science and philosophy of Descartes' "methodical doubt" (a typical example of a gnoseological clause, which, however, did not grow into a gnoseological discursive tree with Descartes), laying the Cartesian cogito at the basis of his phenomenology. We will now make sure that the specific elements of gnoseologically discursive microstructures were already encountered in the texts of ancient philosophers. However, the natural difficulty of the emerging gnoseologically discursive *Thinking* of the Hellenic sages manifested itself in the fact that genetically the "tree" of their gnoseological discourse almost always stopped its "growth" on its inherent negative and revealing premise, so to speak, on the "apophatic half". Without providing any alternative to the cognition of apodictic truth in return, the ancient gnoseological-discursive skepticism simply ruthlessly devalued the dogmatic faith of its ontologically convinced opponents. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the "natural selection" of the evolutionary formation of the European philosophical tradition, gnoseological discourse, as a rule, was subjected to historical "atrophy" under the inevitable pressure of the "struggle for the assertion" of positive knowledge (even if not reliable), inspired by the notorious attachment to a visible practical result, to which human cognition has always been weak.

When Parmenides (540-470 BC) first separates *opinion* ("doxa", "gnome", "mythos") and *knowledge* ("logos", "gnosis", "episteme", "mathema"), he starts from the dubiousness of accepting "facts" as knowledge only on the basis of their "obviousness" (gnoseological clause). There is a well-known example of Parmenides about the inevitable mistake of the "opinion" of a foreigner that in a given city people do not know anything about cheese only on the basis of the fact that he saw that there is no cheese anywhere in the city. The foreigner simply could not know that in the city he was visiting the government had adopted a decree prohibiting the manufacture of cheese. According to Parmenides, basing on a fact one can only form an opinion, while knowledge can be obtained by penetrating the laws or "canons" regulating "nature". Of course, as already stated, in general, the teaching of Parmenides comes down to the unconditional acceptance of a certain Being (ontological clause), nevertheless, the Being of Parmenides is "hidden" from direct perception by the senses, that is, from the facts of the empirical world, thus, it rises above "apparent" opinions (gnoseological clause). Consequently, with a strict discursive analysis, we must state already in the texts of

⁴⁸ Husserl E. *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. St. Petersburg, 2004, pp. 359–384.

Parmenides a mixture of both discourses, or rather, metaphorically speaking, the imposition of the “crown” of the ontological discursive tree on the “thin trunk” of the gnoseological tree with the inevitable suppression of the “growth” of the latter (but not the complete destruction of its clausal “root”).

Sophists go even further in the gnoseological procedure of revising “for granted” knowledge: people always have only an opinion; reliable knowledge is the prerogative of the Gods alone. No one can know why he actually lives and in what reality his “being” takes place. Protagoras (481-411 BC) reduces the essence of a person to his aspirations: what a person strives to appear, he is. Accordingly, a person turns out to be a “measure of all things”, including an ontological measure: “whoever feels what, the way it is”, is a kind of ontological “curvature” of the gnoseological tree, which stops its development at the negative “apophatic sprout”. Another well-known sophist Gorgias (483-375 BC) demonstrates an example of “chattering” (in the sense of Heidegger) of philosophical problems through the virtuoso manipulation of “language games” with gnoseological clauses that are not developed into a tree, and therefore are not capable of giving “fruit” of apodictic knowledge. Gorgias “understood” that it is always possible to “prove” that what is being discussed does not exist at all. After all, it is always easy to formulate an argument against the existence of anything. But even if there is something about which there is a philosophical discussion, then it is higher than human understanding. Finally, even if we admit the possibility of existence and cognition, it is always possible to “prove” that what is being discussed is inexpressible in words (words are not adequate to concepts, are polysemantic, and the number of words is too small). This is the result of Gorgias' sophistry: in a discussion, every word can be called into question, and therefore everything is disputable. Ironically, Husserl himself, who nevertheless brought the growth of the gnoseological discursive tree to a positive “fruit” of proving not only the reality of the “region of being” of *Consciousness*, but also the possibility of obtaining apodictic knowledge through the phenomenological description of its intentional structure, nevertheless came under criticism of the “third level of argumentation” of Gorgias. Indeed, the reproach of the linguistic inexpressibility of phenomenological procedures, to which, in fact, the criticism of the discursive inadequacy of Husserl's phenomenology, undertaken by V.A. Ladov, comes down, is essentially a “linguistic maneuver” of the same gnoseological discourse, which “is not aware of itself”, having fallen under the influence of the “discursive unconscious”. In this sense, our discursive research is an attempt to get out of the power of the “discursive conditionality” of gnoseological skepticism, directing gnoseological discourse into a positive channel of conscious description of apodictic truths, which is possible, as we will see below, when the gnoseological tree matures to the phenomenology of the reason.

Socrates (469-399 BC) is an unsurpassed master of philosophical dialogue, in which, in his opinion, one can obtain reliable knowledge (in this Socrates is a dogmatist). However, the irony of Socrates, as the initial stage of his dialogical method, has an unambiguous anti-dogmatic character: “I know that I know nothing, but others do not know this either” (gnoseological microstructure of clauses). In order not to take opinions for reliable knowledge and to be able to make the transition from “myth” to “logos”, Socrates, as is known, invented a method of reasoning, which Aristotle would later call “dialectics”. From a discursive point of view, the dialectic of Socrates withstands the criterion of gnoseological discourse, however, if expressed in the terminology of Husserl's phenomenology, it still does not overcome the *natural attitude* of cognition, and more precisely, it operates within the boundaries of the eidetic stage of phenomenological reduction, which, according to Husserl's just conviction, is limited (and we would add, “ontologized”) by the “dogma” of psychologism. Therefore, with the help of the dialectic of Socrates, the reverse process was also possible - the transformation

of *knowledge* into *opinion*, as happened with the rebirth of the healthy skepticism of the dialectic of Socrates into the dogmatic idealism of Plato (explicit ontological discourse).

Aristotle (384-322 BC) is already skeptical even about the tenets of logic, under which he himself first summed up the status of scientific thoroughness. It turned out that logical *Thinking*, especially supported by the scientific systematization of its laws, is more suitable for refutation than for proving something (that is, again for negative aspects of gnoseological discourse). The laws of logic reveal the limitations of human *Thinking*: it is impossible to define a concept without recognizing preliminary conventions, of which there are many. The most general provisions with deductive reasoning turn out to be unprovable, and generalized knowledge with inductive inference acquires a probabilistic status. As a result, the science of Aristotle's logic played more in favor of the "skeptical" (gnoseological) discourse than the "dogmatic" (ontological) discourse. Aristotle, as is known, made a significant contribution to the further substantiation of the difference between *episteme* (reliable knowledge, which the philosopher called "true knowledge" or "first proposition") and *doxa* (opinion, which Aristotle called "plausible knowledge")⁴⁹. Paying attention to the particularly strong social conditionality of man ("man is a social being to a greater extent than bees and all kinds of herd animals"⁵⁰), Aristotle quite correctly characterized "plausible knowledge" exclusively in the sociological aspect. He did not even define this "knowledge" by content, but simply mentioned to whom it belongs (to all people or the majority, or sages, etc.)⁵¹. Although knowledge of the "first propositions" is certainly more valuable and reliable than "plausible" opinions and it is desirable that every person has reliable knowledge about everything, however, it is social conditioning that forces a person to be content with only plausible judgments that are available and applicable in social activity, regardless of their proximity to truth. On the other hand, reliable knowledge about what a person encounters in everyday circumstances, in which he is placed by the power of social relations, is by no means everyone who has this knowledge, not always and not about everything. One has to act immediately, using what is "at hand", and this is "one's own opinion", which every individual can always have about everything, focusing on the opinions of the "majority", "wise men", etc. So, Aristotle in his own way anticipated the "discursive conditionality" of social and cultural knowledge, designated by Foucault as the "power of discourse", opposing it to "true knowledge", reliable "through itself", that is, existing independently of discursive social practices, in other words, to the *anti-discourse* of the "first provisions." Aristotle gives his reasoning a goal-setting *focus*, characteristic of gnoseological discourse, when he tries to figure out what is more plausible, that is, closer to the "first propositions": the opinion of all, the opinion of the majority, the opinion of the wise (authorities), the opinion of specialists in certain arts? True, Aristotle's answer is very far from a mature gnoseologically-discursive positive understanding of reliable truths, as "revealing themselves in acts of experience" (Husserl), and therefore clearly compromises with the "discursive power" of "plausible knowledge", tending to accept the dogmatic *topics* of ontological microstructures: "For what the wise believe can be considered plausible, if it is not contrary to the opinion of the majority of people"⁵².

⁴⁹ See: Slinin Y. A. Transcendental subject: a phenomenological study. St. Petersburg, 2001, pp. 7–9.

⁵⁰ Aristotle. Politics. Book I 10, 1253 a 7.

⁵¹ In his *The Topics*, Aristotle defines these two types of knowledge as follows: "True and first propositions are those that are certain not through other propositions, but through themselves. For it is not necessary to ask "why" about the principles of knowledge, but each of these principles must be certain in itself. Plausible is what seems right to all or most people or wise - to all or most of them, or the most famous and glorious" (Aristotle. *The Topics*. I 1, 100 b 18–23).

⁵² Aristotle. *The Topics*. I 10, 104 a 11–12.

The plot of how Aristotle's ontological discourse still defeats gnoseological-discursive anti-dogmatism deserves special attention. Its plot is that Aristotle, being under the influence of the defining idea of classical ancient philosophy - the idea of the formation of knowledge in the form of a *concept* (coming from Socrates) - sets a special understanding of experience as a means of bringing cognition to a concept. *The universality of the concept is ontologically the first for Aristotle, and this self-sufficient ontological clause predetermined the general target program of the entire Aristotelian onto-gnoseological discourse, on which his first "sciences" grew up, predetermining, as is known, the paradigmatic constructs of all subsequent Western European scientific rationality.* This a priori discursive attitude of experience on the conceptual result unconsciously "ruled" in the science and philosophy of the West until the 20th century, when the founder of philosophical hermeneutics, H.-G. Gadamer, trying to apply the phenomenological discourse to hermeneutical analysis, was forced to reconsider the traditional view of the essence of experience. According to Gadamer, the Aristotelian experience sins with the lack of demand for philosophical penetration into the essence of the act of sensory perception, which comes from ignoring the primacy of the influence of the state of consciousness on the human cognitive system, manifested in one or another complex of attachments, predilections of a person, his beliefs, value system, etc. Gadamer called this lack of traditional philosophy "the loss of the intrinsic historicity of experience"⁵³. Gadamer sees the reason for this shortcoming in the erroneous orientation of the philosophical concept of experience exclusively towards science (Aristotle). In science, any experience is significant to the extent that it is confirmed by experiment, that is, in practice. The merit of such an experiment rests on fundamental repeatability. And this means, according to Gadamer, that experience in its essence, as it were, erases its history. As pointed out, Aristotle inclined to see the universality of experience, due to which the universality of the concept arises and thus the possibility of science. But this means simplifying the process of carrying out the experiment. It turns out that everything typical in experience is given by itself, without contradictions?! What interests Aristotle in experience is exclusively its role in the formation of concepts (a typical ontological clause that specifies the ontological primacy of the concept's universality). To consider experience in line with such a discursive program, that is, from the point of view of the result, means to skip over the process of experience as such, that is, through the essence of the influence of social relations on the act of sensory perception, although the very fact of this influence as a result of experience is fixed by the traditional theory of cognition. It is in this attachment to the result that the essence of experience, which Gadamer calls "the inner historicity of experience," eludes. So, using the example of a critical rethinking of the Aristotelian understanding of scientific experience, Gadamer was able to capture positive negation as a characteristic of gnoseological discourse embedded in phenomenological philosophy, concluding that the process of experience is a negative process, that is, experience itself constantly refutes false generalizations and what was considered typical, as if becoming detyped. Most important (which is what gnoseological discourse wins by demonstrating its advantage in cognition the *essence* of things, and not the *facts* of their manifestation), is a productive meaning that is also present in this negativity: not just delusion is overcome, but new knowledge about the object is acquired (in the sense of novelty in the perception of this object or phenomenon, "a more experienced look at things").

However, after the powerful Aristotelian "ontological-discursive turn" in the genesis of classical ancient thought, the gnoseological discourse still does not completely give up its positions. Already after the death of Aristotle, a whole school of *skeptics* appeared, which can be called an alternative to all three of the above dogmatic schools of atomism, Platonism and Pythagoreanism. The founder of the school is Pyrrho (c. 360-270 BC). The main idea of the skeptics was that questions about reality

⁵³ Gadamer H.-G. Truth and method. Moscow, 1988, pp. 409–421.

surpass the powers of the human reason, and therefore, in principle, are inaccessible to cognition. The human reason must manifest itself in the act of recognizing this truth, no matter how traumatized such recognition is by the false self-conceit of mankind. The name of the philosophical school of skeptics comes from the Greek verb σκεπτικός - "look around", reflecting the specifics of their "methodology": when they got acquainted with any new opinion about something, skeptics "looked around" in search of an alternative. Faced with dogma, the first thing a skeptic did was turn the knowledge of dogma into an opinion, following the same sophistical principles of Gorgias: 1) it can always be proved that what is being discussed does not exist reliably; 2) even if it exists, it is unknowable; 3) even if it is knowable, it is inexpressible in words. Therefore, it is more reasonable to remain silent, even if you understand everything.

Pyrrho is famous for his admonition to his disciples: "Abstain from judgment!" Behind him, all skeptics cultivate "epoche" - refraining from any affirmative judgments, which creates a necessary condition for "objective" cognition of the truth, which comes by default. Here the methodology of the skeptics intersects especially closely with Husserl's initial phenomenological procedure (reduction from judgments in the *natural attitude*), which leads to the initial stage of the *phenomenological attitude*, called by Husserl, by analogy with the skeptics, the "phenomenological *epoche*". Continuity in terminology says a lot: skeptics really set a fairly stable growth of the tree of gnoseological discourse, consistently developing the dynamics of branching of gnoseological clauses from elementary aphorisms such as "the lot of a person is not knowledge, but opinion" to the formulations "methods of refuting dogmatists" that are multilayered in their discursive hierarchy, so called "tropes". From the "Three Books of the Pyrrhonic Propositions" by the late famous skeptic Sextus Empiricus (end of the 2nd century BC), 15 such tropes are known, of which the first 10 are referred to as the so-called "senior skeptics", and the remaining 5 to the "junior skeptics". The essence of all tropes is to prove the impossibility of obtaining reliable knowledge through experience, based on the testimony of sensations (the first 10 tropes) and on logical *Thinking* (the last 5 tropes). Thus, despite the fact that ancient skepticism, of course, did not come to the discovery of real ways to obtain positive apodictic truths, nevertheless, the school managed to bring the apophaticism of negative gnoseological-discursive knowledge to a productive logical conclusion. This is confirmed by the strong influence of the intellectual position of skeptics on the ethics of philosophical criticism in favor of interest and tolerance for other people's opinions, modesty in relation to the authorship of all kinds of "dogmas", overcoming arrogance and categoricalness in ontological judgments. After the skeptics, philosophy was enriched by a humble recognition of the paradoxical incomprehensibility of the essence of the world, bringing European thought closer to the "border situation" of discovering the flawed duality of "naive" ontological-discursive cognition, which Husserl called *natural attitude*. In the language of the gnoseological clauses of the ancient Stoics, "reality is complex and contradictory", "bodily and incorporeal", "revealed and hidden", "spiritual and non-spiritual", "exists and not exists", "reality can even be what it is not expected to be seen."⁵⁴ It can therefore be said that ancient skepticism anticipated Husserl's denunciation of the apodictic legitimacy of the "sciences of facts" as a necessary condition for redirecting scientific attention to the "essences" ("noumena") of things.

One cannot lose sight of the special place of the medieval stage in the formation of European rationality, which indirectly determined the historical continuity of the ancient "philosophical telos" (Husserl) and the return to its ideals in the Renaissance, when the ancient "doxes" received their transformation in discursively similar new European scientific axioms. In the most general sense, despite its radical striving for the unshakable truths of the eternal absolute reality of God, the

⁵⁴ Kostetsky V.V. Introductory course of philosophy. Tyumen, 2000, p. 100.

religious philosophy of the Middle Ages, based, as is known, on the “dogmatic” Platonism (Avrelius Augustine) and the “scientific ontologism” of Aristotle (Thomas Aquinas), only strengthened “ontologization” of discursive social practice, including in the field of scientific and rational culture. On the one hand, the possibility of cognition of apodictic truths simply due to Revelation (anti-discourse), on the other hand, the “ontological-discursive” interpretation of the Holy Scripture as Revelation embodied in the text (“dogmatic” discourse). As a result, in medieval philosophy there is an “ontologization” of Scripture by “dogmatic” attitudes (especially in the philosophy of scholasticism). In other words, penetration of the Revelation (anti-discourse) into the apodictic knowledge is not accompanied by a preliminary “purification of consciousness” through gnoseological discourse (which is practically rejected by the same “dogmas”), and therefore is blocked by an ontological-discursive obstacle - theological dogmatic clauses. Accordingly, the priority of the idea of the incomprehensibility of God (the Absolute), which was established in the religious philosophy of the Middle Ages, either through the senses or by the power of the reason, does not come from the conscious position of gnoseologically discursive *Thinking*. On the contrary, the idea of the inaccessibility of God to “naive” human cognition, which is very productive from a gnoseological-discursive point of view, turns into a dogma of a limited unconscious attitude of accepting the truth of Scripture on faith, “blindly” rejecting any positive-cognitive resource as empirical-rational (Aristotelian) experience, and hermeneutic (phenomenological) experience (ontological discourse).

Let us make a reservation right away that in medieval Europe we are faced with just one of the possible variants of the religious doctrine of the cognition of God, which does not exhaust the entire potential of the world philosophy of cognition of the apodictic knowledge of the personal Absolute or “Personal God”. For example, we find a fundamentally different approach to comprehending the personal aspect of the Divine spiritual world in the theistic Vedanta of Jiva Goswami (the late Middle Ages of India), where the main method of cognition (*pramana*) is *shabda* - listening from an authority representing apodictic knowledge of the Absolute along the so-called *parampara* (a chain of disciplic succession). Jiva Goswami uses a typical gnoseological discourse in the interpretation of *shabda-pramana*, which successfully exposes the illusory “dogmatic” knowledge (*maya*) formed by sensual (*pratyaksha-pramana*) and rational (*anumana-pramana*) experience, but not by dwelling on the apophatic description of the impersonal Absolute (Brahman), rather by the ongoing kataphatic theology of the Supreme Personal Deity (Bhagavan), received as a revelation of *shabda* directly through hearing⁵⁵. It is interesting that Jiva Goswami's theory of cognition, sustained in gnoseological discourse, is in good agreement with Husserl's phenomenological reduction and his noemoneotic description of the intentional subject of cognition⁵⁶. In general, the principles of cognition of the essence of the world through authoritative evidence are most fully developed, as it turned out, outside the Western philosophical tradition: even before the ancient model of scientific cognition, Vedic thinkers followed the priority of the gnoseology of the authority of the text and the methodology of cognition through initiation into the apodictic meanings of things and the world, transmitted through the “chain of disciplic succession” (D. B. Zilberman).

In the Renaissance, European humanity, from the point of view of the macrostructure of philosophical discourse, makes, it is commonly believed, a “revolutionary overturn”, depreciating the

⁵⁵ Sokol V. B. Genesis of the European understanding of the Vedic ontology of supersensible sound: from the impersonalism of Brahman to the personality of Bhagavan // *Izvestiya Rossiyskogo gos. Pedagogical Univ. A. I. Herzen*. 2008. No. 12 (84). pp. 22–28.

⁵⁶ Sokol V. B. The problem of “incomprehensibility” of the epistemology of the theistic Vedanta by Jiva Goswami in the light of E. Husserl's phenomenology // *Asiatica: works on philosophy and cultures of the East*. Issue. 5. St. Petersburg, 2011, pp. 148–164.

“medieval [theological] way of being” (Husserl) and striving for a new “image of being”, the prototype of which it finds in the ancient, that is, the philosophical “existence.” However, *from the point of view of the discursive microstructure, there is only a modification of the typical ontological topic of the “for granted” absolute existence of God to the “for granted” priority existence of “pure reason”*. Theoretical philosophy is affirmed without any evidence (a “self-evident” axiom) as something ontologically the first, allowing “free reason” to establish rules for the person himself and for the entire life world as a whole. The target *focus* of the Renaissance model of the ontological clause sets a reference point exclusively to the cognitive possibilities of “reasonable being”, which should elevate a person to a “higher” level of viewing the world, free from mythological prejudices and the power of “false authority of tradition”. Through the liberated reason, universal knowledge of the world and man will also come, in the end, the teleology of the world and its highest principle, God, will be comprehended. Thus, the European philosophy of the Renaissance continues within the boundaries of the overwhelming influence of the ontological discourse, which underpins all branches of philosophical science, including gnoseology. Accordingly, under the influence of the ontological-discursive “power”, philosophy as a “pure theory” receives the status of a liberator not only of the scientific class, but also of any educated person, which implies a “natural” transition of the theoretical autonomy of the reason into the practical sphere of all social practices. An endless prospect of a reasonable transformation of the ethical potential of a human has opened up, as well as renewal of the political, economic and other spheres of humanity surrounding each “liberated” personality. The whole world and the person in it could be re-formed from a free reason on the basis of universal philosophical knowledge. Thus, the “natural” reason established the European *Thinking* in the “natural” rationality of the *natural attitude*.

In modern times, the contagious faith of the Renaissance in the omnipotence of reason found its concrete embodiment in the generally accepted idea of creating a single, strict, obligatory *scientific method* for all, thanks to which all kinds of errors and paradoxes can be eliminated, and endless and fruitless disputes between different philosophical schools are forever stopped. Thanks primarily to the work of Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and René Descartes (1596-1650), by the middle of the 17th century, the method in its main features was formed with a clear tilt towards extremely narrow positivist tendencies. Its main characteristic is the reliance on sensory data obtained mainly through a specially designed experiment with the introduction of quantitative methods to maximize the accuracy of measurements. Experimental procedures are brought by the science of modern times under a carefully formulated theoretical substantiation by means of exclusively rational methods, which together creates the impression of the possibility of establishing, on the basis of experimental data, the universal laws of nature and society. Due to the use of experimental data as initial premises, induction (Bacon) comes to the forefront of rational variations, pushing the traditional Aristotelian syllogism into the background. On the other hand, deductive methods of constructing of theories (Descartes) remain important in such sciences as logic, mathematics, pure mechanics, etc., to which Descartes himself gave a common name: *mathesis universalis*. The sciences *mathesis universalis* are indeed given special attention at this time, which is connected with the “mathematical background” of the philosophy of science of the New Age: “it goes without saying” that the basic laws of nature and society can and should be expressed in the form of mathematical formulas (a natural consequence of the dictates of the ontological discursive topic of the existence of total being, rationally constructed by the reason). An extreme positivist tilt was also expressed in the orientation of experimental and theoretical developments towards their practical implementation in social practice. Hence the criticism of scholasticism for speculation and practical unsuitability, as a result of which the very word “scholasticism” acquired a negative connotation, synonymous with “futile philosophizing.” Husserl in his final programmatic work “The Crisis of the European Sciences and

Transcendental Phenomenology” (1936) gave his definition of the modern scientific epiphenomenon, calling it “Galilean science”. The crisis of sciences, evidently manifested in Europe by the first third of the 20th century, Husserl connects with the natural completion of a certain cultural experiment (in the spirit of the time, so to speak), which was a rather limited form of scientific research adopted by Europe at the suggestion of Galileo thanks to the philosophical support of Bacon and Descartes. The “Galilean sciences” are diverse in substantiality, inconsistent in quantity, regularly updated in form, but all of them are connected by common theoretically-methodological, philosophical and worldview principles, conditioned to an overwhelming extent by *ontological discourse*:

1. *Attitude for the transformation of social life*. According to Husserl, in most ancient cultures we do not find such an attitude of cognition: although all known civilizations acquired all the knowledge necessary for social life with no less enthusiasm, however, this knowledge was achieved in a different way, namely, relying on a religious and mythological worldview. Neither in Indian or Chinese culture, nor in any of the archaic cultures, we find even a hint of a scientific-theoretical worldview that arose only in the Mediterranean: among the ancient Greeks, the religious-mythological worldview, starting from the 7th century BC, ceased to be totally dominant. Along with the practical target cognitive position, the Greeks developed a theoretical, “disinterested” contemplative attitude of cognition (Pythagoras). Not practical benefit, but amazement (Aristotle), which causes the universe in a person idly contemplating it, is a stimulus for a purely theoretical knowledge of the world. A very small group of ancient Greek sages-theorists, who in the eyes of the majority often looked like eccentrics, became able to transfer their “disinterested” purely theoretical knowledge from generation to generation, predetermining the specifics of the scientific and theoretical European socio-cultural model. The philosophical texts of Plato and Aristotle, the geometry of Pythagoras and Euclid, the physics of Archimedes, the astronomical research of Ptolemy, as well as medieval warlocks, alchemists and astrologers bear the rudiments of Galilean science. On the other hand, the purely theoretical works of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton and other great scientists of this era, which, introduced into social practice, led to fundamental changes in the entire social life of mankind, bring a lot of practical results already in modern times. The scientific and technological progress that arose on the successful “tandem” of science and technology dramatically changed the entire life of European society, infinitely increasing its influence on the overall development of civilization.

2. An uncompromising rejection of authority in cognition, with the exception of one's own senses and reason, on the basis of which a special scientific method is developed (at the same time, senses and reason are recognized as imperfect, which in itself is already very paradoxical). Arose against the backdrop of controversy and struggle with the Christian “dogmatic” worldview that dominated Europe at that time, Galileo's science unambiguously overthrows the authority of Holy Scripture as a fundamentally unscientific source of cognition of the real world, as well rejecting any authority, including the opinions of other philosophers, mystics, gnostics, etc. The principle of autonomy and independence of the scientist is declared paramount in the new universal method. Truth has the right to be called scientific only when it is so obvious and understandable for a scientist that he is able to give it a causal, that is, a logical explanation, relying solely on his own experience and his own reason. In asserting this principle, Descartes played a decisive role in his Discourses on Method, where the first of the four methodological rules he states “not accepting as true anything that I would not recognize as such with obviousness”⁵⁷.

⁵⁷ Descartes R. Works: in 2 volumes. Vol. 1. M., 1989. p. 260.

Here we are dealing with a special historical collision that deserves our close attention, because it is directly related to the discursive analysis of Husserl's phenomenology. It is in this Cartesian principle, which also went down in history as the famous "methodological doubt", that *Descartes switches the well-established trend of European philosophical discourse from attitude of the ontological topic of the undoubted acceptance of beings to the position of the gnoseological topic of fundamental doubt in every being*. As Y.A. Slinin correctly states, "only Descartes managed to pave the way to the area of apodictic, absolutely reliable knowledge", however, "until recently, no one really understood this: only after the works of Husserl did it become completely clear"⁵⁸. As you know, Husserl sets the start for his phenomenological method, starting precisely from the "methodological doubt" of Descartes, evaluating the Cartesian cogito ergo sum as the greatest discovery of European philosophy, but, alas, which did not find a productive continuation.

Surprisingly, Descartes managed to get out of the grip of the ontological-discursive conditioning of European philosophical Thinking and was the first to take the next step in comparison with ancient skeptics to a fundamentally different Thinking - the Thinking of gnoseological discourse, which received more or less scientific justification only from Husserl, and therefore was called phenomenological Thinking. Descartes himself describes his gnoseological-discursive revelation, unprecedented in the history of European philosophy (after the ancient skeptics), as follows: "Even at school, I learned that it is impossible to come up with anything so strange and incredible that it would not have been already expressed by any of the philosophers. Then, during my travels, I became convinced that people who have concepts that contradict ours are not because of this barbarians or savages, many of them are as intelligent as we are, or even more intelligent ... Therefore, I could not choose anyone whose I should have preferred opinions to the opinions of others, and found myself, as it were, compelled to become my own leader."⁵⁹ Here Descartes well demonstrates the natural source of the inner freedom of the gnoseological thinker from the tendency to limit, simplify thoughts by ontological dogmas, which at the same time does not develop into skeptical ataraxia and arrogance, but, on the contrary, gives rise to healthy philosophical humility, which, as a rule, awakens unbridled inspiration for cognitive creativity. : "I never considered my mind more perfect. However, I am not afraid to say that I had the good fortune to set foot on such paths from my youth that led me to considerations and rules that enabled me to draw up a method by which I can gradually improve my knowledge. Thus, I became able to bring them to the highest degree, which can be reached by the mediocrity of my mind and the short life span. With the help of this method I have already reaped many fruits, although in judging myself I try to incline more to distrust than to conceit."⁶⁰ Descartes' thinking, as can be clearly seen, does not imply dogmatic edification and the desire to call someone to follow him as some kind of "successful" authority. On the contrary, it is open to corrections and improvements, and this is the most important characteristic of gnoseological discourse, which warns philosophy and science from naive "daring" universalizations of certain supposedly obvious, "for granted" premises, inevitably ending with the destruction of faith in the scientific and cognitive process. This demonstrates the high ethical status of gnoseological-discursive Thinking: "My intention is not to teach here the method that everyone must follow in order to correctly direct their reason, but only to show how I tried to direct my own reason. Whoever undertakes to give instructions to others should consider himself more skillful than those whom he instructs, and if he turns out to be insolvent even in the slightest, then he is subject to censure."⁶¹

⁵⁸ Slinin Y. A. Transcendental subject: a phenomenological study. St. Petersburg, 2001, p. 57.

⁵⁹ Descartes R. Works: in 2 volumes. Vol. 1. M., 1989. p. 259.

⁶⁰ Ibid. p.251.

⁶¹ Ibid. p.252.

So, in Descartes' "methodological doubt" we have a wonderful sketch of a true example ofgnoseological *Thinking*, which took on a clearer outline already in Husserl's phenomenological science. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the "arguments about the method" directly echo the universalgnoseological-discursive tropes of ancient junior and senior skeptics⁶², such as: "I will say one thing about philosophy: for many centuries it has been developed by the most excellent minds and, despite this, there is still no statement in it that would not serve as a subject of controversy and, therefore, would not be doubtful"⁶³. Unfortunately, a "Cartesian drama" awaited Descartes himself: the philosopher with his personal method of "directing his own reason" to the productively doubting self-cognition of the cogito never succeeded in conveying it to that general positivist spirit that triumphed in the science of modern times. By virtue of the "social order", requiring an immediate practical result, Descartes "betrayed himself." From a human point of view, this is understandable: being the ideologist of a new science, he felt more like an experimental scientist than a philosopher. Therefore, as Husserl will say, having made a great discovery, he immediately stopped, switching to the problems of the "ontological existence of God", the development of experimental studies, etc., which were relevant to his time, which were rigidly guided by the traditional attitudes of ontological-discursive *Thinking*.

3. "Galilean sciences" are built on the principle of idealization of natural phenomena, which, as already indicated, are studied within the framework of a quantitative approach. As a consequence, mathematics totally penetrates not only the natural sciences, but also the humanities. Numbers and formulas become objects of absolute faith in their full correspondence with the truth, despite the fact that they "prove" frankly imaginary "ideal objects" that, by definition, do not exist in nature, such as ideal gas, absolute black body, etc. Scientific paradoxes of ontological-discursive constructions reach obvious, but not noticed by anyone under the "power of discourse", contradictions. For example, the principle of idealization makes itself felt in the very theory and practice of measurements, purposefully rounding, that is, distorting the accuracy of certain quantitative indicators. It is well known that there are no absolutely accurate measurements in any scientific field. There are no such measuring instruments with which it would be possible to measure the length, weight, speed of movement, voltage or current, etc. without errors. A priori, it is already assumed that, despite the fact that the creators and inventors of measuring instruments will always face the task of minimizing the error of their instruments, none of them will ever reach the ideal (truth).

4. Finally, in what the most destructive influence of the ontological discourse manifested itself, the science of modern times does not just create its own methodological requirements, but allows itself to ontologize them, that is, gives them the status of a real objective existence. It is in this imprudence of the new European scientists that Husserl sees the initial cause of the crisis of all European sciences.⁶⁴ It turned out that only that which lends itself to the research of "Galilean science" really exists. Everything else is declared to be naive human opinions and beliefs, the fruits of illusions or "idols" of consciousness (F. Bacon). In philosophy, this position found a response in works of John Locke, in particular in his doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. The primary qualities are density, extension, form and mobility, they are inherent in the physical bodies that make

⁶² Slinin Y. A. Transcendental subject: a phenomenological study. St. Petersburg, 2001, pp. 58–59.

⁶³ Descartes R. Works: in 2 volumes. Vol. 1. M., 1989. p.254.

⁶⁴ See: Slinin Y. A. The crisis of European humanity: what does it consist of and what means does Husserl offer to overcome it // Husserl E. The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 368.

up the world. Bodies and the primary qualities inherent in them exist really and objectively, regardless of whether or not any subjects perceive them sensually. Secondary qualities are colors, sounds, tastes, etc. It would seem that they are also inherent in things. However, according to Locke, this is not so: secondary qualities do not play any role in the things themselves, but are only caused in us by the action of the primary qualities of things, that is, the volume, shape, structure and movement of their imperceptible particles. Therefore, Locke declares secondary qualities to be apparent, illusory. The extent, density, volume, shape of physical bodies can be measured with greater or lesser accuracy; various systems of equations can be constructed that describe the uniform and accelerated, rectilinear and curvilinear motions of these bodies. But colors, sounds, tastes, and the like, as such, are not quantifiable. If scientists can, they try to reduce them to phenomena of a mechanical order that can be measured. So, in their opinion, in the real world there are no red, orange, yellow, green, blue or purple things, but there are bodies whose surface reflects light vibrations of the corresponding wavelength and frequency.

Husserl calls Locke's interpretation physicalist objectivism, emphasizing the substitution that is taking place here of the natural human perception of the real qualities of the world with a metaphor of the "scientific picture of the world", moreover, without any justification, simply "by default", accepting this as an obvious axiom, "for granted", and therefore not requiring any proof. In the "scientific picture of the world" of the New Age, at the suggestion of Locke, there is no real place for colors, sounds, smells, etc. Objectively, totally, there are only waves, particles, electromagnetic and gravitational fields. On the other hand, the everyday world of an unlearned person, full of sensations of heat and cold, etc., in no way connected in direct perception with reasoning about the speed of movement of molecules, etc., is declared by physicalist objectivism to be ignorant, and therefore false. Physicalist objectivism, in fact, already 20 years after the publication of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), found its internal failure in George Berkeley's *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710). The Irish philosopher convincingly showed that Locke's primary qualities are, in fact, derived from secondary qualities: we cannot know anything about primary qualities without having data on secondary qualities. The secondary qualities are given directly in sensations, the primary ones are the product of abstract *Thinking*, which operates with these empirical data. The conclusion is obvious: if the primary qualities are an intellectual interpretation of the secondary ones, then the scientific worldview based on such "primary qualities" is just as imaginary as the world directly perceived by the "secondary qualities". Husserl called Berkeley's position transcendental subjectivism: all our knowledge of the world comes down to knowledge of secondary qualities, in other words, to the direct data of sensory perception. The entire subsequent history of philosophy is a struggle between physicalist objectivism and transcendental subjectivism. Over time, European philosophical discourse, especially transcendental subjectivism, acquires an aggressive skeptical and relativistic character.

Hume denies objective validity to the relation of causality, reducing it to the subjective habit of linking constantly successive representations. Kant reduces even space and time to subjectivity: neither of them are properties of any things in themselves at all, but are only forms of all subjective sensory perceptions. The teachings of Hume and Kant, as is known, had a significant impact not only on all later Western philosophy and science, but also on the general worldview of European mankind. As a result, scientists became even more convinced of the failure of physicalist objectivism, and their worldview became saturated with subjectivism and relativism. For the science of the 19th century, this is especially characteristic: positivism arose, the generally recognized philosophy of science of that time. Positivism is based on Humeism, therefore it is thoroughly imbued with the same subjectivism, skepticism and relativism. Another leading philosophical trend of the 19th century, neo-

Kantianism, naturally follows Kant's subjectivism and thus merges with positivism in its skeptical essence. It is in skepticism and relativism that Husserl sees the main cause of the crisis in European sciences in the 20th century as well. The outstanding philosopher of science of the 20th century, Karl Popper, confirms Husserl's opinion: "The goal is to challenge relativism in the broadest sense of the word. This is all the more important because in our time the ever-increasing escalation of the production of weapons has made the further existence of mankind almost identical with the achievement of mutual understanding between people".⁶⁵ For us, it is important that *until now skepticism and relativism, which were a natural result, as it will become clearer from further analysis, of mainly ontological-discursive Thinking, remain the most destructive philosophical and ideological obstacles to scientific progress, depreciating the very concept of truth as the goal of scientific knowledge*. The modern philosophy of science is still facing the problem of "compatibility" of transcendental subjectivism with the ideas of physicalist objectivism that the picture of the world drawn by ordinary consciousness is illusory and incorrect, that is, it closes on a "half-truth" - the belief in the a priori illusory nature of the picture of the world formed by "ordinary consciousness" (and in fact, ontological-discursive *Thinking*). But then the scientific picture of the world is also incorrect, illusory. There is no place left for truth, since all human knowledge as a whole is called into question. In other words, transcendental subjectivism stops at the skeptical thesis that there is no absolute truth at all and that at best we have the opportunity to deal with relative truths.

Husserl wonders why it happened that European science, which so promisingly appealed to a broad and free reason in the Renaissance, ended up so narrowly limiting itself to the tiny framework of the positivist ideal by the New Age.⁶⁶ His answer reveals a deep reason, undiscovered before him, — a reason that grows directly from the "seed" of ontological discourse that imposes the *natural attitude* of cognition: "The idea of philosophy, passed down from the ancients, is not a school concept that covers only a group of disciplines. Although it changes significantly, nevertheless, in the first centuries of the New Age, it formally retains the meaning of one all-encompassing science, the science of the totality of being"⁶⁷. The whole multitude of sciences (those that are already operating and those that have yet to be substantiated) in accordance with the spirit of the Renaissance are only, according to Husserl, "non-independent branches of the Unified Philosophy". And where is the "root" of the ideal "single philosophical" tree of the Renaissance? In the context of our discursive analysis, the "root" of any discursive tree is in its microstructure, and in this case, of course, we are dealing with discursive clauses of the ontological type, characterized by topics of "naive-natural" acceptance "for granted" of the fact of undoubted existence of "total being".

In the above reflections, Husserl is constantly guided by a secret insight that the telos that appeared to European humanity with the beginning of Greek philosophy, "according to which it wants to become humanity on the basis of philosophical reason and can only remain as such"⁶⁸, has been lost. Along with the telos, the meaning of philosophy as unfolding in history "the revelation of the universal reason," innate "to mankind" was also lost. Husserl deeply believes that this telos is not just "a historical-factual illusion, an accidental conquest of an accidental human community, but, on the contrary, in Greek humanity, for the first time, something breaks through, which, as an entelechy, is essentially contained in humanity as such"⁶⁹. To make this telos visible again, by showing how the

⁶⁵ Popper K. The myth of the conceptual framework // Popper K. Logic and the growth of scientific knowledge. Moscow, 1983, p. 10.

⁶⁶ Husserl E. Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 22.

⁶⁷ Ibid. p.22.

⁶⁸ Husserl E. Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 32.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

sciences that take place away from philosophy invariably prove to be untenable, since their own semantic foundation remains hidden from them, because their ontological-discursive claim to totality in explaining the existent dries up - this constitutes the own main task for the founder of phenomenology⁷⁰.

The excessive exaltation of the meaning of universality (*mathesis universalis*), which already begins in Descartes, Husserl rightly declares “daring”, striving “no less than to cover with strict scientificity all questions that make sense at all, in the unity of a theoretical system”⁷¹. Husserl comes to the important observation that “historically, the positivist concept of science in our time is a residual concept (*Restbegriff*)” from which all the “higher and final” questions that were previously part of metaphysics “dropped out”. However, upon closer examination, it turns out that all the excluded questions are inextricably linked with the problems of the reason in all its forms: in gnoseology, true cognition means rational cognition, in axiology, true values are the values of reason, in ethics, a good deed is a rational deed, etc. “Reason” begins to play the role of the title of “absolute”, “eternal”, “unconditionally” significant ideals. Man, as the subject of “metaphysics” is considered as a rational being, and if he is the subject of history, then the problem of “historical meaning”, that is, reason in history, turns out to be in the center. Accordingly, the problem of God is reduced to the question of “absolute” reason as a teleological source of the universe. Similarly, immortality, freedom and other “metaphysical” categories become the subject of the problematic of the reason. However, the broad “metaphysical” questions that contain the idea of reasonable being, by definition, must be located outside the world of “facts”, claiming a higher dignity in comparison with the sciences of facts. Husserl resolutely declares that in this sense, positivism, came into modern times “decapitates philosophy”⁷², and in the context of our study, *Thinking* “decapitates” philosophy as the science of self-*Consciousness*.

It is quite possible to understand the philosophical impulse of the Renaissance, which inspired the stormy scientific research of the New Age with the spirit of the ancient idea of the unity of the integral being of all metaphysical problems, because it imparted meaning to the cognition of all other sciences, even those “mundane” to facts. Hence the ardent belief in the possibility of discovering a true universal method, with the help of which philosophy could become a genuine “queen of the sciences”, seriously constructed as *philosophia perennis* - “eternal”, that is, “dogmatic” philosophy (a typical ontological-discursive idea). However, the inspired humanity of the Renaissance turned out to be untenable in solving the highest and last questions of “reasonable being”, and this happened only because of the loss of faith in the effectiveness of the new method, which, it turned out, “worked” only in the positive “sciences of facts”⁷³. It is clear that this belief was doomed to disappointment, because the ontological discourse is “naive” in the “root”, accepting already in the topic “simply on faith” dubious axioms of the real existence of facts. Therefore, accordingly, this belief was “confirmed” only in the successful developments of the sciences of facts, created on the position of the same “naive” *natural attitude*. But what about metaphysics, which considered actual philosophical problems, and other “sciences about the spirit”? It is difficult to disagree with Husserl that despite the fact that “there was no lack of encouraging undertakings”⁷⁴, the belief in the Unified Philosophy, in some kind of universal knowledge, “could not linger for a long time.” Although in these

⁷⁰ Biemel V. Preface // Husserl E. *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 13.

⁷¹ Husserl E. *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 23.

⁷² *Ibid.* p.24.

⁷³ *Ibid.* p.26.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

statements Husserl, of course, does not use the argumentation of the discursive algorithm and does not directly point to the ontological-discursive background of the problem, his reasoning is scientifically quite rigorous, and therefore interesting, indirectly confirming the inferiority of the ontological philosophical discourse in search of apodictic reliable answers to the “highest and last questions”: “Universal philosophy, in which these problems were connected with the sciences of facts, took the form of impressive, but, unfortunately, not closing together, but successive philosophical systems... Belief in the philosophical and methodological ideal that guided movements since the beginning of the New Age, began to waver... Among the researchers, filled with the spirit of philosophy and therefore concentrating their interest on the highest questions of metaphysics, an ever more distinct sense of inconsistency was established, which grew out of their deepest, although completely unclear motives. This feeling made them protest more and more loudly against the firmly rooted, self-evident moments of the ruling ideal. There comes a long period of passionate struggle, which began with Hume and Kant and continues to the present day, for a clear understanding of the true foundations of this age-old inconsistency. A struggle that, of course, captured the minds of a very few called and chosen ones, while the rest of the mass quickly found and continues to find formulations with which to reassure themselves and their readers.”⁷⁵ We must add that Husserl's “to the present day” is quite true even a century later, that is, up to the latest philosophy of the third millennium.

The “linguistic turn”, which gave rise to the analytical philosophical tradition and eccentric French postmodernism, did not go far from the discursive “matrices” of traditional philosophy, only modifying the “content” of the “for granted” dogmas of the ontological topic. In this case, *in place of the self-evident fact of the totality of reasonable being of the Renaissance and the New Age, there was the fact of the self-evident total being of language in modern philosophy (especially in L. Wittgenstein)*. In this sense, philosophical postmodernism and analytical philosophy do not say anything new, despite the very revolutionary (regarding previous philosophical systems) statements, dutifully remaining under the rule of ontological discourse. On the contrary, *Husserl's phenomenology sets a fundamentally different discourse of philosophical Thinking, which we call gnoseological, in which the fundamental motivation of philosophical cognition changes, entailing a complete reloading of the content of the topic and the focus of the discursive program of thinking.*

Continuing his painstaking analysis of the crisis of European sciences, the founder of phenomenology is trying to penetrate deeper into the solution of the “unclearness” that he himself noticed, of the feeling of the inconsistency of the ideal in the universal philosophy of modern times. In the following rhetorical question, Husserl comes as close as possible to the ontological-discursive “outset” of the European philosophical drama: “Is it possible to separate reason and being where the cognitive reason determines what is being?”⁷⁶.

This question alone is enough, Husserl himself notes, to understand the “very remarkable” overlook of the entire historical process, which opens up thanks to the identification of its internal motivation, as associated with the “internal decomposition of the ideal of universal philosophy and the method corresponding to it”, spurring on new and new, to “bad” infinity, revolutionary transformations of philosophical foundations. It is clear that such a situation leads to legitimate skepticism regarding the possibility of metaphysics in general, but in fact destroys the faith of mankind in its own reason, understood precisely in the sense in which Aristotle contrasted “episteme” with “doxa”. Philosophy becomes a problem for itself, which implicitly touched upon the

⁷⁵ Ibid. p.27.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

meaning and possibility of the entire problematic of reason. As a result, any trust in philosophy as a scientific discipline is devalued up to the level of “fiction” (R. Rorty). As for the positive sciences, for a long time they seemed impenetrable to any skepticism. However, as Husserl again rightly notes, “the problem of the possibility of metaphysics eo ipso includes the problem of the possibility of the sciences of facts, because it was in the inseparable unity of philosophy that the latter acquired their meaning as truths for separate areas of being”⁷⁷. In accordance with the sense in which the sciences of the Renaissance and Modern times were justified in their time as branches of philosophy, all of them ended up being covered precisely by an implicit crisis: it did not affect the field of special sciences in terms of their theoretical and practical successes, but thoroughly questioned the meaning of their truth. For “truth” since the time of Aristotle has been associated with the concept of “existent”, which is only naively “goes without saying” by virtue of ontological-discursive power. “Reason” in this context gives meaning and value (“truth”) to everything that is taken for being. Therefore, with the skepticism that is natural over time in the “self-evident” image of the idea of universal cognition aimed at the totality of existence, which is becoming less and less understood, faith in reason in general disappears and even a person’s faith “in himself” (“thinking reed” by Pascal). As a remarkable confirmation of Husserl's prophecy, French philosophical postmodernism (Lacan, Deleuze, Guattari, Kristeva, Baudrillard, etc.) already denies any reasonable objective rationality even to the so-called exact positive sciences⁷⁸.

Indeed, can the reason determine the existent? Isn't the very formulation of the question absurd, contradictory to reason? Can, for example, a judge determine the law? Isn't a judge a true judge just insofar as he serves the law, but does not invent it in any way? If a judge can determine the law, he is no longer a judge, he is the law. But what is such a judge capable of knowing with his own law? Only their own subjective “doxes”, of course, there can be no talk of any knowledge as an “episteme”, knowledge of the true law, that is, apodictic truths, reliable through themselves. However, at the “root” of the ontological discourse, the human reason categorically asserts that the problem of being is obvious and undoubted, and the solution to the nature of total existent is the path to an all-encompassing true science. But who determined it? All the same reason, always not sure of itself and, to be completely honest, forced to doubt everything (Descartes). Isn't there a fatal “motif” here that deliberately dooms the scientific philosophical discourse to endless “returns” (Nietzsche)? Isn't it more reasonable for the reason to start its cognition from the opposite end: what can I know in general? Reliably? What is already determined by “its very givenness”, which even the reason itself is not capable of doubting? And this is precisely the “root” topic of gnoseological discourse, which, unfortunately, has lost its leading priority in the fate of European philosophy. And when Husserl tries to create a phenomenological method fundamentally different from the method of the universal philosophy of the Renaissance and Modern times, and in fact going against the established trend of Western philosophy, from a discursive point of view, he intuitively tries to restore the legitimate prerogative of gnoseological discourse in scientific *Thinking*.

In other words, expressed in terms of discursive analysis, Husserl's diagnosis of the crisis of modern philosophy and science is their ontological discourse. The means of treating a crisis situation, according to Husserl, is a phenomenological criticism of the naivety of the “self-evident” axiomatic attitudes of modern scientific rationality, followed by a radical change in the attitude of cognition, which, as we must understand, implies a transition to the language of gnoseological discourse up to

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Sokal A., Bricmont J., *Fashionable Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science* / transl. from English. A. Kostikova, D. Kralechkin; foreword S. P. Kapitsa. M., 2002

its overcoming in the anti-discursive phenomenological epoche, opening the intentional sphere of apodictic entities. In the case of phenomenological description without intentional reflection, we are not able to reliably know what really exists. Therefore, we are forced to take something as existent “for granted”, that is, to return to the naivety of the natural attitude, to the boundaries of one or another worldview dogma of perceiving the world.

Philosophy after Husserl, as already mentioned, is predetermined by the “linguistic turn” initiated by the works of F.Brentano and G.Frege and giving rise to two main philosophical trends that still determine the dynamics of the Western philosophical tradition - phenomenology and analytical philosophy. Husserl challenged the “linguistic turn” of contemporary philosophy and, accordingly, the entire future analytic movement of Western thought as a direct product of the “linguistic variation” of the natural attitude. Indeed, especially if a fairly rigorous discursive analysis is applied, the position of the “linguistic turn” is unambiguously recognized as conditioned by the ontological-discursive topic of the absolutization of the being of language: “the boundaries of my language mean the boundaries of my world” (L.Wittgenstein [Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]).

As already explained in detail, the ontological discursive tree inherent in the natural-attitude “naivety” is “rooted” in the “for granted” dogmas of the uncritical perception of the object as existent. In the case of linguistic philosophy, the thesis of “absolute being of language” is accepted as an axiom, which in fact is just another historical variation of the previous ontological-discursive topics of traditional European philosophy: “absolute Being” of Parmenides, “real nature” (fisis) of ancient natural-centric philosophers, “the universality of the concept” of Aristotle, the “absolute being of God” of medieval scholasticism, the priority being of “pure reason” of the Renaissance and Modern times, etc.

By the beginning of the 20th century, after the “linguistic turn” of the traditional ontological discourse of European philosophy, “language as an object of philosophical research takes Kantian ability of judgment, the practical analysis of which should determine the possibilities and boundaries of philosophical knowledge. The fact that language has taken the place of *Consciousness* as the basis of this analysis does not cancel but merely modifies this goal. Describing the conditions necessary for understanding the speech of another person addressed to us, analysts seek to identify the formal structure of language and come to ontological conclusions on its basis, that is, to move from the formal structures of language to the formal structures of being.”⁷⁹ In other words, “Language is the subject of intense study in analytic philosophy for the same reason that ideas have been the subject of study for philosophers since the 16th and 17th centuries, when the classical concept of philosophical analysis was formed: ideas at that time and sentences now serve as a boundary between subject, that cognizes, and knowledge. Thus, the transition from the philosophical classics to the period of analysis is associated with a change of the object of study: in the place of “ideas” there come linguistic entities — sentences (and subsequently terms)”⁸⁰.

⁷⁹ Blinov A. L., Ladov V. A., Lebedev M. V. Analytical philosophy. M., 2004. p. 20 [Digital resource].

⁸⁰ Ibid. p.12.

Cognitive-gnoseological discourse on the border of consciousness

The century-long history of the phenomenological movement has shown that, perhaps, the most significant difficulty in the theoretical and practical implementation of the method of phenomenology, starting from the moment of its inception in the works of the founder E. Husserl, is the problem of the discursive-linguistic status of phenomenological description.

Vsevolod Adol'fovich Ladov quite convincingly demonstrates the "openness of the question of an adequate language game" of phenomenological discourse and thus rightly calls into question the viability of phenomenological science in principle⁸¹. Accordingly, the author is forced to conclude that "language inevitably drags the transcendental philosopher into the "quagmire" of *natural attitude*, not allowing him to "grope" for any reliable support in order to stay in the sphere of pure thought." Following Ladov's logic, it turns out that consciousness inevitably "naturalizes", since the language "always outstrips the reflective gaze by one step, placing "referential traps" in its path."

A significant difficulty that attracts attention, continues Ladov, is the very form of the specific purely scientific discourse chosen by Husserl. Even if the language allowed to get rid of naturalism, then the form of discourse of phenomenology as a theory would still "ruin the whole thing": after all, the main goal of any scientific theory is to assert logical valency, to search for solutions to questions about the truth or falsity of propositions. What else is science for? Only for the sake of formulating truths about the world. Ladov suggests that Husserl, "declaratively" suggesting the reduction of such goals, completely "gives himself into the hands" of such a discourse. Phenomenology as a theory also proclaims truths—truths about consciousness. In this theory, everything is so that there is consciousness as a region of absolute being. However, here a "blatant naturalization" is suspected, against which phenomenology itself must fight. It turns out, from Ladov's point of view, that Husserl's "ego cogito cogitatum" contradicts itself. It is intended to indicate intentionalist discourse, but at the same time it has the status of a judgment with positive logical valence: ""Ego cogito cogitatum" - this is how things really are, says phenomenology as a scientific theory." One way or another, Ladov sums up an important result of his investigation of the discursive problem of phenomenology with the just conclusion that "referentialist scientific discourse must be categorically "contraindicated" for phenomenology"⁸². Ladov turns out to be absolutely right if we add that "referentialist scientific discourse", in fact, is a kind of *ontological discourse* that has been entrenched at the forefront of European philosophy since antiquity, located, unfortunately, from beginning to end within the boundaries of *natural attitude*, which is capable to "naturalize" anything. Phenomenology is indeed able to legitimately exist in the status of a rigorous science solely on the basis of a fundamentally different discourse, which in our analysis is designated as *gnoseological discourse* and which must be returned to the phenomenological tradition if the goal is to restore the true intention of its founder, which is truly valuable from the point of view of the progress of European philosophy and science. Therefore, in order to overcome the "naive" *ontological Thinking of the natural attitude*, Husserl takes a conscious cognitive position of the *gnoseological Thinking*, due to which he gets the possibility of

⁸¹ Blinov A. L., Ladov V. A., Lebedev M. V. Analytical philosophy. M., 2004. p. 704 [Digital resource].

⁸² Ibid.

critical intellectual contemplation "from the outside" of the mindset of a person in the *natural attitude*.

Husserl's phenomenological description is incomparable with the usual empirical description (which, by definition, funds the discursive practices of *Thinking*), because it is located in a different "dimension" of *Consciousness*. V. I. Molchanov draws attention to this most important difference: "It is not about [when Husserl talks about description] to describe specific objects, say a rose or a copper ashtray, phenomenology is the doctrine of the experience of *Consciousness*, but not about roses. A rose or an ashtray can become the subject of a phenomenological description only as the correlates of a certain—we emphasize, a certain—experience"⁸³. We, in turn, would like to "emphasize" the unique "definiteness" of the experience of phenomenological description with even greater force, placing emphasis on the most important fact that the described "experience of *Consciousness*" includes the "language" of meanings or essences, *eidos*, with which he describes himself. At the same time, it must be remembered that the phenomenological "language", being a correlate of the empirical language "within" *Consciousness*, is thereby congruent to that semantic essence of the empirical language practice of *Thinking*, which, in contact with social practices, creates a rigid connection of the "power of discourse". This means that the "language" of phenomenological description is grammatically, semantically, etc. "very similar" to ordinary language, but we must not forget that it is at the same time located in a fundamentally "new dimension" of the phenomenological *epoche*. From this "other dimension", as if condescending from above - *and* down, the phenomenological description falls "on paper" of the phenomenologist through the elementary procedure of embedding ready-made meanings ("ripening" in the acts of ideation of *Consciousness*) into familiar "letters". On the contrary, in the context of the hypothesis of the meaning genesis of linguistic philosophy, the procedure is exactly the opposite: meanings are born from the text through acts of interpretation of *Thinking* (in the sense of modern philosophical hermeneutics) to "consciousness" (again, in the context of understanding consciousness within the framework of analytical philosophy), that is, from below - up.

During the transition from the *natural* to the *phenomenological attitude*, a *new thinking* is explicated - intentional "pure thinking" of the flow of experiences of pure *Consciousness*, which is fundamentally not connected directly with "inner speech" or the so-called "mental discourse" in the tradition of discursive analysis. Due to the resulting semantic-genetic bankruptcy, the discourse external to the *Consciousness* naturally "depreciates". In other words, the precedent of the birth of "own" reason on the basis of (again) "own" intentional language, by the very fact of its implementation, frees the *Consciousness* (intentional subject) from the need for the functioning of a discursive language, which in the field of living meanings of the phenomenological *epoche* is experienced by a stream of pure acts of *Consciousness* as "dead set" of characters. Of course, together with the "linguistic fixations" of discursive-semantic interpretations, the natural "*Thinking*" of the a priori *natural attitude*, funded by them, also "dies off".⁸⁴

When we define the *natural attitude* by the traditional ontological categories of "being", "existence", etc., we a priori confuse the "linguistic-semantic content" of concepts. For example,

⁸³ Molchanov V.I. Analytical phenomenology in Husserl's Logical Investigations // Husserl E. Logical Investigations. Vol. II. Research I / trans. V. I. Molchanova. M., 2001. p. LI.

⁸⁴ Classical *Thinking* of a *natural attitude*, as it was indicated at the beginning, is, according to Husserl, "thinking" in quotation marks, namely, that "set of mental habits" that is a decisive obstacle on the way to a phenomenological rational description of the apodictic essences of *pure Consciousness*, being, among other things, deep the cause of all sorts of "false interpretations" of phenomenology.

Husserl states unequivocally that only the *phenomenological attitude* overcomes the "existence/non-existence duality" (which is "bracketed" as a result of the phenomenological reduction). Then the following question arises: how *Thinking*, funded by the "language game" of the concepts of traditional ontology, conditioned, it turns out, by a naive natural worldview, is able to formulate a definition of *natural attitude* without first overcoming the boundaries of its own conditioning by this attitude? After all, for this purpose, *Thinking* must reach the "free from natural predisposition" space of "ripening" of the data of the *natural attitude* "from outside"? Next, we will explore in more detail the specifics of Husserl's phenomenological discourse, which differs significantly from the traditional *onto-gnoseological discourse* of Western philosophy, in terms of the very possibility of a linguistic description of the "extra-linguistic" sphere of "pure consciousness". Now we must simply state the contradiction of the logical vicious circle (*equivocation*, to use the term of Husserl himself): the *natural attitude* is determined by the categories of being, funded within the boundaries of the *natural attitude*! How can such a definition be applied in practice? Moreover, it is impossible even to conceive of it (until we have left the *natural attitude*)!

Husserl clearly separates the "sciences of facts" and "sciences of essences", between which lies the procedure of "reduction of a psychological phenomenon to pure essence". This is possible only with a radical change of attitude, for the reason that in the position of the usual *natural attitude*, the distortion of truth occurs precisely in the "naive" identification of factual and essential being. Consequently, it is by no means possible to give a strict scientific definition of *natural attitude* as an *essence* from the logic of ontological *facts*, for the same reason that it is impossible to overcome the force of universal gravitation by means of objects conditioned by the same law.

The difficulty is also aggravated by the practical inconsistency of the elements of the "change of attitude" procedure: in accordance with Husserl's method, as mentioned above, the path to the field of pure phenomena begins with a "natural position" that overshadows eidetic reality with a "cap" of factual reality. How, in this case, starting from *natural attitude*, simply by means of some *theoretical* definition, to abstract from it? The definition should already contain the practical elements of delimiting the eidetic and factual "regions of being", at least at the level of a priori ideal contemplation (of the mathematical type). It turns out that the traditional "ontological discourse" is in principle unsuitable for both theoretical substantiation and practical implementation of the essential "recognition" and "overcoming" of the *natural attitude* of cognition, because from beginning to end it is located in the plane of "*factual*" *interpretations of things*.

More productive in the interpretation, reflection and practical overcoming of the *natural attitude*, in our opinion, can be a "*cognitive-gnoseological*" *discourse* that can abstract from the "factual" objecthood of physical reality, as well as the psychological world of the subject of cognition with its ontological abstractions.

Summing up, we can say that the ontological discourse in Husserl's phenomenology plays an exclusively auxiliary role, devoid of the immanent potency of an adequate semantic content of the description of phenomenological experience. Moreover, as it turns out, it is the ontological discourse that imposes on the subject the *natural attitude* of cognition, the overcoming of which, as explained in detail above, is the fundamental principle of the phenomenological method. Ultimately, in the "solitary spiritual life" of *Consciousness*, following Husserl, we enter the sphere of anti-discursive self-cognition, in the sense that we are faced with a precedent of meaning genesis in circumstances of absolute freedom from discursive power of any kind, including the power ofgnoseological discourse freed from the dogmas of ontological clauses.

Gaining access to apodictic truth

The vector of phenomenological Thinking is a movement from ontological to gnoseological discourse: the status of "rigorous science" is not "befitting" to take seriously a problem field as a subject of study, which is obviously limited by the limits of methodological doubt.

Namely, this is the object of being: if you try to withstand the scientific and ethical imperative of honest research, you have to admit the heuristic failure of attempts to a priori define a certain entity or the fact of the existence / non-existence of something as an apodictic truth. As the history of European philosophy has convincingly shown, we do not have a single undoubted rational / irrational basis in order to formulate judgments of the type: "This exists, and this does not" in relation to objects and phenomena of the surrounding world, just as we have no right to judgments like: "This thing is so-and-so...", including "Man is, in fact, so-and-so...". Only under the spell of "naive" uncritical pre-scientific perception can one be tempted to take the dogmatic axioms of ontological-discursive topics for "for granted" truths.

The target program of the focus of *ontological discourse* on the methodology of "knowledge of that without knowing for sure what" looks, strictly speaking, pseudoscientific. Therefore, first of all, the question of the status of cognition as such should be resolved: "What can we know with certainty, reliably?", and as we move from this topological "start", already in line with the gnoseologically-discursively given program, the scientist receives the legal right to make judgments about the nature and existence of those subject areas where the question of the reliability of cognition has found a positive resolution. In this case, there is no need even for additional proofs of the discovered "regions of being" (Husserl), they are given "automatically" with apodictic obviousness.

Thus, the need for a targeted program of *gnoseological discourse* is revealed, which boils down to a single problem - the problem of the method of gaining access to undoubted truths, or, in documentary terms, to the search for a "method of cognition the method" of direct scientific research of undoubted realities⁸⁵. Here one should not be embarrassed by seeming tautology: we are really talking about a scientific methodology for developing a methodology relevant to apodictic cognition. The need for such, say, *pre-methodology*, is due to the "negative" start of any scientific research, located, as Husserl himself admitted, in *natural attitude*, that is, in the cognitive position of a naive belief in the givenness of the existing subject of research. Obviously, in order to proceed to the direct, in the traditional sense of the word, method of cognition of an object in this situation, a procedure is needed to free oneself from the "naive" perception of this object as unambiguously existing in the perception that appears to us (that is, in fact). It is hard to disagree that we are not talking here about some monosyllabic empirical or even intellectual manipulation, for which a short explanation is enough - on the contrary, a full-fledged methodological science is required here, which guarantees the final overcoming of the pseudoscientific prerequisites of cognition. When the "naivety" of the actual perception of the subject is methodologically and consistently overcome, one can begin to develop a methodology for studying the essence of the subject. However, in this case, it

⁸⁵ See similar reasoning: Yampolskaya A.V. Phenomenological reduction as a philosophical conversion // Questions of Philosophy. 2012. No. 9. pp. 157–166: "Descartes sought to know the world, but Husserl wants to know knowledge itself, that is, to know how we know. The constant shift of research interest from what is known to how it is known is the first element of the phenomenological, that is, "unnatural" attitude of thought.

is already based not on the naive dogma of the existent, but on the undoubted result of gnoseological-discursive penetration into the sphere of “pure essences” (Husserl).

In this sense, it would be fair to assert that if the method of overcoming the *natural attitude* through *gnoseological-discursive Thinking* is implemented, *on its basis* it is possible to build ontological-discursive constructs and the corresponding methodological developments without the danger of losing the eidetic level of research, that is, the sphere of apodictic truth. In other words, the method of *gnoseological discourse* is also a way to pave the unmistakable path to the method of *ontological discourse* in a common objective-logical bundle. *Ontological discourse* produces a “naive” science of the *natural attitude* only in isolation from the orientation towards the focus of *gnoseological discourse*. In general, *ontological discourse* can and should become a methodological tool for achieving the target program of *gnoseological discourse*. Consequently, *in the case of realization (through a complete phenomenological reduction) of the dominant position of pure non-discursive Consciousness (phenomenological attitude), Consciousness is able to positively “occupy” both gnoseologically discursive Thinking and ontologically discursive Thinking in achieving undoubted apodictic knowledge (phenomenological description).*

So, two phases of gnoseological-discursive *Thinking* are already visible:

1. The negative (“apophatic”) phase of exposing dogmatic judgments, funded by a priori transcendentals of “self-evident” “truths”. It is here that the distinction between essences and the facts of their explication takes place - the first step in Husserl's phenomenological science. Through skeptical depreciation of the naive belief in the certainty of the existent, gnoseologically discursive negation leads to the destruction of the rational constructs of the *a priori natural attitude*, which makes it possible to completely reduce *Thinking* from the height of the phenomenological reason, the implementation of which ensures freedom from the judgments (epoche) of the *phenomenological attitude*, which is from a discursive point of view, the state of the anti-discourse of the *Consciousness* of “solitary life of a soul” (Husserl). Thus, in the first phase of *gnoseological discourse*, *Thinking* opens two non-contiguous worlds, clearly separated from each other by the boundary of methodological doubt: the world of relative facts of surrounding objects and phenomena of “doubtful existence” (naively assumed in *natural attitude* as existing) and the world of apodictic truths of undoubted acts of experiencing the consciousness of an intentional subject (the subject of study for a truly rigorous science).

2. The positive (“kataphatic”) phase begins in the sphere of the scoping of undoubted apodictic truths discovered in the first phase, *that is, after* the realization of the phenomenological epoche, being the result of a conscious reflection of the pure transcendental Ego towards mental intellectually-understanding activity. In this case, *Thinking*, as an internal discourse is genetically secondary, that is, a product of the anti-discursive semantic field of “pure *Consciousness*” of an intentional subject, and therefore takes an auxiliary role as a sign tool for phenomenological description of noetic-noematic structures of *Consciousness*. The key role in the functional discursive restructuring of the *Thinking* of gnoseological discourse belongs to the reason, understood phenomenologically (Husserl considered the clarification of the phenomenological essence of the reason one of the priority tasks of his new science). Only under the control of the phenomenological reason awakened by the reduction is the understanding able to function in the gnoseological-discursive mode, otherwise the understanding inevitably “falls” to the “habitual” level of ontologically discursive a priori structures, that is, to the *natural attitude*. Phenomenological reason is the sphere of a certain anti-discourse, which Husserl selects, as we have already noted, a very precise

designation - "*Consciousness of reason*" (Vernunftbewußtsein⁸⁶): *it does not mean Thinking, but acts of Consciousness aimed at experiencing Thinking*. Only in the sphere of pure experiences of anti-discursive meanings, immanent to the *Consciousness* of the intentional subject of the *phenomenological attitude*, does the scoping of rational research open, discovered by Husserl's "only rigorous science" and, accordingly, inaccessible to the naive *Thinking of the natural attitude* (that is, the sphere of power of any kind discourse).

According to Husserl, there is thinking and "thinking" - the first as a "living" eidos of pure *Consciousness* denies the second as a mechanical "dead" play of certain signs (*Thinking*). The path to a new phenomenological thinking *Consciousness*, which denies the classical traditional understanding of thought as inner speech, involves a break with internal discourse (reduction) and access to the "region of experience before thinking" (epoche), consisting exclusively of pure meanings, free from linguistic conditionality (anti-discourse).

Let's supplement the gnoseological-discursive description of a person in *natural attitude* as follows:

1. In natural prescientific perception, each person identifies the acts of experiencing the obvious presence of his "I" with the acts of experiencing "own body". As a result, the legitimate certainty of the existence of one's own *Consciousness* and its "owner" ("I"), emanating from the region of reliable knowledge (*pure Consciousness "I"*), "merges" in the "*stream of Consciousness*" with the retential and protential sensations of "one's own body" and everything, which is related to the body, including data from the bodily senses, which are located in the region of problematic knowledge⁸⁷. Thus, in *natural attitude*, a person "naively" accepts the undoubted act of experiencing "his body" as a fact of the "undoubted" presence of the body itself. Accordingly, doubtful knowledge obtained from the activity of bodily senses is experienced by the subject of knowledge in *natural attitude* as undoubted "facts".

In other words, a person in *natural attitude* is naively convinced of the identity of his "I" and "own body", therefore, the problematic knowledge received by the body's sense organs within the total space-time environment is experienced by him as an undoubted factual reality (reliable knowledge).

2. A person "naturally" identifies the acts of experiencing the obviousness of the existence of own "I" that occur in *pure Consciousness* with the acts of experiencing "*own Thoughts*". For example, Kant's transcendental subject, which falls under the a priori variety of the subject of cognition in *natural attitude*, "naively" identifies reason (Vernunft) with "Consciousness of reason" - Vernunftbewußtsein (Husserl's term⁸⁸). The realm of Kant's transcendent sphere is mediated by reason, which, although also unable to penetrate into transcendent being, can speculatively perform systematization of cognition, translating it into the perspective of practical philosophy. Therefore, despite the fact that the rational knowledge of the Kantian reason is located within the region of problematic knowledge of *Thinking*, in the subject of an a priori *natural attitude* it is naively associated

⁸⁶ Husserl E. Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book. Moscow, 2009, p. 423.

⁸⁷ In the present study, an gnoseological-discursive delimitation of two polar onto-gnoseological regions is carried out: the region of problematic (doubtful or plausible) knowledge and the region of apodictic (undoubted or reliable) knowledge.

⁸⁸ Husserl E. Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book. Moscow, 2009, p. 423.

with undoubted reliable knowledge, since it is experienced by the *Consciousness* of the subject as a “logically irrefutable”, “apodictic” judgment. And if, according to Kant, the funding role of consciousness is judgment (psychologism), then for Husserl it is experiences (antipsychologism).

Husserl explains the “psychological” as a “peculiar object of psychology”, he wonderfully argues the need to reduce such psychological impartial objecthood by “extremely unpleasant ambiguity”, coming from the attraction to some kind of “psychology without a soul”. One does not need to have great insight to see in the “psychology without a soul” exposed by Husserl the transcendental system of Kant, which in “overcoming metaphysics” really destroys the sphere of experiences of the “soul” (*Consciousness*), leaving behind *Consciousness* only the role of a mechanically constructed judgment (that is of the same *Thinking*), thus “throwing out the baby with the water.”

Finally, the summarizing - “general” - gnoseological-discursive addition to the “general thesis” of Husserl's *natural attitude* can be succinctly formulated in a brief thesis: *The subject of the natural attitude accepts the “reality” of the dubious data of the experience of the region of problematic knowledge of Thinking as an undoubted reality, that is, in the status of reliable knowledge, immanent to the region of apodictic knowledge of pure Consciousness.*

Thus, the essence of the “naivety” of cognition in *natural attitude* is the displacement of the true subject of reliable cognition from the region of apodictic knowledge of *Consciousness* to the region of problematic knowledge of *Thinking*, which gives rise to the methodology of naive efforts to obtain undoubted knowledge through *Thinking*, that is, in the obviously doubtful scoping of the problematic region. Accordingly, the essence of Husserl's phenomenological reduction as a radical methodological tool for the final overcoming of the *natural attitude* of cognition is the exclusion the factual data of the region of problematic knowledge (*Thinking*) from the scoping of rigorous science in order to fully focus on the essences of *Consciousness* of the region of apodictic knowledge. At its first stage - eidetic reduction - the data of empirical experience are excluded (corresponds to Appendix 1 of the description of the *natural attitude*), at the second stage - the transcendental-phenomenological reduction - the judgments of the rational experience of the transcendental subject are “bracketed” (Appendix 2 of the description of the *natural attitude*).

Husserl gives a detailed description of what happens to the ontological-discursive perception of being after the transcendental-phenomenological reduction is performed: “In transcendental experience, all “transcendental being”, understood in the conventional sense as true being, is excluded, “bracketed”. The only thing that must remain besides this is “consciousness itself” in its own essence (*Wesen*), and in the place of transcendent being, the “intended being” of the transcendent and, thus, all kinds of correlates – the implied, the noema”⁸⁹. Brought “in brackets” (reduced), according to Husserl, there can be not only an objectively existing / non-existent object, “transcendent” in relation to *Consciousness* (empirical subject), but also a psychological subject (*Thinking*): “Thus, all ontologies pass into the power of reduction (become its prey)”⁹⁰. On the other hand, according to Husserl, “pure phenomenology preserves all ontologies in itself ... since the roots of any ontology are its fundamental concepts and axioms”⁹¹.

⁸⁹ Husserl E. Hua V: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Buch III: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*, Hrsg. v. M. Biemel, Den Haag, 1952. S. 76.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid. S. 77: „Gleichwohl schien die reine Phänomenologie alle Ontologien in sich zu bergen... [denn] die Wurzeln aller Ontologien sind die Grundbegriffe und Axiome derselben“.

The following is extremely important in the last words: at the same time, any ontology, in fact, turns out to be just a kind of dubious interpretation of the *natural attitude*, while its "root" is constituted in *Consciousness*, as some ideal objecthood (noema), which can be described within the boundaries of formal ontology, which Husserl conceives. It turns out that phenomenology potentially contains all possible (known or not yet) ontologies. Therefore, Husserl creates a formal ontology as an a priori doctrine of the pure modes of an object in general. This doctrine can only be a reliable knowledge of essence (essentia), but never a doctrine of existence (existentia), of "real being."

Hence the fundamentally negative position of Husserl's phenomenology towards the ontological discursive focus is affirmed: the question of the existence of an object is the question of its "original" givenness to the transcendental *Consciousness*, which thus constitutes the object as existing. "To every "truly existing" object, in principle there corresponds (in the a priori unconditional essential universality) the idea of some possible consciousness, for which this object itself is grasped (erfaßbar) primarily (originär) and, at the same time, completely adequate. And vice versa, if this possibility is ensured, then the object eo ipso is truly existing"⁹².

So, ontology "dissolves" in the intentional subject and at the same time is preserved in the Husserl's phenomenology of cognition as the central concepts and axioms of ontology as a theoretical discipline, reduced to "constituting absolute consciousness". "Absolutely existent is existent (ist seiend) in the form of intentional life, which, whatever it contains as conscious, is at the same time consciousness of itself."⁹³

The "dissolution" of ontological problems in the intentional dimension of the subject can be commented in more detail as follows. As is known, Husserl bases his phenomenology on the logic of the essences of things that are revealed in the *intentional* experiences of the acts of *Consciousness*. The German classic introduces a significant change in the interpretation of *intentionality* as a fundamental characteristic of human *Consciousness*, given by his teacher F. Brentano, who defined intention as the orientation towards an object inherent in an act of *Consciousness*. Husserl sees the error of the entire previous philosophical tradition in that it did not distinguish between the object opposing *Consciousness*, the form in which this object is given to *Consciousness*, and the sensual content of the experiences of *Consciousness* themselves. This difference stems from three types of connections that take place in any cognition: "A) The connection of experiences in cognition (Erkenntniserlebnis), in which science is subjectively realized, that is, the psychological connection of ideas, judgments, insights, assumptions, questions and etc., in which the study is carried out. B) The connection of studied in science and theoretically known things, which, as such, constitute the field of this science. C) Logical connection, that is, the specific connection of theoretical ideas, which constitutes the unity of the truth of a certain scientific discipline"⁹⁴.

Accordingly, Husserl rebukes even his teacher, who, although he recognized the intentional nature of *Consciousness* to be constantly directed at something, nevertheless did not see differences in the very "act of grasping" of objecthood. Therefore, Brentano concludes that "the only difference

⁹² Husserl E. Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book. Moscow, 2009, p. 442.

⁹³ Husserl E. Hua V: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Buch III: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften, Hrsg. v. M. Biemel, Den Haag, 1952. S. 78.

⁹⁴ Husserl E. Logical research. Part 1: Prolegomena to pure logic. St. Petersburg, 1909, pp. 154-155.

is the “content”, and the act of representation itself is determined in various ways, since there are different contents to which the representation itself is directed”⁹⁵.

In fact, the quality of *Consciousness* to be always directed at some object is an obvious and long-known fact, already noticed by Aristotle, and often discussed by medieval scholastics and philosophers of modern times. However (it must be admitted) only in the phenomenology of Husserl (not even Brentano) does *intentionality* receive its worthy recognition as a founding principle of any attempt to start a scientific study of *Consciousness*. After all, if *Consciousness* is always intentional, then, consequently, it is also intentional in the sphere of *sum cogito*, which, as a “phenomenological residue” after Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, remains an apodictic truth, having successfully passed the tests of Descartes’ “methodological doubt censorship”. The most important consequence of this fact is that the certainty of the *cogito* naturally and necessarily grants the status of certainty (apodicticity) to its intentional object, the *cogitatum*. For from the point of view of *gnoseological discourse*, it is absurd to divide the act of *Consciousness* into parts (which could come to mind in the case of an *ontological approach*) - there is no direction without what it is directed to! Consequently, in the immanent structures of the *Consciousness* of an intentional subject, there are not only acts of experiences, but also those objects to which these experiences are directed. Finally, and most importantly, these intentional objects are present with the same undoubted apodictic certainty as the acts themselves, since they are integral components of these acts. At the same time, in terms of content, intentional objects, to which acts of sensory perception, speculation, and expression of will are directed, do *not differ in any way* from “real” natural things, phenomena, processes, events, which, as dubious, are reduced and put “outside the brackets” of scientific research. It turns out that their existence is doubtful as real things, phenomena, processes, etc., independent of the *Consciousness*, but as part of the acts of the intentional *Consciousness* itself, they exist apodictically, that is, undoubtedly. Husserl will say that they exist as parts of *Consciousness* as “correlatives” of real objects, which do not exist independently of *Consciousness*, according to the principle “without a subject there is no object.” Husserl called these “correlates” intentional objects. In terms of quantity and content, they are identical to habitual, that is, real objects of the natural world - phenomenologically congruent to them. However, the existence status of intentional correlates is completely different: unlike real objects that exist on their own, that is, transcendent in relation to *Consciousness*, intentional objects do not exist outside *Consciousness*, being its integral part. At the same time, the existence of real objects is doubtful and problematic, and the existence of intentional objects is undoubted or apodictic. So, Husserl came to one of the main achievements of his phenomenology - the discovery of the world of intentional objects, unnoticed before him, the boundless terra incognita for a truly rigorous science, operating with exceptionally reliable, undoubted data.

Intention is giving meaning to an object. The meaning of intention itself, according to Husserl, is to be meaning-giving. The direction of *Consciousness* towards an object, which is usually understood as intention, is not some kind of physical action, when something is directed towards something — in essence, this is a *semantic* attribution. The word “giving” in the phrase “giving meaning to an object” in Russian does not sound exactly like in German: Husserl uses the word “Verleihen” - to give something to something in terms of “to lend”. In the Russian language, Russian phenomenologist Viktor Molchanov notes, there is a similar word that characterizes feudal relations in Europe -

⁹⁵ Husserl E. *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898–1925)*. Den Haag, 1980. s. 7. Cit. Quoted from: Razeev D.N. *In the networks of phenomenology*. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 68.

“seignioral-vassal relations”⁹⁶. By analogy with fief relations, one can understand what Husserl had in mind. The landowner “attribute meaning” to the peasant by negotiating with him: “Be a peasant, provided that you are given land, tools, accommodation, etc.; but you are required to be our peasant, not “peasant in general” who empowered himself in this way. We are talking about the fact that *Consciousness* attributes meaning (for Husserl, “meaning” and “essence” are identical concepts) to an object, which becomes *an intentional object of Consciousness*. The object becomes the carrier of a certain meaning, which is given to it by the intentional subject. The orientation of *Consciousness* to an object (which is usually understood as intention) is not some kind of mechanical action of one substance on another, but the establishment of certain relationships (“bond relations”), a kind of “agreement” between “partners” (*Consciousness* and an object), the dividend of which is the meaning, which acquires an “owner” - an intentional subject. As a result of the intentional “agreement”, due to the “borrowed” meaning, the object transcendent to the *Consciousness* becomes an immanent intentional object. It is extremely important that in this understanding, the category of meaning loses its rigid connection with the sign (name, meaning), always being “outside” / “between” one or another fixed “point of being”, thus opening a new “region of being”, up to Husserl, unnoticed by anyone, is the sphere of pure *Consciousness* (pure meanings, essences), which has a non-substantial nature, representing a set of “acts of experiences” (units of meaning) that form a “*stream of Consciousness*” in the dynamics of “immanent time”.

It may seem that some relativism is visible here on the basis of arbitrariness in giving any meaning to this or that object. However, Husserl perceives free activity in giving meaning not as arbitrariness, but as a description: the relation of *Consciousness* to the world of things is the relation of comprehension of meaning or *discovery of meaning*. This meaning-giving by Husserl must be distinguished from Kant's "assignment of meaning": we put into an object what we ourselves have synthesized in the mind. Husserl has a softer structure: *meaning is given and revealed at the same time*. Therefore, Husserl calls this process the *constitution* of an object: *constitution* is the establishment of meaning and at the same time its discovery (description), implying that we establish something not as we please, but as it “reveals itself” in the act of experiencing (ideation). Establishment is the equivalent of the word “constituting”, which means that we establish something, but not in the way we want. For example, a good state constitution is established not arbitrarily, but in accordance with the positive experience (discoveries) of the socio-cultural practice of the people of this state. Only then can such a constitution serve as a guarantor of the stability of the state. But if we arbitrarily change the constitution according to our subjective and opportunistic discretion, then the state loses its meaning as a guarantor and reliability of the life of the people. Likewise, we establish a certain meaning for the subject, while at the same time revealing it, but not imposing it. Husserl considers this property of *Consciousness* to give meaning to its main characteristic (intentionality), which operates regardless of whether we realize something psychologically by *Thinking* (that is, with the help of fantasy, sign systems, perception, etc.) or not, which differs not only from the position of Descartes' psychologism, but also from Frege's "anti-psychologism". Therefore, Husserl insists on a distinction between cogitatio, i.e., specific experience, and cogitatum, i.e., the object, "being", to which the experience is directed. Accordingly, phenomenological research

⁹⁶ Molchanov V.I. Research on the phenomenology of consciousness. M., 2007. S. 336. “Consciousness gives meaning to an object, consciousness gives, endows (verleihen) an object with meaning, consciousness, as it were, lends meaning to an object, as if there is a seignioral-vassal relationship between consciousness and an object - consciousness gives the object a meaning for use, and the object becomes an object called into the sphere of consciousness. Ozhegov's Explanatory Dictionary: Seignioral-vassal relations - 1. In the Middle Ages: land ownership granted to a vassal, as well as the very right to such possession and the duties of a vassal. 2. In Sweden: administrative-territorial unit.

is called upon to descriptively clarify cogitatio, cogitatum and their relationship (noetico-noematic analysis).

The first thing that Husserl himself draws attention to is that the very concept of “content” of an intentional act of *Consciousness* carries a fundamental duality in which it is necessary to distinguish between the sensory content of experience (“sensory matter”) and intentional content (“intentional matter”). Husserl distinguishes in external perception, for example, in the vision of a colored object, “the moment of color, which constitutes a real component of a particular vision, which is an “experienced” or “conscious content”, as well as the nature of perception, and the full manifestation in the perception of a given colored object. This object itself, on the contrary, is not experienced or realized, although it is perceived; and in the same way the perceived coloring is neither experienced nor realized in him”⁹⁷.

The intentionality of any act of *Consciousness* implies a focus on an object, but at the same time, this object itself does not belong to the act of *Consciousness* as its *real (sensory)* matter, which is a complex of sensations given in the phenomenon of an object (“moments of experiences”), that which experienced (perceived). According to Husserl, it is thanks to the sensations of the “real contents” of the act of *Consciousness* that a person is able to cognize the essence of the objective world implied in the act (intentional content, intentional matter), thus returning “back to things”. Therefore, the main given of phenomenology is the moments of sensations (experiences), the object itself, experienced in the act, does not play a decisive role, *the problem of its existence or non-existence, correspondence or inconsistency with the image of perception by the subject, does not have a decisive meaning* and should be reduced, placed “in brackets” (phenomenological epoche).

Thus, what is experienced is not an object in the proper sense, but a “complex of sensations”. The object itself is “intended” or “constituted” in an act, which first of all means the *implication* of this object (“empty intention”), in which its *existence or non-existence turns out to be phenomenologically insignificant* (implying the centaur and the chair in which I sit every day, in the *phenomenological attitude*, is the same by the essence). Therefore, in the context of discursive analysis, the topic of priority of the problem of existence/non-existence, which substantiates the axiomatic specificity of the microstructure of the ontological discourse, is rejected by Husserl's phenomenological method as irrelevant to the goal of obtaining reliable apodictic knowledge.

Following Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848), a Czech mathematician and philosopher (the second outstanding personality who, together with F. Brentano, radically influenced the scientific worldview of the young Husserl), Husserl adhered to the position of the objectivity of truth, which is independent not only of the psychology of people, but in general of their existence: the truth of mathematical statements, as, for example, $2 + 2 = 4$, does not depend on a person. It is known that the question of the objectivity of truth from time immemorial and still is a controversial issue, attacked by various kinds of relativism (a vivid example is Friedrich Nietzsche, who compared the humanity of the Earth with smart monkeys who “invented” their “objective knowledge”, which “will go out” together with the planet). Bolzano in his “Theory of Science” (1837) drew attention to the fact that there are statements “in themselves” - that is, in no way correlated with the psychological life of a person. In other words, we can state something as obvious, without having any opportunity to check it and realize it psychologically. It is not difficult to find such examples in mathematics, but

⁹⁷ Husserl E. Logical research. T. II / trans. V. I. Molchanova. M., 2001. p. 324.97 Husserl E. Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung.

Bolzano cited more “lifelike” analogies for persuasiveness: in Italy in such and such a year a certain number of grapes were harvested. We will never be able to verify how many grapes there are, but it is obvious that there is some exact number of them: there are so many, not so many. It turns out that the exact number of grapes is psychologically unrealizable in principle, but we are convinced that such a number is reliable and necessarily exists. If such an observation applies even to empiricism, what can we say about abstract mathematics. So, statements of real being often cannot be realized psychologically. However, the *natural attitude* of Western philosophy, tied to the ontological-discursive topic, since the time of Parmenides, “ontologizes” precisely the subjective psychological reality: “there is only what we can think of.”

In the context of comparison with the problems of mathematical “rigorous” science, Husserl tries to understand how European mathematics fixes logical truths, although at the same time it is not able to discover them “consciously”, because it is limited by psychological conditioning? The “naive” *natural attitude* to this answers that objects, including mathematical ones, exist “regardless of our consciousness”, we cannot create them simply with our imagination, will, etc. But such a statement obviously falls into category of naive reasoning, because in fact the history of human culture unequivocally states the fact that we can and do create the surrounding objective world precisely as a symbolic world (Ernst Cassirer). The philosophy of postmodernism (R. Barthes, J. Bataille, A. Toynbee, F. Jamieson, J. Deleuze, J. Baudrillard, etc.) showed especially clearly that entire generations are forced to live following this or that fantasy, idea, fashion, narratives, simulacra, etc. To overcome this naivety, we need to ask: what in our *Consciousness* makes us think that the surrounding objects do not depend on us? Even if we assume that things really do not depend on us, then what does it mean to “assume that things do not depend on us”? The only solution is to turn to the study of our *Consciousness* and understand the meaning of “independence of objects from consciousness.” And the objects themselves do not have this meaning! My computer does not say that it has “independence from my mind”. It is not objects that signal us, but we ourselves believe that objects do not depend on us. How does this happen in us? How do we understand abstractions (for Husserl, mathematical abstractions are primarily interesting)? And in general, how does abstraction arise? It is not enough to be content with simply stating what abstractions are and how they differ from material objects. One has to turn to the sphere of *Consciousness* not as a psychological sphere of *Thinking* (registered associations, emotions, etc.). Moreover, we should even exclude psychological actions completely, because they have nothing to do with the fact that, for example, $2 + 2 = 4$ (whether you laugh or cry, $2 + 2$ will still be 4). Hence the problem: how to come to subjectivity, but non-psychological? And here, when Husserl formulates the target program of his phenomenology as the problem of the possibility of comprehending truths that cannot be fixed psychologically (how do we realize what does not depend on us?), he moves to the position of gnoseological discourse.

Thus, in accordance with discursive analysis, the *natural attitude* is the unconscious surrender of the subject of cognition to the ontological discursive program (the result of the subject of cognition’s unconscious choice of the “power” of ontological discourse), which begins to fall under conscious criticism only when moving to discursive-gnoseological structures of *Thinking*. It is on the verge of the unconscious ontologically discursive *Thinking* and the awakening awareness of the gnoseologically discursive *Thinking* that the “beginner” phenomenologist encounters the methodological “pain point” of the psychological “split personality” in his attempts to think “in two attitudes”. At the same time, on the one hand, the philosopher is theoretically oriented toward the

gnoseologically discursive “soaring above the *natural attitude*”⁹⁸, but on the other hand, he directly deals practically with “very precise, from the point of view of the ontologically discursive *Thinking*, Husserl's definition of *natural attitude*, delicately corresponding to the *Thinking* of a person of *natural attitude*.”

Solution of the problem of obviousness

By the New Age, philosophy received the so-called "theory of cognition", funded mainly by the "roots" of ontological discourse, which, of course, led European gnoseology to gnoseological-heuristic bankruptcy.

Husserl confirms our conclusion by pointing out in his own words the cognitive failure of the “natural-scientific theory of cognition”: “How can experience as consciousness give an object or simply touch it; ... how the play of consciousness can give objective significance, significance relating to things that exist in themselves; why the rules of the game of consciousness are not indifferent to things; how can natural science in all its parts become intelligible, if it refuses at every step to posit and cognize the nature that exists in itself, - in itself, in comparison with the subjective stream of consciousness: all this becomes a mystery, as soon as reflection seriously turns to these questions. As is known, the discipline that wants to answer them is the theory of cognition; but up to now, in spite of the great work of thought that the greatest researchers have done on these questions, it has not yet answered them with scientific clarity, unanimity and decisiveness. Only strict consistency was needed in maintaining the level of this problematic in order to see the nonsense of some, and consequently, of any psychological “natural-scientific theory of cognition”. If, speaking in general, certain riddles are immanent to natural science, then it goes without saying that their solutions remain fundamentally transcendent to it in terms of their presuppositions and results. To expect the solution of any problem that is inherent in natural science as such—in other words, inherent in it in a fundamental way, from beginning to end—from natural science itself, or even to think that it can, for its part, provide any prerequisites for to solve such a problem means to revolve in a senseless circle.”⁹⁹

In recommending the rehabilitation of the theory of cognition, the founder of phenomenology practically attempts to return it to its gnoseological-discursive “roots”. “If the theory of cognition wants, nevertheless, to investigate the problems of the relationship between consciousness and being, then it can mean only being as a correlate of consciousness”¹⁰⁰, which means, in other words, to question the “taken for granted” the presence (factuality) of being. It turns out that the assumption of a modern European scientist about the existence of the subject he is studying as “for granted” is a prejudice shared by everyone “in a natural way”. Husserl argues that, despite the theoretical research conducted by the scientist, he, in fact, remains within the limits of a naive *natural attitude*, that is, within the boundaries of a certain belief in the world and its existence. This faith, not based on any reliable evidence, is the cause of the countless set of self-evident postulates of science, which are shared by scientists, and after them by the whole society. In this sense, the theory of cognition

⁹⁸ Motroshilova N. V. "Ideas I" by Edmund Husserl as an introduction to phenomenology. Moscow, 2003, p. 97.

⁹⁹ Husserl E. Philosophy as a rigorous science. Novochoerkassk, 1994, p. 138.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p.139.

developed by Husserl must be understood in a new sense - not as a theory of cognition of what exists in the world (external, physical given experience) or in the human soul (internal, psychical given experience), but as a teaching, exploring the possibility of how certain acts of *Consciousness* receive the status of cognition - the *focus* of the gnoseological clause. That is, Husserl's theory of knowledge can be studied solely on the basis of the *phenomenological attitude* (assuming, at a minimum, a transition to the *topic* of gnoseological discourse), in the position of which what *Consciousness* is directed to "gives itself as it gives itself", that is, as a phenomenon. At the same time, in relation to the fact of the objective existence or non-existence of these phenomena (that is, in relation to the ontological discourse), a purposeful abstinence (epoche) is maintained. Thus, Husserl's philosophy of cognition is not a theory of cognition of objects, but a theory of cognition of the phenomena of our *Consciousness* and can be called the "phenomenology of cognition"¹⁰¹.

In this sense, Husserl's phenomenology singles out two independent regions of being:

The realm of things (the region of objecthood) — here there are specific laws of cognition (doubtful knowledge), described by traditional Western gnoseology, primarily in explaining rational cogitation, the philosophy of cognition of *Thinking*.

The area of *Consciousness* that does not depend on the objecthood world and language conditioning - here are other laws of cognition, focused on acts of *adequate and apodictic obviousness* of "pure *Consciousness*" (undoubted reliable knowledge), falling under the jurisdiction of the "phenomenology of cognition"¹⁰². Here we can also use the successful methodological find of the Russian modern philosopher Y.A.Slinin, who built his phenomenological study of the transcendental subject on the "stratification of knowledge from the point of view of its reliability". The author recalls that already the ancient Greeks distinguished genuine, reliable knowledge (episteme) from only plausible opinion (doxa).

So, we can distinguish 2 onto-gnoseological regions:

Region of problematic knowledge	Region of apodictic knowledge
1) a set of plausible opinions (doxa) - <i>Thinking</i>	1) a set of reliable truths (episteme) - <i>Consciousness</i>
2) the sphere of Cartesian doubt	2) outside the sphere of Cartesian doubt
3) subjects of cognition - psychophysical and transcendental (according to Kant) subjects of <i>Thinking in natural attitude</i>	3) subject of cognition - "pure <i>Consciousness</i> " or intentional subject of phenomenological attitude
4) conditioned by the "power of discourse", that is, <i>Thinking</i> , as "inner speech", being a linguistic interpretation	4) outside the "power of discourse" - is generated by the extralinguistic sphere of <i>Consciousness</i> of "solitary life of a soul"
5) discursive status: ontologically and gnoseologically-discursive semantic microstructural clauses	5) discursive status: anti-discourse as a logical completion of the functioning of gnoseologically-discursive thinking
6) includes direct data of the empirical, rational and intuitive experience of the subject of cognition in <i>natural attitude</i>	6) includes intentional acts of experiencing the correlates of empirical, rational and intuitive experience (noema)

¹⁰¹ See: Razeev D.N. In the nets of phenomenology. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 95.

¹⁰² Ibid.

	and noesis) of the <i>phenomenological attitude</i>
7) the reliability of axiomatics (a set of basic "obvious truths") is justified by doxic statements of "self-evident" facts	7) the reliability is justified by intentional acts of adequate and apodictic obviousness (direct contemplation of the essence)
8) has a "psychological and social character" (according to Slinin): it needs external, socio-psychological, with a coercive power of proof	8) has an "ontological character" (in the sense of Slinin): it has an immanent coercive power of proof

Husserl purposefully "curtails" the movement along the logical series of ontologically discursive concepts and returns the study to a *typical gnoseological-discursive thesis*: if the intentional subject as a whole exists apodictically, then any knowledge about the fundamental eidetic structures and other "internal content" of the intentional subject will also become a set of apodictic truths. Intentional *Consciousness* is also interpreted by Husserl not as some kind of once and for all given substance (ontological discourse), but as a stream of acts of experiences following one after another, never duplicating each other and existing in the eternal dynamics of "internal time" - gnoseological discourse. After all, Husserl's inner time is not an ontological time in which processes transcendent to the *Consciousness* take place (this time is just questioned and reduced "in brackets" along with all natural substantial-accidental metamorphoses). Husserl's internal time is a purely subjective condition for the cognitive activity of the intentional subject of cognition, which for the first time separated from the "objective natural time" already in the transcendentalism of I. Kant, which, of course, Descartes could not be guided by in forming his idea of the internal structure of cognitive activity of a person.

The acquisition of valid knowledge (the goal-setting *focus* of the gnoseological clause) is the question of how *Consciousness* is in principle capable to cognize, and it, of course, determines the truth status of the science claimed by phenomenology. Husserl designates the problem of reliable cognition of the essential content of the world as the problem of *obviousness*. The phenomenologically *obvious* is expressed as a feeling of the "understandable": not because it is confirmed in experience, but because it is "considered" as such, that is, it is so well-fundled by the "dogmatic" ontological discourse in the structures of our *Thinking* that it never occurs to anyone to think on what basis is it "understandable". This is why Husserl calls this sensation "self-evident" ("selbstverständlichen")¹⁰³. "Going for granted" is the plane of functioning of the principle of *obviousness* and, according to Husserl, it covers not only value judgments in the sphere of the life world, but, as has already been pointed out in detail, also judgments of the highest rank, that is, judgments of the most serious "exact" sciences.

The essence of Husserl's phenomenological method is precisely in the radical refutation of the dogma of the priority of ontological problems precisely because of the naivety of its "obviousness". Recall: "In all the relationships between constitutive phenomenologies and the corresponding formal and material ontologies, there is nothing like the *former being substantiated by the latter*. When a phenomenologist recognizes an ontological concept, sees in such a guiding thread of his intuitions,

¹⁰³ Husserl E. 1) Die Krisis... S. 19–23; 2) LU, II. S. 546. Quoted from: Razeev D.N. In the nets of phenomenology. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 94.

then *in no way does he make his judgments ontologically*¹⁰⁴, because "the roots of any ontology" are constituted in pure phenomena of *Consciousness*¹⁰⁵, and only then are they fixed in the dogma of discursive *Thinking* through modes of "obviously necessary" Being and Existence and the corresponding "taken for granted" ontological axiomatics. Moreover, Husserl uses literally the same phrase "selbstverständlichen" already in quotation marks, that is, with the exact opposite purpose, namely, critically exposing the naivety of the so-called "obvious" axiomatic premises of the sciences of the *natural attitude*.

In Husserl's "Logical Investigations", the obviousness appears as a result of the coincidence of the implied and contemplated exclusively within the framework of *gnoseological-discursive Thinking*, brought to the limiting verge of correlation with the acts of experiences of *Consciousness*. To study these acts, special concepts of "empty intention" and "contemplative content" are introduced. Intention as an orientation of *Consciousness* to an object is "experienced" in the form of implying (*gnoseologically-discursive Thoughts*) of this object in the act of *Consciousness*. Later (in the "Amsterdam Reports"¹⁰⁶), Husserl himself would call this ultimate intertwining of *gnoseological-discursive Thinking* and *Consciousness* "phenomenological psychology", which also needs to be reduced in order to achieve a region of pure *Consciousness* free from any psychology. Only the *implication* of the object does not give us the object *itself*: the pure implication of the object, which has not yet become the object of direct experience, Husserl designates the "empty" ("significative") intention. The object of an empty intention is only a meaning to which no contemplative givenness yet corresponds, that is, there is still no "contemplative content" that finally forms the phenomenon. Simply put, what is implied in *Thinking* is *not yet obvious* in *Consciousness*. The implementation of the principle of obviousness requires a filling contemplation, or, according to Husserl, intuition. Thus, the act of cognition is an act of coincidence of the implied (*Thinkable*) and contemplated in intuition (*Consciousness*), leading to *obviousness*. Since the intended objecthood does not always receive a corresponding contemplative content, then not every intentional act is an act of cognition: if there is no coincidence between the implied and the contemplated, then there is no *obviousness*, which means there is no cognition (Husserl calls such a case "disruption of intention"). In most cases, however, intended objecthood partially coincides with filling contemplation, then we are dealing with cognition in the mode of *inadequate obviousness*. The ideal of cognition is such a reduction to *obviousness*, the result of which is the complete coincidence of the implied with the contemplated, that is, reduction to *adequate obviousness*. In this case, there are no more unfulfilled intentions, the content of contemplation completely coincides with initially only *Thinkable*, the obviousness is experienced as the self-givenness of a thing in the mode "this is it itself". However, the possibility of unconditional adequate obviousness is questioned because of the "intentional horizons" that accompany any experience of *Consciousness* as a set of unfilled "empty intentions". It turns out that each filling of an empty intention is always accompanied by a set of coincidences of new empty intentions (new intentional "horizons") that arise in the same process, which means that the ultimate coincidence of the implied and contemplated becomes unattainable, and any *obviousness* turns out to be *relative*, that is having the character of greater or lesser *adequacy*. Thus, the limitations of the phenomenological cognition of the acts of *experiencing* the *Consciousness*, "mixed" with the acts of *gnoseological-discursive Thinking*, are revealed. This means that a completely new principle must be

¹⁰⁴ Husserl E. Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book 1. Moscow, 2009, p. 479.

¹⁰⁵ Husserl E. Hua V: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Buch III: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften, Hrsg. v. M. Biemel, Den Haag, 1952. S. 77.

¹⁰⁶ Husserl E. Selected works / comp. V. A. Kurennoy. Moscow, 2005, p. 321.

found, checking the conclusions of science for compliance with their status of absolute cognition. Therefore, Husserl comes to the idea that any obviousness must, in turn, be rechecked before being recognized as reliable knowledge, and by such a recheck Husserl establishes a test for the *apodicticity of obviousness*.

From the point of view of opposing inadequate (assertoric) obviousness, adequate and apodictic obviousness act as equivalent concepts, but apodictic obviousness itself is *more obvious* than adequate obviousness. It is *not easy* to understand the essential difference between adequate and apodictic obviousness, because they belong to different orders of acts of *Consciousness*, which Husserl singled out according to the difference between two levels of *natural attitude* (empirical and a priori)¹⁰⁷ and, as a consequence, two stages of phenomenological reduction: eidetic [level of psychology of *gnoseological-discursive Thinking*] and transcendental [level of pure *Consciousness*].

The concept of *apodictic* obviousness is specially introduced by Husserl in order to point out a special type of obviousness, which is given precisely in the act of reflection “inside” the *Consciousness*, in contrast to *adequate* obviousness, which corresponds to acts of the first order (perception, recollection, fantasies and other modes of *Thinking*). Apodictic obviousness is therefore a correlate of reflective *Thinking*, connected with the a priori activity of the understanding. This means that apodictic obviousness can be achieved only in the case when a priori *Thinking* itself becomes a given of phenomenological analysis, which is possible only in the conditions of the epoche due to the bracketing of reflection itself (that is, all *Thinking* as a whole). And this is the stage of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, which allows the phenomenologist to be on the other side of filling or not filling the intention (which determines adequate obviousness), since its principle is “contemplation in reflection” - “pure contemplation”, and not filling the intended objecthood with contemplation, as in the case of adequate obviousness. Therefore, even inadequate obviousness at the level of transcendental reduction can become apodictic, which is extremely important for the functioning of phenomenology as an “exact” science capable of providing reliable knowledge. For example, the act of perceiving the Moon is inadequate, since it contains empty intentions that do not find their contemplative content (we perceive the Moon only from one side, which means that the other side of the Moon is only implied by *Thinking* in empty intentions, which, in general, may never be contemplatively filled with experience). Nevertheless, the reflection of pure *Consciousness*, directed at the very act of inadequate obviousness, is *possible*, and the given reflections of the perception of the Moon will be apodictic givens. The objecthood of the reflexive act will be the intentional structure of the perception itself (the sphere of the intentional subject of *Consciousness*), accordingly, its analysis will take on the character of apodictic obviousness.

Thus, the concept of apodictic obviousness is introduced by Husserl to designate the phenomenon of obviousness, explicated in reflexive acts immanent to *Consciousness*. Such a reflection does not even belong to *gnoseological-discursive Thinking*: it is aimed at direct acts of *Consciousness*, and therefore refers not just to the analysis of cognition as an act of *Thinking*, but to intentional cognition as a “ripening” (*ideation*) of the basic structures of the sphere of *Consciousness* as a whole. This is the essence of the considered example of the phenomenology of cognition, which, as was shown above, is possible in strict adherence to *gnoseological* discourse, brought to the limit of its own self-overcoming in pure non-discursive *Consciousness*.

¹⁰⁷ Husserl E. Main problems of phenomenology. Lecture course in 1910. § 9 // Razeev D. N. In the nets of phenomenology. SPb., 2004, pp. 239–245.

Thus, only apodictic obviousness, overcoming the limits of adequate obviousness, provides the status of a true science, which is claimed by phenomenology. In turn, apodictic obviousness is possible only if a complete transcendental-phenomenological reduction is carried out. This means that only as a result of the implementation of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, the theoretical and methodological comprehension of which is possible only on the basis of “*pure*” *gnoseological-discursive Thinking*, is in principle the target completion of the phenomenological project undertaken by Husserl to create a “truly rigorous science” possible.

“Pain point” of overcoming the natural attitude

Ontological discourse describes the “I” of the natural attitude as “discovering” itself in some “environment”. This “environment” consists exclusively of its inherent, distinguishing it from others, and invariably present characteristics: name, personal qualities, beliefs, desires, etc. (that is, attributes of psychophysical, linguistic, transcendental and intentional subjects).

Here it turns out that at the same time this “I” also “possesses” manifestations of its unique properties that are constantly changing in the space-time continuum (that is, within the boundaries of the psychophysical subject).

Moreover, the natural “consciousness” disidentifies its fixed “I-environment” from the constantly changing content and intensity of the “possessing” sphere: “I” always experiences certain things and events in different ways, therefore Husserl pays attention, that the “I” is the experiencer, but not the experience itself. In other words, a psychophysical subject in natural attitude naively “assumes at his own expense” the experiences of an intentional subject (the sphere of experiences of Consciousness), thus “mixing” with him. Similarly, Husserl continues, my beliefs (that is, the reason of the transcendental subject) can be confirmed or questioned (the act of the intentional subject). Therefore, “I” is not the belief itself, but “I” is the one who has this belief, etc. It turns out that in this example, in the concept of “I”, three subjects are already mixed - psychophysical, transcendental and intentional. In the context of discursive ontology, we can add in line with Husserl's logical series: “I” is not the language itself, in which I *Think* and speak, but “I” own this language (the status of a linguistic subject). Thus, under the category “I” Husserl means all 4 possible statuses of the subject - psychophysical (physicalists), linguistic (Wittgenstein), transcendental (Kant) and intentional (Brentano).

Within thegnoseological discourse, this four-component structure is diversified as follows:¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Note to the table. Husserl's region of problematic knowledge also corresponds to the “real world” denoted by the word “real”. For the region of apodictic knowledge (intentional sphere), Husserl “chooses the word “reell”, similar to “real”, but still different from it” (Motroshilova N.V. “Ideas I” by Edmund Husserl as an introduction to phenomenology. M., 2003. p. 378). This apodictic intentional “real” (reell) includes, along with noesis (reell) and noema (irrele), also the aspect of hyletic data, “matter” (from the word Hyle - matter) (Ibid., pp. 367, 378). Strictly speaking, Husserl's reell is summed up from two interrelated components: 1) the hyletic moments of concrete experience, or “materials” (Stoffe), or formless matters; 2) a multitude of acts that give

Region of problematic knowledge of <i>Thinking</i> (REAL)	Region of apodictic knowledge of Consciousness (REELLE + IRRELLE)
<p>1. Psychophysical subject - definition in gnoseological discourse: a psychophysical subject is a subject of belief in the reliability of empirical knowledge obtained from the feelings of the physical body and "physical phenomena" (according to Brentano) of the mental functions of the brain (the basis of objecthood of the psychophysical subject), skeptical about the "information" of transcendental, linguistic and, even more so, phenomenological "realities". Thus, it constitutes the psychophysical functional mode of <i>Thinking</i>.</p>	<p>4. Intentional subject - definition in gnoseological discourse: we understand the intentional subject exclusively in the gnoseological-discursive perspective as a subject that, first of all, skeptically rejects the reliability of the so-called objective psychophysical, transcendental or linguistic knowledge of <i>Thinking</i> and, as a result, accepting subjective acts of experience as absolute apodictic truths and in the status of objecthood of the stream of Consciousness.</p>
<p>2. The transcendental subject is a definition in gnoseological discourse: the transcendental subject, in the focus of its microstructure, is funded by "faith" (according to Kant) for the "sufficiency" of cognition of the objecthood of phenomena revealed to the transcendental structures of "consciousness = thinking"; in the topic - agnostically disposed towards the empiricism of psychophysical and other types of "reliable knowledge". Thus, it functions as a transcendental mode of <i>Thinking</i>.</p>	
<p>3. Linguistic subject - definition in gnoseological discourse: a linguistic subject is skeptical about the reliability of the empirical experience of the organs of the physical body, including the mental function of the brain, but is convinced of the reliability of linguistic meanings, identical, from his point of view, to "consciousness" and cognitive activity of a person (the basis of the objecthood of a linguistic subject). Thus, it funds the discursive mode of <i>Thinking</i>.</p>	

In accordance with the four-component subjectivity of Husserl's phenomenological reduction, singled out by means of the gnoseological-discursive structure, a natural assumption arises that the discovered three "coverings" of pure (intentional) subjectivity should correspond to three stages of reduction. Accordingly, *a complete phenomenological reduction can be represented as a three-step*

"materials" form and meaning (morphe), thanks to which experiences are "filled with meaning" (sinnvolle). Taken together, both components characterize reelle, which is what Husserl refers to as "noesis".

"switching off" of psychophysical, linguistic and transcendental subjectivities and their corresponding objecthood, which terminologically can be designated as follows:

Stage 1 - Psychophysical reduction (corresponding to Husserl's eidetic stage), bracketing the psychophysical "I" and its objecthood - the empirically perceived world.

Stage 2 - Linguistic-psychological reduction, bracketing the linguistic subject and its objecthood - linguistic meanings (discursive dynamics of the region of a priori categories of sensuality and understanding of Kant's transcendental subject).

Stage 3 - Transcendental reduction (finally releasing the pure intentional "I", therefore it can also be called *intentional-phenomenological reduction*), bracketing Kant's transcendental reason and the corresponding objecthood - the principles of the ideas of the soul and the world soul, ethics and noumenal theology¹⁰⁹.

However, it is not enough to theoretically know the method of bracketing the psychophysical world and even not enough to have the intention to implement it, it is necessary, as Husserl points out, to understand *how* this should be done. And this is a huge additional and completely "ungrateful" effort, because in itself it does not give any phenomenological result, but only creates conditions for the implementation of an adequate description of ideational contemplation. And experience really confirms that many attempts to realize an epoche (even if one is based on one's personal experience of phenomenological reduction) remain within the limits of ordinary "consciousness" (that is, the consciousness of *natural attitude*), never entering the sphere of the transcendental (intentional). It is clear that in this case the philosopher submits to the irresistible unconscious force of the temptation to step, according to Husserl, "on one or another false path, which, of course, will not lead to the goal, the temptation of an incorrect understanding of how this epoche should be carried out, — in which it is possible to achieve clarity in advance"¹¹⁰. Another difficulty in the practical implementation of the phenomenological reduction, according to the modern researcher of Husserl's heritage N.V. Motroshilova, also recognized by Husserl himself, lies in the alleged "potential infinity of reduction - in the fact that it is generally impossible to purify subjectivity completely"¹¹¹.

Husserl argued that most of the difficulties of "the phenomenological reduction ... lie in the thought habits of age-old traditions, which remain valid even if they are consciously rejected"¹¹². Having many years of experience in introducing the phenomenological method into philosophical science, Husserl states: "The power of prejudice is so great that transcendental epoche and reduction have been present at various stages of their development for decades, but at the same time, it was achieved only that the first results of genuine intentional description were carried over into the old

¹⁰⁹ Even if we return to the ontological-discursive path of phenomenological reduction, we can trace a clear correspondence of the distinguished three stages of reduction with the successive exclusion of empirical, rational (psychological, discursive-linguistic) and transcendental ontology: 1) body (spatio-temporal continuum), 2) understanding = thinking (rational psychology), 3) reason = noumenal reality (ideas, ethics, faith, etc.).

¹¹⁰ Husserl E. *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 201.

¹¹¹ Motroshilova N. V. "Ideas I" by Edmund Husserl as an introduction to phenomenology. Moscow, 2003, p. 278.

¹¹² Husserl E. *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 324.

psychology with consequences detrimental to their meaning"¹¹³. "Even published works can only have their real impact after a real understanding of reduction has been achieved, which is always very difficult"¹¹⁴. Therefore, Husserl concludes his sad observation of phenomenological history, the continuation of the development of true phenomenology is possible only with the recognition of the fact that "everything that seemed to be taken for granted with the obvious interpretation of the universality with which the epoche should be realized, in fact is just a misunderstanding"¹¹⁵.

If we focus on the positive criteria for the actual accomplishment of true phenomenology, then, in accordance with Husserl's warning, the scientific world must be ready for significant transformations in the *Consciousness* of the personality of the scientist himself, in science as a whole, and in the very life of society. As a result of his intensive search for ways to introduce phenomenological thought into the European mentality, Husserl maximally radicalizes the transforming effect of a correctly understood phenomenology on the *Consciousness* of a person and even humanity, comparing it almost with a "religious conversion": "The total phenomenological attitude and the epoche corresponding to it are, first of all, in their essence are meant to produce a complete change in the personality. This transformation of the personality could be compared with a religious conversion, but in which, besides this, the significance of the greatest existential change is hidden, which, as a task, confronts humanity as such"¹¹⁶.

In principle, the topic of distinguishing between two stages of reduction is indeed very difficult even for theoretical understanding, not to mention practical implementation, and was hard even to the very founder of phenomenology. Here we are faced with a certain *punctum dolorosum* ("pain point") of Husserl's method of complete phenomenological reduction, the description of which he himself sometimes accompanies with rather "painful" epithets, such as, for example, the obligatory "colossal efforts" for the phenomenologist to acquire the necessary "height of prescribed methodical fulfillment". Husserl's phenomenological work, which is already difficult enough, is also constantly attacked by certain "temptations" that push the phenomenologist to "fall" from such a difficult phenomenological "height", that is, to return back to the *natural attitude*. For example, in his final work "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", Husserl devotes a whole paragraph to a detailed description of "the difficulty of understanding the true meaning of the implementation of the total epoche", as well as "the temptation to misunderstand it." The philosopher points to the "incomparable originality" of the total epoche, which implies its ambiguity, and "from the very beginning". Therefore, the first temptation that lies in wait for the phenomenologist is associated with an understandable "too human" weakness to always simplify one's work, which in this case will motivate to reduce efforts for the very understanding of the reduction process.

The goal of phenomenological research is unattainable, if only for some time, devoted to phenomenological analysis, you change your *Consciousness* from natural perception to a phenomenological attitude, but then, leaving the premises of a scientific laboratory, return your ordinary "consciousness", dissolving in society of "natural" people. To believe so is already to be tempted to "misunderstand" the procedure of phenomenological abstinence. Husserl, on the other hand, unequivocally and uncompromisingly declares the need for the phenomenologist to carry out

¹¹³ Ibid. p.330.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p.331.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p.187.

“a complete change in the whole attitude of life with the acquisition of a completely new way of life”¹¹⁷. A complete transcendental epoche necessarily requires the phenomenologist to choose a “habitual¹¹⁸ attitude”, which he must decide to accept not as a “transitory, randomly and individually repeated act”, but “once and for all”¹¹⁹. Only in this case, the phenomenologist “at once stops the cumulative realization of significances that permeates the entire natural life of the world and the entire interweaving of these significances, that is, that realization, which, as a single “*natural attitude*”, constitutes “ordinary” life, life “directly”¹²⁰.

It turns out that if we really want to carry out a transcendental reduction, overcoming all temptations, we need to understand well the “weaves of meanings” mentioned by Husserl that make up “ordinary”, “naive” life in *natural attitude*. Therefore, it is necessary to trace in detail how in the stream of “naive consciousness”, which is also inherent in the psychophysical subject and generated by the positions of the *natural attitude*, countless acts of “normal life” are created in the ontological-discursive mode of “implementation of the significance of the pre-given world”. After that, the psychological-discursive “underlying” of the procedure for a total change of attitude will become more understandable, that is, the transition to the position of constant abstinence from such “implementations”, as well as that mental obstacle (“pain point”) and temptations that do not allow to “take out of the game” the very pre-data of “significance” that create the illusion of evidence of the “indisputable presence” of the natural world.

Here we come close to the investigated punctum dolorosum, the “pain point” of Husserl’s phenomenology. It turns out that without a radical transformation of the mindset of the phenomenologist himself, the implementation of the method is not possible. And the most “painful” moment in such a serious restructuring of the researcher’s “lifestyle” required, in our opinion, lies in the difficulty of implementing a special, one might even say, a unique act of self-reflection associated with the individual conditioning of the phenomenologist’s personality by his own mental and bodily “present existence”. Thus, we are talking about the *psychophysical localization of the “pain point”: the main methodological difficulty in understanding oneself in a natural attitude and understanding the procedure for its overcoming is the existential crisis of the psychophysical subject*. After all, a novice phenomenologist does not actually start his philosophical research, being some kind of abstract “disinterested observer” or a liberated “intentional subject”. In fact, he is always a “living person”, who, even at the moment of immersion in a “disinterested” phenomenological analysis, does not leave the sphere of direct contact with his “natural world”, but is always immersed in a concrete psychophysical reality with never weakening experiencing the needs of *Thinking* of own mind and physical body. Even if the phenomenologist has managed to perform a “colossal work” and break out into the free “hover” of his intentional world, in this case he is constantly “attacked” by the flow of experiences of the mind and physical body, even if they are “in brackets”. The question is logical: how much is possible in the conditions of a “rigid” simultaneous relationship between the phenomenological (intentional) and natural (psychophysical) regions of the existence of a person, the *practical* implementation of changing the *natural attitude* to the *phenomenological attitude*?

¹¹⁷ Ibid. p.203.

¹¹⁸ The habitual features of the subject, according to Husserl, indicate a substantive actor who takes an existential form (having the status of being), that is, the concept of habituality is maintained by Husserl mainly in ontological discourse.

¹¹⁹ Husserl E. *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 204.

¹²⁰ Ibid. p.203.

Husserl repeatedly, directly and indirectly in various interpretations, pointed out the existence of a psychologically paradoxical situation of a “split” personality in the process of implementing a phenomenological practice. In the lecture course of 1910, “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology”, Husserl points to the experience of “attachment of the “I” to the body” as a founding act that switches the essence of the personal “I” to the position of the empirical subject as a “member of nature”, as an “object inside the spatial temporary existence”¹²¹, that is, into the *natural attitude*. It always exclusively the “I” of the intentional subject experiences, but these experiences *are realized as connected with the body precisely because of the attachment of the “I” to this body*. Thus, the *intentional subject of Consciousness, experiencing an act of attachment to the body (and, therefore, to the understanding rigidly connected with the sense organs of the body, that is, to its own mental constitution of the Thinking), becomes for this reason a psychophysical subject*.

Husserl draws attention to the fact that the process of deep transformation of the original intentional subject into a psychophysical subject occurs stepwise and in an orderly manner. First, sensory experiences (perception of things, including the body, sensations of color, sound, etc.) have their own figurative relation to the appearing thing, which, as already mentioned, is a special “thing among other things” - “one’s own body”. Similarly, it happens with specific bodily sensations associated with the movement of the eyes, hands, etc., which are “localized” (*hineinlokalisiert*) into the body and parts of the body. Further, sensory emotions (*sinnliche Gefühle*) also have a similar *attachment*, with which the psychic experiences of a higher order of *Thinking*, etc. are closely intertwined. The grouping (*Verteilung*) of the experiences-perceptions (*Wahrnehmungserlebnisse*) that the “I” has in contact with the variety of things in its sphere of “possession” also relates entirely to the *body*. At the same time, each time this method of distribution is associated precisely with *his* body, while with the alien body and the groups of experiences attributed to it to the extent of empathy, a corresponding, but different method of distribution and, moreover, other groups of experiences are associated. Ultimately, Husserl proceeds to a theoretical description of the key thesis of his method, connected with the substantiation of the possibility and necessity of breaking the indicated attachment of the “I” to the body, which is founding the natural perception of “naive” life: “So, it is obvious that any attachment to the body there is something that can be separated from the body again”¹²².

Indeed, theoretically, the procedure for separating the experiencing intentional “I” from the empirical subject of the “I-body” looks impeccable: since the fact that it is a sensing thing (it reacts to a prick with pain, to an itch - by scratching, etc.) does not belong to the essence of a thing, the fact of the appearance of a thing as a body can be separated from the sensation of a thing as a mental experience. It is impossible to imagine a thing that would not be spatial and would not have real properties. But it is quite possible to imagine a thing, including the well-known human body, which would not be a sentient thing. “Res extensa” is in fact “res cogitans” to the extent that “cogitations” are related to a thing in terms of experience.¹²³ But “cogitare” in itself has nothing to do with “res extensa”. It turns out that in their essence, cogitation and extension do not have a direct connection and are fundamentally different from each other. On the other hand, in the essence of sensations of pain, color, sound, as well as perception, judgment, desire, etc., there is no essential relation to any

¹²¹ Husserl E. Main problems of phenomenology. Lecture course of 1910 // Razeev D. N. In the nets of phenomenology. SPb., 2004. p. 254.

¹²² Ibid. p.255.

¹²³ Ibid.

thing. And if so, then "we can cut the empirical relationship between cogitatio and res"¹²⁴. In other words, although we cannot, of course, in practice separate experiences from real people experiencing them, we can nevertheless "consider experiences in themselves, without considering them in their empirical relation"¹²⁵.

So, we are talking about a theoretical operation on the *Consciousness* of a "disinterested observer", who in his intentional world "turns off" the natural representation of the existence of nature, due to which he can afford such scientific research in which he is able not to use certain judgments about nature (*Thinking*), while maintaining the essential significance of nature. However, this does not remove the question we have raised: how does this "theoretical operation" turn out for the personality of a phenomenologist in practice? In reality, however, we observe that the phenomenologist is forced to face a serious psychological difficulty, which Husserl, as a highly conscientious scientist, himself points out (again without providing a concrete method for overcoming it), designating it as "doubling paradox"¹²⁶.

Putting himself on the frontier of the "Copernican revolution" from the position of a phenomenological psychologist (who has completed the eidetic stage of reduction) to the position of a transcendental phenomenologist (bringing abstinence to a transcendental-phenomenological level, that is, a total epoche), the scientist finds himself in a truly painful situation of "split personality". Psychologically, he experiences himself as a "normal person", a psychophysical subject of the real world (*Thinking*), and at the same time - an intentional subject, constituting this world, including himself as a human phenomenologist as an intentional object immanent to his own *Consciousness*. For example, as required by the ethical code of a scientist, I set up an experiment on myself: at the same time I must recognize myself as the subject of phenomenological research, that is, the body and mind, which in the real world are designated as the philosopher V.B. Sokol; and (at the same time!) as an intentional subject, which is fundamentally transcendent to my own psychophysical "I", that is, to the same body and mind of the philosopher V.B. Sokol, now alien to me and manifested inside my *Consciousness* in the role of intentional "correlates". Who am I really at this moment and in this state of *Consciousness*?!

Husserl "calms" our confusion with the following reasoning¹²⁷. The "soul" as an object of psychology in *natural attitude* is present for us, and *we ourselves, as people, are "bodily-mentally" present for ourselves*, thanks to "objective external apperceptions." In this external perception I am given to myself within the limits of the total perception of the spatial world, and thus in external experience I recognize myself as a man. And it does not happen that only my body is externally perceived as an "inanimate corporeality" (*korperliche Leiblichkeit*). I exist in space as a concrete person, in the same way as any other person in the spatial world, any object of culture, art, etc. In this attitude of external (spatially-mundane) experience, subjectivity of a soul (that is, psychophysical subjectivity) - mine or another - is a component of a concrete "being-as-a-person". Husserl then introduces a lengthy argument aimed at distinguishing between the two "parallel" hypostases of the so-called "life of a soul" that he discovered. The above-mentioned psychophysical subjectivity as "soul-I" in the attitude of external experience" appears in relation to the "soul- I" of the pure consciousness of the intentional subject as a noematic correlate existing at the same time ("in

¹²⁴ Ibid. p.256.

¹²⁵ Ibid. p.257.

¹²⁶ Husserl E. Selected Works. Moscow, 2005, p. 330.

¹²⁷ Husserl E. Selected Works. Moscow, 2005, pp. 331–334.

parallel") or, literally, "noematic phenomenon within the universal apperception of world, that is, the correlate of a certain external apperception"¹²⁸. It turns out that the apperceptive life of consciousness, in which the really existing world is constituted, and in it, in particular, human existence, in the words of Husserl, "is not apperceived (constituted) in it"¹²⁹, that is, it does not come "from inside" the world of psychophysical subject. In other words, "the life of *Consciousness* apperceiving the external world" is by no means the "life of a soul" that traditional psychologists designate as "psychological experiences" of *Thinking*, belonging, as a human psychophysical being, to the apperceptive composition of the real world. Thus, Husserl radically separates the intentional "soul" (*Consciousness*) and the psychophysical "soul" (*Thinking*), and in order to be fully convinced of the distinction between the intentional and worldly life of consciousness (that is, between intentional and psychophysical subjectivity), Husserl considers it is *necessary* to add, as he himself puts it, "something else", namely: "a somewhat more precise explanation of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction". To facilitate the ascent to the "pure transcendental" (that is, intentional) level of pure *Consciousness*, Husserl proposes to make a total phenomenological reduction "not directly", but by "building" it over the psychological (eidetic) reduction: the second reduction is performed in relation to the first. The psychologist who makes the first reduction is a "positive" researcher and has as his object the soul-I subjectivity of *Thinking* as something real in the pre-given "natural" world: "as an eidetic phenomenologist, he investigates the logos of the soul-I"¹³⁰. For him, the phenomenological-psychological reduction is a method for extraction of the own essence of the "real soul-I", and above all, an intentional life. The basis of this method is "exclusion from the game" or "discarding" transcendental statements carried out in life. Thus, the phenomenological epoche at the first level must be realized in advance and "become a habit", when the psychologist still does not cease to be a "positivist", that is, to preserve the significance of the apperception of the world, remaining the *Thinker*. Then it is already possible to radically exclude this apperception of *Thinking* (this is the essence of the Copernican revolution), which will really "turn over" the whole life of the phenomenological psychologist and all his psychological research. He becomes a "transcendental phenomenologist" (intentional subject or pure *Consciousness*), for whom there is no longer a certain ("die") world, so there is no more sense to explore "determinate things belonging to the world of reality". The determinate world is for him only a phenomenon, and he himself turns from a natural person into a "transcendental observer who considers this possession of the world, the way in which this or another world appears in *Consciousness* in accordance with its meaning and significance, and reveals it in experience and analysis of experience"¹³¹. Consequently, the "doubling paradox", Husserl explains further, with a correctly implemented transition, should be replaced by the "*parallelism of awareness of the phenomenological intentional field and psychological reduction as a method of access to it*". To understand the essence of the rather fruitful idea of "parallelism", it is necessary to trace the logic of Husserl's reasoning in more detail. If the psychologist, through the first, psychological reduction, has always himself (as a person in the world) been the subject of research (in the form of apperception of *Thought*), then "the phenomenologist as a phenomenologist is not "I" for himself, he, as a person, is "bracketed", he himself is a phenomenon. He is the phenomenon of his transcendental "I", that is, the being and life of the "I", which can always be discovered in the radical epoche, revealed precisely as that final functioning subjectivity, the result of the previously hidden activity of which is the universal apperception of the

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

world”¹³². At the same time, Husserl emphasizes that the radical “exclusion from the game” of any use of such significance as “the present world” is deliberately carried out “in the once-and-for-all mode as a habitual and consistent firm volitional decision.” If the procedure for the reduction of a higher level (transcendental-phenomenological) in relation to the primary reduction (psychological) is done correctly, the content of psychological phenomenology does not disappear, but remains as a *transcendental content*: what was previously a psychologically real meaning now becomes a phenomenon. This “transcendental content”, experienced by the essential “I” (the intentional subject of *Consciousness*) in the transcendental-phenomenological attitude of the radical epoche, as more and more acts of reflection on consciousness will expand to new and new levels of human consciousness up to pure intentional experience (pure *Consciousness*). On the other hand, if reflection on consciousness (and then reflection on this reflection and repeating so on) is carried out in a phenomenological-psychological attitude, then whatever phenomenological results we get, all of them will have only a psychological meaning within the framework of *Thinking*.

Thus, we come to a statement of the *parallel* of the simultaneous existence of the intentional-phenomenological field of being of *Consciousness* (with the method of access to it - transcendental-phenomenological reduction) and the transcendental-psychological field of being of *Thinking* (with the method of access - psychological or eidetic reduction). In other words, the transcendental “I” in its concrete transcendental life (in our terminology, the intentional subject of *Consciousness*) is a *transcendental parallel* in relation to the “I” as a concrete person in the usual sense (in our terminology, the psychophysical subject of *Thinking*). Parallelism implies a total and concrete correspondence in all singularities and connections, that is, some peculiar kind of being of two hypostases of a person, which are different, but at the same time are not separated from each other in the natural sense. In the words of Husserl, “the transcendental “I” as the “I” of transcendental experiential self-comprehension (Selbsterfahrung) is different from the natural human “I”. At the same time, “it is least of all something “second” in the ordinary sense, separate from it, a kind of doublet, outsideness in the natural sense.” Just by changing the attitude, everything that the phenomenologist discovers in his “soul”, while retaining his own essence, acquires a new, absolutely transcendental (that is, intentional) meaning. Consequently, our confusion about the “split personality” of the phenomenologist V. B. Sokol can now be dispelled by the following reasoning. At the same time, I can be in the pure experience of my intentional “I”, able to contemplate the body and mind of V. B. Sokol as intentional objects immanent to my *Consciousness*, and simultaneously recognize myself as a natural person V. B. Sokol in his essence - from the height of the absolute (intentional) meaning of his true “I”.

In general, precisely because of the existential priority of the sphere of experiences of the intentional subject, the “pain point” of phenomenological reduction overtakes the philosopher at the moment of experiencing attachment by his *Consciousness* to the psychophysical “I” of his own *Thinking*.

The *technology of the practical procedure* for the transition to the “disinterested” contemplation of one’s own body and mind as intentional objects “within” one’s own *Consciousness* (in the *phenomenological attitude* of a pure intentional subject) remains unclear. It must be achieved, starting from the situation of having an experience of *attachment* to the body and *Thinking* in the mode of their “external” existence (“mixed” psychophysical subject of a *natural attitude*). The act of attachment is naturally intensified by the experience of the *domination* of the “I” over the body. How,

¹³² Ibid.

in practice, under the conditions of double “pressure” (experiences of *attachment and domination in relation to the body and mind*) on the mixed consciousness of the phenomenologist, pushing him from the inside to “fall” into the natural, that is, “bodily-interested” perception of the world, should the position of “disinterest” of the phenomenological epoche be carried out? Indeed, a very difficult nuance to understand. Let's think about it in more detail.

Theoretically, it is still possible to “put” in one’s “res cogito” the “bracketing” of oneself as a part of nature, but what about the “experience of attachment” (in the spirit of domination) of my intentional “I” to the psychophysical “I”?! If the “I”-experience of *Consciousness* is ontically more real than even ideal *Thinking*, then in this case, how is it possible (in the technological-procedural sense) to “step over” my (as an intentional subject) experience of attachment to the body and mind (as correlative intentional objects), in relation to my body and mind as a psychophysical object of nature? Is it possible in principle the conscious “keeping” of the *parallel coexistence* of the intentional “I” and the corresponding bodily-psychological “I” of a particular person in total epoche? Indeed, in fact, the ontologically primary experience of attachment of the “I” to the body in the spirit of habitual domination over it resists any, even true, but ontologically secondary theoretical and phenomenological reasoning, such as multilevel “fields” of parallel coexistence? Also confusing is the problematic nature of understanding the breadth of the experiences of dominating attachment, rooted by definition in the transcendental ego of Husserl: what are the limits of their sphere of influence? Are they limited by the immanent to *Consciousness* field within the transcendental subject, that is, between the intentional “I” as a subject and the intentional objects of my mind and body as noematic correlates? Or do acts of attachment and domination somehow extend to the “real” mind and body, transcendent to *Consciousness*, due to which the intentional “I” can feel “internal lack”, being content only with intentional correlates? If the experience of attachment “operates” exclusively within the cogito, and it is precisely on this that the phenomenological method is based, then there is no reason at all to relate one's existence to an “external” psychophysical corporality. It turns out that the essence of my “I” does not have any real ontological connection with its “determinate” in the real world body and mind? In other words, the essence of a person’s personality, an intentional subject (according to Husserl, the transcendental “I”, or our *Consciousness*), from the position of a *phenomenological attitude*, does not need at all either the human body, or even the human mind for its full existence?! But this is already a problem not “impartially” gnoseological, but “painfully” ethical. It concerns the personal value system of the scientist-phenomenologist, his beliefs and the depth of spiritual realization. It turns out that in order to become a phenomenologist, I must accept (moreover, according to Husserl, “once and for all”) the conviction that “I am pure *Consciousness* – not a body and not even a mind (not a *Thinking*)”. As a preliminary necessary condition for the actual implementation of Husserl's phenomenological reduction, the philosopher must already share the gnoseological-ethical maxim: “I am a pure “transcendental Ego”, limited exclusively by the intentional world of “correlates” of thoughts and things, including human bodies, including my own one”. This is truly a “religious conversion”!

Based on the foregoing, the problem of the “pain point” of the psychophysical subject of phenomenological reduction can be formulated in two theses.

1. The immanent to the *Consciousness* sphere of experiences of attachment of the intentional “I” to the psychophysical corporality, funded by the transcendental spirit of dominating over the kinesthetic acts of the “I” in relation, even if “indirect”, to the spatio-temporal life world, in the practical implementation of the procedure of transcendental phenomenological reduction *should become an insurmountable obstacle* on the way to the *phenomenological attitude* of the

"disinterested observer" for the following obvious reason. Namely: the "transcendental force" of the sphere of pure experiences of the intentional subject of *Consciousness*, due to their "existential priority" even in relation to the phenomenological and psychological theoretical constructions of *Thinking*, is immeasurably more powerful compared to the "theoretical pressure" of the call for the need to "cut off" empirical connection between the experience of attachment and the determinate being of objects of attachment.

2. The phenomenologist faces the personal ethical problem of self-identification of the essence of his "I". In practice, the subject of phenomenological reduction is able to enter the state of pure transcendental-phenomenological epoche only under the condition of preliminary reorganization of his worldview in favor of the "transcendental-phenomenological existential priority" of the transcendental Ego (intentional subject), independent of the "determinate being" of the body and mind, in which the "I" is only "indirectly" localized. The "hopelessness" of the described difficulty, in our opinion, is quite simply overcome by the discursive restructuring of the subject of reduction from ontological-discursive *Thinking* to gnoseological-discursive *Thinking*. After all, the psychic and ethical "tension" of the psychophysical subject is generated by the experiences of "attachment" and "dominion" in relation to the ontologically-discursively imposed "for granted" identifications with the "body and mind". Indeed, it is the topic of the ontological type of discursive microstructure that a priori "inspires" the subject of cognition with the idea of "obviousness" of its direct essential connection with the psychophysical subject. On the contrary, the gnoseological-discursive topic, with the same force of evidence, casts doubt on the "availability" of such a connection, thus destroying the semantic content of the acts of "attachment" and "dominion" in relation to the body and mind that Husserl discerned. If we take into account that the nature of the semantic genesis is immanent in the same sphere of experiences of the intentional subject of *Consciousness*, it turns out that the absence of "semantic content" should destroy the very implementation of the acts of experiencing attachment and domination. Consequently, along with psychological and ethical semantic experiences, the subject of phenomenological reduction is freed from the "pain sensations" that prevent reduction analyzed above. In other words, accepting "healthy skepticism" as the a priori basis of gnoseological-discursive *Thinking*, the philosopher without "psychological stress" is alienated from the "region of being" of the problematic knowledge of the psycho-physical subject, thereby "turning off" it from the region of apodictic knowledge of the intentional subject of *Consciousness*. At the same time, the subject of the phenomenological reduction overcomes the naive "attraction" of the psychophysical "component" to the *natural attitude* and, thus, returns to "itself", that is, to the true "I" or the intentional subject of the phenomenological attitude - pure *Consciousness*.

So, the question of the technology of the practical procedure for the transition to the "disinterested contemplation" of one's own body and mind as intentional objects "inside" one's own *Consciousness* (pure intentional subject) is removed by discursive restructuring of the *Thinking* of the subject of phenomenological reduction from ontological clauses of cognitive comprehension of the theoretical description of the phenomenological method of Husserl to gnoseological clauses. As a consequence of this adequate "understanding of Husserl", the desired, rationally constructed, separation of the psychophysical subject is carried out with its subsequent alienation (phenomenological reduction) in favor of the phenomenological epoche of *pure Consciousness*.

In the context of comparing *Consciousness* and *Thinking*, it is now clearly seen that *Consciousness* itself has an immanent potential for reflection due to the intentional semantic "contract" (Verleihen) with *Thinking* that covers it, but not vice versa: *Thinking* is deprived of an internal reserve for an adequate (apodictic) meaning genesis. Due to the sense-forming non-self-sufficiency, *Thinking* in

isolation from the leadership of *Consciousness*, that is, outside the cognitive position auxiliary to *Consciousness*, is forced to “invent” under the power of certain discourses (language games) endless interpretations of the existent, doomed to the eternal internal "semantic" conflict due to the truly-semantic "bankruptcy" (the essence of relativism and skepticism).

In the context of the *opposition of Consciousness and Thinking*, it is important to emphasize here that “phenomenological thinking” as a “living” intentional eidós of pure *Consciousness* denies the usual “*Thinking*” as a “dead” mechanical game of certain sign systems, including linguistic-semiotic structures. Therefore, the proposed path to a new phenomenologically thinking *Consciousness*, which denies the classical traditional understanding of *Thought* as internal speech, is understood as a break with internal discourse (reduction) and access to the “region of experience before *Thinking*” (epoche), consisting exclusively of pure meanings, free from linguistic conditioning (anti-discourse). At the same time, the extralinguistic stream of experiences of the “*Consciousness of reason*” still turns out to be constituted by a special, that is, anti-discursive language, designated by us as the *intentional language*, which is immanent to the pure *Consciousness* of the phenomenological epoche and, as a correlate of the “ordinary” language, is congruent to it in terms of noematic form, but directly opposite in terms of the principle of meaning formation.

The final phenomenological separation of the categories of *Thinking* and *Consciousness* can be defined in the broadest overview using the following table:

Consciousness	Thinking
Phenomenological attitude of cognition	Natural attitude of cognition
Region of apodictic knowledge	Region of problematic knowledge
Intentional subject of noetic-noematic structures of acts of experiences of pure Consciousness	- Psychophysical subject - Linguistic subject - Kant's Transcendental subject
Intentional reason	- Kant's Transcendental reason - Habermas' Communicative reason
Intentional language of phenomenological description	Discursive language of "inner speech"

About the essence of the soul and the content of consciousness

Husserl penetrates even further into the problem of the paradoxical duality of the relationship between the intentional essence (“soul” or our Consciousness) and the psychophysical corporality corresponding to it (our corporal-reflective Thinking).

The philosopher raises the question of the “essence of the soul”, asking: How does the soul “spiritualize” this or that living body as a body (körperliche Leiber)? How “souls” are localized in the space and time of the lifeworld? How do they “come to life” in the psychic sense, manifesting “consciousness” of the world? How each “soul” cognizes in experience “its” body, not simply as this or that special body in general (Körper), but in a peculiar way, as a “living body” (Leib), as a system of

its “organs”, which it moves as a dominant “I”? How does it intervene in the world around it, conscious of it, as “I push”, “I move”, “I understand” this or that, etc.? The “soul” is present in the world, but in the same way as the body? In the natural “sciences of facts” the human body is ranked among the physical bodies. However, Husserl protests and rightly asks: “After all, this is a “living body” - “my body”. How do I “set my body in motion”, how do I “dominate” through the body, how do I “spiritualize” it?¹³³ Not to have clear answers to these questions means, according to Husserl, to lose “the last substrate for the science of “souls””, which happened in traditional psychology. Under the influence of the new European constructive idea of bodily nature and mathematical natural science, psychology borrowed its basis from a parallel science, in which the concept of the soul was not drawn “originally”, but was borrowed from Cartesian dualism, which presupposes the soul as something real in the same sense as bodily nature (topic of natural science). It turned out that the body and the soul denoted two real layers in the world of natural experience, in the same sense, as really connected with each other like two parts of one body (the body of “consciousness” mixed with *Thinking*). Without overcoming this prejudice, true psychology as the science of the actual nature of the “soul” (of pure *Consciousness*), according to Husserl's firm conviction, will not appear¹³⁴. Phenomenology is precisely designed to reveal the essence of the intentional-transcendental mode of existence of the “soul” (*Consciousness*) in the world in its supposedly paradoxical (in *natural attitude*), but, in fact, real impact on the body as a legitimate sphere of its “possession”. First of all, Husserl shows “the absurdity of the fundamental equalization of the soul and body as realities”, pointing out the essential difference between temporality, causality and individuation in a natural thing and in the soul. The phenomenological reduction returns science from fundamental scientific concepts back to the contents of the “pure experience” of *Consciousness*, radically putting aside “all the presumptions of exact science, all the mental [*Thinking*] calculations inherent in it, that is, considering the world as if these sciences did not yet exist, precisely as the life-world”¹³⁵.

Already immediately after bracketing space and objective time, it is found that the soul (*Consciousness*) does not exist in the same form as the body, it does not have space-time dimension (*Raumzeitlichkeit*) at all. Moreover, *all spiritual objects (not only souls, but also works of art, technical devices, etc.) are inherently “embodied in bodies” (“ver-korpert”), and only for this reason are they all “involved” in space-time of the bodies*. At the same time, in terms of what is incorporeal in them, they are involved there “indirectly”. In other words, spiritual objects, being spatially extended along with their bodies, are present in a “not own-way”, but only indirectly; also, indirectly, through corporality, they acquire past and future existence, that is, they are extended in time. Further, Husserl rightly reduces the essence of the experience of the “bodily incarnation of the soul” to the experience of “prevalence” or “dominion”: permanent and immediate *dominion*, or prevalence (*Walten*) only in this body (*Korper*)”¹³⁶.

Due to the fact that the “soul” (*Consciousness*) dominates the body, and can rule over different sense organs separately (see with the eyes, feel with the fingers, etc.), perception itself is generally possible, and then all other experiences in relation to objects in the world. Consequently, the act of domination of the “soul” over the body mediates the universal correlation of the “I” with the world. In practice, this domination is carried out in the modes of movement - “*kinestheses*”: “I move”, “I

¹³³ Husserl E. *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 282.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* p.283.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.* p.287.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.* p.288.

push", etc. However, it is especially important that this experience of domination as "I move" in oneself is not spatial, that is, bodily movement. When a part of the body, such as a "hand", moves in space, the dominant action of the soul ("kinesthesia"), embodied in unity with the real movement of the hand, is not itself carried out as a spatial movement, but only indirectly "co-localized" with it. The next important observation in this connection is that if the activity of the "soul" (acts of domination or prevalence) is not manifested in space, then it means that it cannot be directly perceived by someone else. The other sees only the movement of my hand, but he cannot see the "kinestheses" of the soul associated with this movement of the hand. In other words, only on the basis of my own original experience of dominating my body, can I understand by analogy (analogizing appresentation) another "living body" dominated by another transcendental "I" (intentional subject), another "soul", another *Consciousness*. It turns out that it can only seem to me that I myself and other "I"-subjects of the life world are each rigidly connected with their body and directly localized in space and time, but in reality, my transcendental (intentional) "I" and "I" of other bodies in their essence do not exist in them.

Similarly, Husserl disidentifies the causal connections of the soul and body, and also shows the irreducibility of their individuations. The transcendental "I" (intentional subject) individualizes itself, and not from causality with external spatio-temporal corporeality: "through living corporeality as corporality (durch die körperliche Leiblichkeit) "I" has its position in corporeal space, to which it owes its living body as a body (seinem körperlichen Leib), and can be distinguished by everyone. But the possibility of being distinguishable or identifiable for everyone in space-time, with all the psychophysical conditioning that comes into play, adds absolutely nothing to his being *ens per se* ("being in itself")"¹³⁷.

So, for the transcendental "I" ("soul", intentional subject of *Consciousness*), space and time are not the principles of individuation, pure *Consciousness* is also not bound by any natural causality, which, by definition, is inseparable from the space-time continuum. At the same time, the intentional "I" (*Consciousness*) acts as a master, directly prevail (Walten) over his body through kinestheses, and only then indirectly affects other bodies.

At the same time, the decisive task for a "breakthrough" to a stable pure phenomenological analysis is "the phenomenological problem of conjugation of consciousness with objecthood, first of all, having its noematic characteristic through its inherent "meaning""¹³⁸. The intentional reason must be comprehended and described as a tool for conjugation of *Consciousness* (experience) with an object.

First of all, the "content" of *Consciousness* should be understood as "meaning", through which *Consciousness* is associated with the object as "its own" (like "fief relations" (Verleihen) in "solitary spiritual life." According to Husserl, "every noema has "content", namely its "meaning", through which it interfaces with "its" *object*."¹³⁹ It turns out that the intentional reason "works" with the "meanings" generated in the "lonely soul." This means that the tools set of the intentional reason is intended for the formation of surreal noematic "forms" on the "material" of those chaste "pure meanings" that are not yet "burdened" with sign (linguistic) fixation (Husserl calls this facet of

¹³⁷ Ibid. p.290.

¹³⁸ Husserl E. Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book 1. Moscow, 2009, p. 401.

¹³⁹ Ibid. p.402.

conjugation of *Consciousness* with the object "the innermost moment of the noema" , "the central point of its core", "the fundamental piece (..... Grundstück) of the noema")¹⁴⁰. Thus, the intentional reason can be defined as a border structure on the verge of the pure meanings of the "lonely soul" and their sign (linguistic) modes, oriented on expression "outside" the immanent structures of *Consciousness* — into the infinite communicative space of the Life World, which preserves, which is very important, the status of an intentional existential region (intentional-intersubjective communication in a phenomenological attitude).

However, the functional sphere of the intentional reason is not limited to the noematic "formation" of pure meanings - with careful phenomenological "ripening" it turns out that "meaning is not a *specific entity* in the total composition of the noema, but a kind of abstract "form" that has taken root in such a one"¹⁴¹. "Meaning is not a separate entity, but a *cut* of phenomenological analysis"¹⁴², which can only be "approached" by the intentional reason. In other words, *in the sphere of pure Consciousness or an intentional subject, meaning is not identical with essence*. If *meaning* is the "innermost point" of the core of the noema of intentional experience, then the *essence* is experienced exclusively in "multiple possible noetic events"¹⁴³, which, flowing parallel to noematic semantic "forms", receive the ability we are looking for to "conjugate, according to the meaning and proposition, with this material world"¹⁴⁴.

Phenomenology of musical thinking

Western philosophy, from its very inception in ancient culture, is forced to take an exam to justify the "practical meaning" of its "socially useful" existence.

The precedent of an unsuccessful experiment of "testing" the theory of the state of Plato in Syracuse turned into a kind of social "curse", obliging philosophy every now and then to explain and "put into view" its own, although "invisible", but at the same time, "vital" value for everyday human worries and difficulties. Despite the outward "non-obviousness" of its "practicality", philosophy, not at all embarrassed, declares itself the "science of sciences" (Aristotle), openly claiming the right to "sacred service" as an indispensable means to guide people's thinking and even their actions. Studies by historians of philosophy show with what great difficulty philosophers from different eras of European culture managed to pass this exam for "different", although in general "satisfactory" evaluation "points"¹⁴⁵. However, more important is the fact that modern philosophers are increasingly forced to state that the latest philosophy seems to be "failing" its examination for scientific and practical use in the society of the 21st century¹⁴⁶. This is especially true of phenomenology, which causes embarrassment in "accessibility" even for a professional philosophical

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. pp.404,409.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. p.410.

¹⁴² Motroshilova N. V. "Ideas I" by Edmund Husserl as an introduction to phenomenology. Moscow, 2003, p. 486.

¹⁴³ Husserl E. Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book. 1. M., 2009. p. 418.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. p.419.

¹⁴⁵ Smirnov I. Can philosophy be practical? / Star. No. 8, 2011.

¹⁴⁶ Melnikov V. I. On the Crisis in Modern Philosophy, 2013. - Digital resource.

audience. Paying tribute to the “depth of philosophical penetration” into the essence of the world, philosophers, at the same time, point out the extreme remoteness of phenomenological analysis from the “needs and problems of everyday life”, reproaching it for transcendental “abstraction” as an elitist “philosophy for philosophers” (V. A. Kutyrev). Meanwhile, the founder of phenomenology, especially at the end of his life, simultaneously with the recognition of the “difficulty for understanding” and, moreover, for the mastering of the phenomenological science he created, explained in detail its irreplaceable role in overcoming both the “crisis of European sciences” and “crisis of European humanity” as a whole¹⁴⁷.

In this sense, the development of the methodology of intentional rationality would be incomplete without its real successful testing in solving a specific socio-cultural problem. And one of the obvious and convincing examples of “higher practicality” and the indispensability of the phenomenological application of intentionally intersubjective reason is the aesthetic-anthropological problematics¹⁴⁸.

In the phenomenological attitude, a fact is obvious, which at the same time is extremely paradoxical, controversial and even unacceptable in its radicalness for the “naive” natural attitude: all acts of experience by pure Consciousness of the stream of aesthetic and anthropological intentions are reduced (again, exclusively in phenomenological thinking) to a common universal experience that can be designated as musical experience.

It is traditionally considered that Western culture (primarily philosophical) is born in ancient Greek thought on the path “from Myth to Logos”. A. Losev directly connects the ancient Logos with the genesis of the Western numerical ontology of the world (including music)¹⁴⁹. Meanwhile, not so long ago, historians of philosophy noticed a certain “injustice of this state of affairs”, pointing to the documented fact of the “falling out” of the subject field of historical and philosophical research of the third most important category of ancient knowledge - Melos¹⁵⁰.

Melos is not a melody, but a certain component of the human Consciousness that precedes music. However, it is more important that not only music: “melos” turns out to be a kind of “musical component”, from which the “musical expressiveness” of any human creative activity, including philosophical and scientific cognition, is born. Consequently, the philosophical culture of the Greeks, expressing the continuity of “archaic cultures”, assumed a “highly artistic” synthesis of words and music, and therefore a synthesis of discursive Thinking and musical (intentional) thinking.

Meanwhile, the deep etymological and heuristic relationship between “logos” (Logos – logically rational Thinking) and “mythos” (Mythos – mythological Thinking), which already in the Late Antique bosom determined the tilt of European science and culture towards the dominance of rational knowledge, is limited only by the word. It is difficult to overestimate the global importance of the chosen verbal boundary of cognition, because it is precisely the “formula of truth as a thought not just spoken, but written down”¹⁵¹ that still determines the specifics of the so-called “Western culture”

¹⁴⁷ Husserl E. Philosophy as a rigorous science. Novocherkassk, 1994, p. 357.

¹⁴⁸ Aesthetic and anthropological development of society: a collective monograph under the general. ed. Shcherbinina M. N. Tyumen, 2010, p. 284.

¹⁴⁹ Losev A.F. Myth. Number. Essence. Moscow, 1994, p. 134.

¹⁵⁰ Uvarov M.S. Melos and the Logos of Philosophy // Bulletin of the St. Petersburg State University. 2003 Ser. 6. Issue. 2 (14). p. 12.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. p.16.

with the priority of the philosophy of “linguistic turn” and the slavery of “the power of discourse”. Western text-centric Thinking has deprived itself of the “musical component” of melos, which is one of the fundamental reasons for the naive scientific and philosophical rationalism of the natural attitude, on the exposure and overcoming of which Husserl bases “living” phenomenology as the science of the return of “living” Consciousness to the “Life World”.

Consistently introducing the anti-psychologism of the founder of phenomenology into the philosophy of music, Losev puts forward the most important conceptual statement: “The meaning of music, that is, its true revealed face, its true phenomenon, can never and under no circumstances be distinguished by physical, physiological or psychological signs”¹⁵². The philosopher literally ridicules the theses of his colleagues “blinded by the elements of factuality and materialism”, who defend “false musical phenomena” such as: “without physical laws, there would be no music itself” (false phenomenon of music as a physical act); “if you didn’t have ears, then there would be no music for you” (a pseudo-phenomenon of music as a physiological act); “if there were no [psychic] experiences of music, then all music would be in the form of printed notes and, therefore, would have no real existence” (a pseudo-phenomenon of music as a psychic act)”¹⁵³.

Living musical Consciousness as a stream of intentional experiences, by definition, free as a result of a complete transcendental-phenomenological reduction from any discursive-theoretical dubious knowledge (including, of course, dialectical), Losev transforms into dialectical-synthetic (that is, theoretical) concept of “musical consciousness”, which plays the role of an epiphenomenon of the dialectical game of “living eidos” of the same discursive Thinking. Thus, Losev performs mathematical ontologization: a phenomenologically pure living (experiencing) musical Consciousness is closed in a “mobile”, but no less “dead” construct of dialectical ontologically discursive Thinking called “life of a number”.

In general, the movement of something does not mean yet its life: the movement -“breathing” of bellows is not the same as the spontaneous respiratory movements of a living person, however, the first is an imitation of the second. An even closer analogy is that the compulsory movement of a person is, in fact, not the same as the voluntary movement of the same person: in the first case, his “life” is just suppressed, in the second it receives a free creative embodiment, although in both case we are dealing with a living person. Similarly, the living eidos of Melos is exclusively an act of free experience of pure Consciousness, however, it can be forcibly manipulated by means of movements of Thinking imitating “life”, even if it is “perfect” dialectical Thinking. In any case, the true “life” of the experience ceases, and remains - a movement like the “Brownian movement of particles”, measured mathematically. But even living cells in an open environment no longer move in accordance with mathematical laws! The infinitely living Consciousness of a person cannot be adequately expressed by any dialectics or mathematics, however, by placing it in a closed system of a fundamentally “lifeless” Thinking, one can dialectically and mathematically simulate the “life” of experience, like imitation of living breathing with artificial bellows. In the same way, live music, which is living Melos - an intentional act of experiencing a living stream of pure Consciousness, cannot be manifested simply by a dead movement of the Thought about music: even if this Thought is “perfect” from the point of view of its mechanical-mathematical technology, it does not become alive. Moreover, the subordination of the living Melos to any external violent manipulation is the destruction of the living melody. Any musician knows that even the mechanical learning of scales, which, by the way, are

¹⁵² Losev A. F. Music as a subject of logic. Moscow, 2012, p. 41.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

made up of mathematically correct constructions of live sounds, does not yet give birth to live music. In the case of mechanical reproduction of sounds, calculation (Thought, Logos) dominates the situation, which is ahead of experience (Consciousness, Melos). The subordination of the phenomenon of "life" to any external force is tantamount to its destruction, despite the remaining "similarity". Similarly, in the half-hearted phenomenology of Losev's music, Thinking defeats Consciousness in the racing game, subordinating its living principle to dialectical dead-mechanical algorithms.

Husserl repeatedly warned that under no circumstances should an intentional act imply a certain procedure of "reflection" ("shooting") of objective objecthood. The phenomenologically understood "stream of Consciousness" absolutely contradicts the metaphor of the "mirror", which fixes some "shootings from a naturalistically given thing". The intentional "look", Husserl invariably repeated, is not some kind of mechanical "beam" of abstract "consciousness", illuminating the semantic darkness of the external perception of reality (a typical provocation of mechanistic rational Thinking). On the contrary, the "life world" of pure Consciousness, eternally experiencing a stream of intentional generations of noematic meanings, is infinitely far from the representations of the three-dimensional spatial-mechanistic "scientific picture of the world" of the natural attitude, which drove consciousness into the Procrustean bed of the "reflection theory". In the phenomenological attitude, meaning (Sinn) is a fundamentally non-spatial and timeless (in the sense of objective time) act of experience-perception (Wahrnehmungserlebnisse)¹⁵⁴ of Consciousness, incomparable with "substance", "matter", "particle", "wave", "reflection", "shooting" or any other intellectual-theoretical construction of Thinking. The phenomenological essence of intention is exclusively in the act (experience) of giving meaning (and then "on loan") to an intentional object immanent to the same pure Consciousness (even a non-objectively existing object, the direct perceptual "reflection" of which from the point of view of phenomenology is just a naive illusion of natural science).

According to Husserl, Consciousness naturally synthesizes all kinds of duality due to the immanent "universal environment, which, in the end, contains all experiences, including those that are not characterized as intentional"¹⁵⁵. Therefore, we present an important, from the point of view of the phenomenology of integral Consciousness, conclusion on the subject of the mentioned interesting phenomenological relationship within the "triangle" of ancient thought Logos - Mythos - Melos. Mythological rationality is nothing but the "sphere of ideas" of the transcendental reason in terms of the reduction of transcendental a priori categories of understanding. Unlike the absolutely lifeless Logos, pure Mythos (that is, Mythos, free from rational-psychological comments from the discursive interpretations of the Logos understanding) has "life", but imitative, like the "breathing" of bellows.

The lonely Mythos against the background of the "hard mechanism" of the lonely Logos creates a deceptive impression of "life" due to the spontaneity of the movements of the rational structures of mythological Thinking, however, in a phenomenological attitude, contemplating the true life of Melos, a "fake" of the living experiences of Consciousness through mythological-dialectical transcendental imitations easily unraveled. Therefore, in the musical world, we meet the corresponding three categories of people: there are "Mozarts" - the embodiment of the natural life

¹⁵⁴ Husserl E. Main problems of phenomenology. Lecture course in 1910 // D. N. Razeev. In the nets of phenomenology. St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 254.

¹⁵⁵ Husserl E. Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book one. Moscow, 2009, p. 267.

of music, there are “Solieri” - perfect imitators of live music, and there are “musicians” who are even devoid of “musical ear” (musically dead). Similarly, the lone Logos is the "mechanism" of the reason, musically dead; lonely Mythos is the realm of mathematical harmony of Thinking, perfectly imitating living Consciousness; and only pure Melos is the life of Consciousness as such. The perfect melody of the life of the phenomenological "Life World" manifests only when the Melos of pure Consciousness acquires creative "power" over the Mythos of the free reason of transcendental Thinking, which, in turn, obediently consolidates the "power" of the musical thinking of the living Consciousness by the means of formatting the corresponding a priori categorical "mechanisms" of the understanding as a structure of psychological-discursive Thinking - Logos.

Super-sensitive sound and its source

The "solution" of the sound root cause of this or that thing or phenomenon as an ideal of cognition of the world is described in detail in the Vedas and post-Vedic texts. So, in one of the songs of the Rigveda (X, 71), which is called “Cognition” as such, Speech is sung as the “first beginning”, through the “sacrifice” creating everything “manifested” in the world and in man. Whoever did not “hear the Speech”, he “did not learn.” Therefore, according to the Vedas, to know an object means to realize its sound essence.

The gnoseology of Jiva Gosvami distinguishes three main paths of cognition (pramana)¹⁵⁶:

- 1) pratyaksa-pramana corresponds to the sensual way of cognition (literal translation “directly before the eyes”), that is, “that which is directly perceived by the senses”;
- 2) anumana-pramana corresponds to the rational way of cognition: "manas" means "mind";
- 3) sabda-pramana - listening to a supersensible sound - the essence of a cognized object (cognition through the supersensory aspect of listening from an authoritative source). As the eminent Vaishnava philosopher Baladeva Vidyabhusana remarked: “Authoritative testimony, defined as the statement of a qualified person, is never a delusion”¹⁵⁷.

It is sabda (literally from Sanskrit, “the sound of authoritative evidence”) that provides access to the “witness” of reliable apodictic knowledge, by analogy with the “half” of the ancient *symbolon*, which serves as a “witness” of truth, and therefore priority is given to it.

The supersensible sound and the reality created by it mean in the ancient oriental texts a multi-stage ontology, “step by step” (in a certain time sequence) realizing its “manifestation levels”. The Rigveda (I, 164, 45) speaks of the "four quarters" of speech. Of these, the “three are secret” (hidden from perception by gross physical senses) “they are known by” only “Brahmins who are wise.” Three supersensible Speech forms "are not to be used", and only on the fourth one "people speak"¹⁵⁸. Russian orientalist D. B. Zilberman, referring to other hymns of the same Rig Veda, confirms: “In the hymns themselves, the Vedas are considered as an “impersonal and uncreated word” (“Rig Veda” VIII, 64, 6), in which four steps (padani), or levels of manifestation of the word are existing, which form the basis of speech, of which the first three are concealed, i.e., not embodied in gross sound”¹⁵⁹.

¹⁵⁶ Jiva Gosvami. Sri Tattva Sandarbha. New Delhi, 1995. P. 17.

¹⁵⁷ Vatman S.V. Bengali Vaishnavism. St. Petersburg, 2005, p. 175.

¹⁵⁸ Rigveda. Mandalas I–IV / Transl. T. Ya. Elizarenkova. Moscow, 1989, p. 205.

¹⁵⁹ Zilberman D. B. The Genesis of Meaning in the Philosophy of Hinduism. Moscow, 1998, p. 159.

A similar idea is implied in the interpretation of the four feet of "gayatri" in the Brihadaranyaka Upanisad (V, 14), which draws Zilberman's attention to a curious parallelism between the sound teachings of the Vedas and the Upanisads, on the one hand, and the Agamas, the "Trika" of the Kashmiri Shaivism and Bhartrihari's Vakyapadiya, on the other. The text of the Brahma-samhita confirms the same parallel, where a more concrete description of creation is given through the realization of pre-verbal supersensible sound, starting from the energy of time and up to the gross manifestations of physical matter¹⁶⁰.

In the application to human cognitive activity, the four levels of supersensible sound are most thoroughly structured in the philosophy of Bhartrihari:

1) the first level is the most subtle level of supersensible sound, called "para" ("para"), "transcendent". It corresponds to the "pure *Consciousness*" of E. Husserl. At this level, the supersensible sound is not at all different from the thing it signifies;

2) the second level of supersensible sound is ontologically located in the plane of reason, or buddhi (corresponding to some extent to Kantian reason); here the supersensible component of sound is called "pasyanti" - literally "seeing", that is, that which can be seen ("sound image");

3) the third level of supersensible sound is located on the platform of the mind (manas, closer to the Kantian understanding), it is called "madhyama" ("madhyama");

4) the fourth, lowest level of sound, that is, the "sensory" sound heard by the ear, is the level of words, rough speech; it is called "vaikhari"; the five sense organs of the physical body are at work here, influenced by the energy of creativity (talent) or, in the case of animal life forms, the energy of instincts (unconscious reflexes).

So, the gnoseology of supersensible sound leads us to the assertion of the presumption of perfect harmony of the absolute power of musical thinking over all manifestations of human life activity, and also highlights the prospect of a scientific and phenomenological substantiation of the presence and functioning of a "single sound source" of spiritual experience and the corresponding canon of perfect behavior of all known world cultures. Genrikh Orlov also came to a similar conclusion in the course of his own extensive study of the "musical tree" of the world, rhetorically reducing the essence of all manifestations of human socio-cultural activity to the "single impulse" of the human voice (from breathing to prayer), from which "the sound that we call music is born", no matter how "hard it would be to believe" this for a modern Western scientist: "With the deep, conspicuous differences in prayer behavior in different religions, it is difficult to believe that they all come from the same source. It is even more difficult to admit that the sound we call music is born from the same source. The commonality of the source is obscured at the moment when everyone tries to explain own behavior. Breaking through the multi-layered soil of dissimilar cultures, a single impulse receives mythological descriptions that are difficult to compare, relies on different symbolic systems, manifests itself in specific modulations of voices in prayer and, ultimately, in the specific properties of music"¹⁶¹.

Indeed, it is hard not to notice a common intentional-musical principle in the theophany (the notion of the birth of sound as the Epiphany) of Muslims, Hindus, Sufis, Tibetan elders, and in the same "Favorian light" of "intelligent prayer", "attached to the breath" in the Orthodox hesychasm (from Evagrius of Pontus to Gregory Palamas), as well as in the "audible and inaudible music" of Pythagoras and Plato. The "natural theology" of voice-sound-music of archaic cultures is no exception: for Indonesians, an audible sound manifests a sound that is implicit, but dwelling in the

¹⁶⁰ Sri Brahma Samhita. The living essence of captivating reality. M., 2000. pp. 57, 83-90.

¹⁶¹ Orlov G. The Tree of Music. St. Petersburg, 1992, p. 348.

heart; Master Chen of Chinese legend echoes a Basonga boy in Africa in an attempt to catch the "elusive melody of the heart"¹⁶².

We find a similar intentional-intersubjective communicative single principle of voice, breath, sound and music in the Gregorian singing of praise and prayers - the universally recognized "root and source of all Western music" (R. I. Gruber, G. Orlov, V. G. Kartsovnik). Gregorian chant was not yet music in the role of an autonomous art form for aesthetic satisfaction: the unison of voices sung half melodically - half recitative was immeasurably more than a musical and aesthetic pastime - rather, it became an integral organic part of the Christian sacred life of the community as a whole, manifesting direct spiritual reality in the experience of joint experience of voice modulations (participation). Therefore, Gregorian chant naturally disposed to the authority of the Bible, allowing it to avoid the influence of the "logic of numbers" of medieval thinkers - seekers of "divine numerical mysteries." Thanks to the direct experience of spiritual revelation in the joint "many-voice" empathy with a single intentional-intersubjective voice, people easily accepted the sacred mandate of Scripture to hear the "Voice of God" when it was impossible to see Him. Experiencing the creative power of the joint "breathing of voices", people did not doubt the description of the fact that with the same voice God gave people the Law and created the world: "And God said ..."; "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul" (Genesis 2:7).

Most importantly, in joint singing it is also obvious that the voice does not simply express the words of the Holy Scriptures as some kind of expression of Thought, but restores the original Word as a sound that, outside of any "logic of numbers", creates the world order in rhythm with the "divine breath" (intentional experiences of the *Consciousness*, explicating into kinestheses of voice modulations). In this sense, G. Orlov's observation regarding the specifics of the rhythm of Gregorian chant is noteworthy: there is not even a semblance of a modern musical-rhythmic hierarchy of discrete numerical units of repeating beats and periods; there are also no uniform rhythms of step, swing, rotation associated with bodily movements or other physical acts. The time order of Gregorian chant (as, indeed, of the ancient Jewish cantillations, as well as the Indian raga) is determined by breathing - "the manifestation and rhythm of life itself", which never has exact repetitions, is inaccessible to numerical descriptions, dissolves in a person "the difference between the spiritual and the physical" (phenomenological epoche). The voice released in Gregorian chant is the breath in the acts of pronunciation of words: on exhalation, there is a "sacrifice of the liberation of the spirit" ("neuma", which in Greek means both "air" and "spirit"). Inhalations and exhalations in participatory singing become the dynamics of the kinesthesia of the intentional voice: exhalations play the role of a wave - "an invariant contour of melodic phrases", inhalations organize natural pauses (moments of rest) between phrases. It is very important that the dynamics of the voice waves of breathing is completely unpredictable and, by its own power, leads the Gregorian choir to an unknown but desirable goal: "A person who joins the symbolic reality of Gregorian chant does not try to impatiently predict its final tone and about its structural order". Therefore, there is a "movement towards the foreseeable fulfillment of the [spiritual] promise" and singing serves as the "musical embodiment of the eschatological aspiration" to achieve this "promise", not through consciously planned actions, but in the surrender to a single voice that leads to goals "by itself in due time." Thus, the symbolic content of Gregorian chant is also providential, which implies a teleological mode of its intentional component: the musical-vocal life of breath, in the language of phenomenology, means the purposeful functioning of the intentional reason, in this case, in the modality of musical thinking.

¹⁶² Ibid. pp.348-349.

Consequently, in essence, vocal singing in intentional-intersubjective communication (participation) intuitively implements the function of intentional reason in order to familiarize oneself with the direct experience of pure *Consciousness*, that is, with the philosophical and phenomenological realization of self-consciousness — the cognition of one's true "I" as an intentional subject. Music, thus, is the unity of the intentions of breathing and voice, which in the field of the intentional reason becomes purposeful musical thinking in the conscious development of the "Life World" of the phenomenological attitude.

According to one of the founders of Western cultural studies, the American anthropologist Leslie White (1900-1975), "culture must be considered as a process sui generis, that is, having a cause of itself"¹⁶³. At the same time, the already mentioned *participation* (L. Levi-Bruhl), which has been phenomenologically explained as an act of experiencing the involvement of the subject-personality in the perceived world of things and people, serves as a funding causal factor for the integrity of this or that cultural "organism". It is necessary to distinguish participation from the usual "participation" of people in public life: one can participate in a meeting, making some kind of collective decision, or even in some kind of social ritual (concerts, demonstrations, festivals, funerals, etc.), while remaining internally indifferent, however, it is impossible to live (experience) without being involved in the living objecthood of the world. In *Notes on a Primitive Mentality*, Lévy-Bruhl connects the acts of participation with the essence of all experience: "Participation is not just a mysterious and inexplicable fusion of things, it is included in the nature of these things. Without participation they would be inaccessible to experience: they would not exist. Participation is a condition of their existence, perhaps the most important, basic condition. We can say: to exist means to be involved in some mystical power, essence and reality"¹⁶⁴. "Participation is by its nature opaque to analysis and inaccessible to the intellect: it is an a priori condemnation of any theoretical explanation, since the theory that makes participation accessible to the reason is false and destroys its subject"¹⁶⁵.

Genrikh Orlov is convinced that "music can be called the most widespread, most effective and involving factor of participation"¹⁶⁶. Indeed, a lot of ethnographic material has been collected, which very convincingly demonstrates the fact of the generative role of musical "reunifying traditions" (musical-trance rituals, etc.) in the emergence and development of a particular cultural diaspora, ethnic group, and even an entire civilization through the formation the corresponding musical and symbolic architectonics of the *Thinking* of the people involved. One of the most striking historical and ethnic examples is the well-known phenomenon of "personal song" among the American Indians: a young man is "initiated" into a full-fledged personal social mission (finding his "face") through the ritual acquisition of a "personal song" (through asceticism and solitary meditation) from the spirit of the animal, which becomes a totem and patron for life. The "face" (the true hidden "I"), acquired and preserved throughout life with the help of a "personal song" received from above, connects the Indian with the whole world: with relatives, the whole people, the forces of nature, the universe as a whole, etc.

The ultimate expression of the vital role of a musical symbol, hidden under the cover of everyday superficial collective consciousness and behavior, in the first place, according to the American

¹⁶³ White Leslie A. *Culturology* // *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Vol. 3. N. Y.: The Free Press, 1968. pp. 547-550.

¹⁶⁴ Orlov G. *The Tree of Music*. SPb., 1992. p. 156.

¹⁶⁵ Levi-Bruhl L. *The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality*. N. Y.: Harper and Row Publisher, 1975. p. 68.

¹⁶⁶ Orlov G. *The Tree of Music*. SPb., 1992. p. 170.

musicologist and folklorist Alan Lomax, is realized through the act of experiencing a sense of security: "The primary purpose of music — to inspire the listener with a sense of security, because it symbolizes the place of his birth, the joys of childhood, the satisfaction of participating in community activities"¹⁶⁷. On the contrary, the loss of the experience of "security", which comes from a sense of life involvement with others (participation), exacerbates the experience of the "lost paradise". Therefore, music cut off from personal musical-participatory symbolic "roots" often inspires "bitter-sweet nostalgic feelings"¹⁶⁸. On the other hand, a person finds himself in "his song": "The song is himself: he "sings" his "I", identifying himself with own deep nature.

Prisoners in solitary confinement, victims of religious persecution, political prisoners before execution sing their hymns not to distract themselves with dear memories, but because in this way they gain strength in unity with the higher reality, in the name of which they suffer and die"¹⁶⁹. Even deeper "penetrating" and more powerfully binding "souls" participation is achieved in the musical participation of several people or groups of people who share common values and forms of behavior. Then a socially unifying, always extremely impressive (ecstatic) collective action takes place, in its inspiring effect, commonly called a ritual (not only religious, but also secular), when the differences between the singer or actor and the audience are erased. The performer produces not just something that meets the needs of the aesthetic *Thinking* of the assembled participants, he broadcasts something more vital and determines the inner need of the human "lonely soul", a certain deep sacred act of *Consciousness*, concerning the phenomenological essence of each person present. The singer, for example, acts as a herald of the collective synergy of musical experiences of each of the listeners, who feel themselves co-authors of the new experience that is being born, as Ó Canainn described in the case of gatherings among the Irish: "It often happens that someone from the audience speaks forward and at a particularly exciting moment of the song takes the singer by the hand and even emphasizes its rhythm or especially strong feeling by squeezing the hand and moving it up and down. It is impossible not to feel in such cases that this person speaks on behalf of the entire audience and conveys to the singer the feeling of participation in the song that they all feel"¹⁷⁰. Here we are faced not with an episodic case of behavior, but a typical pastime in the communities of traditional cultures, for which music is not limited to "pleasant rest", but is the basis of all forms of life: thoughts, speech, labor, defense, etc. Until now, Orlov notes, "during concerts of traditional Indian music, for example, in modern India, or even in a dedicated Western audience, listeners respond to the actions of musicians naturally and spontaneously. Knowing the patterns of the sounding piece and the possible turns of improvisation, they mark the movement of the tala with gestures, shake their heads in admiration, utter exclamations of approval at the end of the dizzying rhythmic cycle, share monosyllabic comments"¹⁷¹ (the so-called "collective chanting with accompanying dances" or "*sankirtana*"¹⁷²). In *sankirtana*, "a powerful feedback channel arises" between the musicians and the audience, "the listeners become their continuation - a single being involved in the game; their participation influences the course and turns of their improvisation and, ultimately, determines the concreteness of the music performed. Music serves here as a common medium for collective game, a focus and a concentrated manifestation of *participation*"¹⁷³. The same

¹⁶⁷ Lomax A. Folk Song Style // American Anthropologist. № 61, 1959. P. 929.

¹⁶⁸ Orlov G. The Tree of Music. SPb., 1992. p. 156.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ O'Canainn T. Traditional Music in Ireland. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. p. 79.

¹⁷¹ Orlov G. The Tree of Music. St. Petersburg, 1992, p. 171.

¹⁷² "Sankirtana" from Sanskrit is translated as "joint glorification": from "san" ("together") and "kirtan" ("singing", "praise").

¹⁷³ Orlov G. The Tree of Music. St. Petersburg, 1992, p. 171.

musical *participation* also serves as the basis for wider collective syncretic actions in various cultural regions of the world, whether it is a church-Christian service or a "Peking Opera", a ceremony in Java or a medieval mystery play. True, in this case, music is only one of the participants in the social ritual, although it is basic in the cultural development of a given society, and the participatory connection only partially spreads through musical attributes, transferring the center of the formation of a new cultural and mythological symbolism to the following levels of "cultural games" (J. Huizinga). It is noteworthy that "concert manners, as we understand them today - absolute sacramental silence in the hall and reverence magically inspired by the conductor - are of very recent origin. Critical remarks about an orchestra or a conductor in the course of a performance were commonplace in France only thirty years ago. The composer's creations were by no means considered an inviolable shrine or his property, to which he had inalienable rights. The performers were so self-willed in free cadences that countermeasures became necessary. Frederick the Great, for example, forbade singers to embellish music by distorting it beyond recognition"¹⁷⁴.

The further we move into the past even of Western culture, the more we observe a closer interweaving of music and everyday communal life: "In churches and monasteries, in princely palaces and craft guilds, in villages and taverns, music was a common property, assimilated by a member of each of the groups so deeply and completely that participation in it was in the nature of instinctive behavior, and there was no difference between performers and listeners. In fact, there was neither one nor the other".¹⁷⁵ Only relatively recently did this original musical-participatory unity of the culture of the West disintegrate to the separation of music into an autonomous and supposedly "independent" art form, still recalling its original "cultural continuity" in modern rituals of singing national anthems on important state events or in mass orgies of "fans" of popular singers and musical groups.

Summarizing the attempt to "demystify" the fundamental structures of archaic consciousness in their comparison with the universal extra-cultural invariants of the Human *Consciousness* of modern Western civilization, as well as in the context of the synergistic interaction of different types of thinking of the *Logos*, *Mythos* and *Melos*, we can formulate the following phenomenological justification for the combination in each individual personality of musical thinking and culturally conditioned Thinking. In a special phenomenological research on the study of the essence of mystical experience¹⁷⁶, we have already defined mystical *Consciousness* as an intersubjective experience, realized in a state of phenomenological epoche, which is achieved as a result of the implementation of the final stage of intentional-phenomenological reduction, which "brackets" transcendental subjectivity, producing "mythological consciousness". In the "phenomenological residue" we get "pure eidos" of the experiences of *Consciousness*, which should be attributed to the prerogative of "lonely", that is, pure *Melos*, free from the "coverings" of *Mythos* and *Logos*. The affective experience of the "primitive mentality" is directly compared with the intersubjective-communicative perception of the "Lifeworld", and participatory thinking - with the intentional reason, which, thanks to a direct connection with the "region of being" of the experiences of *Consciousness=Melos*, can be attributed to the desired essence of *Melos* and identified with musical thinking. Finally, as the

¹⁷⁴ Huizinga J. *Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in Culture*. Boston, 1950. P. 163.

¹⁷⁵ Orlov G. *The Tree of Music*. St. Petersburg, 1992, p. 172.

¹⁷⁶ Sokol V. B. *Phenomenology of mystical experience // Mystical and esoteric movements in theory and practice. Problems of interpretation of esotericism and mysticism: Collection of materials of the Third international scientific conference*. St. Petersburg, 2010. pp. 91-101.

phenomenological-ethnographic research carried out shows, musical thinking becomes a funding factor in the formation of the cultural-symbolic thinking of a given society¹⁷⁷.

So, the concepts of “affective nature”, “mystical experience”, the experience of *participation* and *sankirtana*, “prological thinking” and musical thinking (thinking of the “lonely” *Melos*) turn out to be identical in phenomenological essence and refer to the same stream of experiences of pure *Consciousness* of the region of apodictic knowledge, and, therefore, belong to the sphere of cognitive functioning of the intentional reason.

A comparative analysis of the empirical and ethnographic material of the musical cultures of the world made it possible to identify the need for a methodological transition from the cognitive position of interpreting music to the position of contemplating it, which was the key point in studying the essence of musical thinking by analogy with the “cornerstone methodological task of modern phenomenological science” - changing the *natural attitude* of Thinking to phenomenological attitude of *Consciousness*. The phenomenological transformation of the attitude of musical cognition clearly distinguishes the extra-cultural invariant essence of music (the region of apodictic knowledge) from the “stream” of facts of musical-acoustic polyvariant explications in accordance with certain cultural traditions (the region of problematic knowledge). Moreover, the essence of music in the dynamics of musical thinking, as it turned out, takes on the role of a cultural “sui generis” - the epicenter of spontaneous generation and the formation of the corresponding cultural specificity of the collective musical subject, carried out in intentionally-intersubjective acts of joint empathic interaction with the world or, in the language of ethnographic terminology, in social rituals of *participation* (Levi Bruhl) or *sankirtana* (Jiva Gosvami, Bhaktivedanta Swami). As the phenomenological and culturological analysis has shown, *participation* and *sankirtana* belong to the sphere of experiences of the extra-cultural intentional subjectivity of *Consciousness* (the region of apodictic knowledge), which is opposed both to empirical “data” (artifacts) and to the laws and principles of traditional *Thinking* of a particular culture, regardless of whether it belongs to the archaic or modern civilization (a region of problematic knowledge).

Thus, on the basis of music as a unity of the intentions of breathing and voice (which, thanks to the general teleological orientation of the universal intentional reason = musical thinking, allows even unconsciously mastering a single intersubjective “Life World” of the phenomenological attitude), a common way of perception arises for people of different cultures, in for whom music is inseparable from the voice and the breath that produces it. The concept of Nada (na - “prana”: energy received through breathing) of the Indonesians; Hindu Yoga Shastra (yoga¹⁷⁸ - the act of connecting with supersensible sound through the vocal vibrations of the mantra); Chinese Qin (the connection of “heaven” with “earth” through the sound of strings, turning into an “inaudible” sound); Japanese Gagaku (a kind of joint musical game with the goal of achieving “matching breathing”), West African drum ensembles playing in the “rhythmic belt” mode - all intuitively pursue the goal of achieving the same state of the flow of experiences of phenomenological epoche or “total absorption in the Timeless Now of the Divine Spirit” (Blacking) in the musical experience of “being inseparable from

¹⁷⁷ See a similar conclusion and the relevance of the task in the study of Uvarov M.S.: “It is from melos that its fundamental meanings are born in culture, and we have yet to discover the nature of this melos” [Uvarov M.S. *Melos and the Logos of Philosophy* // *Bulletin of St.-Petersburg State University*. 2003 Ser. 6. Issue. 2 (14). pp. 12-19].

¹⁷⁸ The word “yoga” comes from the Sanskrit root *yoj* or *yuj*, which has many semantic meanings: “team”, “exercise”, “restraint”, “connection”, “unity”, “harmony”, “union”.

breath and movement becoming voice and sound”¹⁷⁹. It is not the music itself that breathes and moves as an objectified abstraction, but the intentional subject, the listener of the music. Therefore, even if a person unconsciously “mixes his own feelings and actions with musical sound, he has the possibility of internal purification, restoration of integrity and unity with the world, an experience that is so familiar to Europeans of the first millennium of our era and the keepers of ancient traditions in the countries of the East and in other parts of the world”¹⁸⁰. Thus, the phenomenologically explicated essence of music through musical thinking, in the case of its social consolidation, returns harmony and unity with the world to each individual and society as a whole (intersubjective communication of the “Life World”).

Conclusion

The designated gnoseological intrigue of the competitive “racing game” of Thinking in relation to Consciousness in the eternal philosophical “pursuit of meaning” (Moritz Schlick) was traced on the “discursive subject field” in the spirit of the linguistic-semiotic paradigm of modern Western philosophizing.

The *natural attitude* of cognition, in which *Consciousness* naively experiences itself as identical with the functional representation of the “psychological apperceptions” of *Thinking*, forces a person to betray his own philosophical purpose of penetrating into the essence of the world through self-*Consciousness*¹⁸¹ in favor of “interpretations” of *Thinking*. “Accompanying” the acts of intentional cognition of the apodictic truths of existence, any *Thought*, due to the lack of onto-gnoseological powers for direct access to them, is forced to “appropriate” the semantic data of the original invariant entities of the “stream of experiences” (*Consciousness*) at the expense of its own “conceptual constructions” with significant interpretative distortions, thereby enclosing pure *Consciousness* in a kind of “prison of the conceptual framework” (K. Popper). The emerging “plagiarism of the meaning (Sinn)” of *Thinking* at the expense of *Consciousness* due to the genetically embedded “substitution” necessarily gives rise to the dubious status of any theoretical cognition in *natural attitude*, from the ascertainment of which Husserl sets the problem of the need to create a “new science” phenomenology as “the only rigorous science”.

Overcoming the *natural attitude* of cognition, judging by the studied “phenomenological drama” of the continuity of the essence of the teachings of the founder of phenomenology and the emerging problem of “misunderstood Husserl”, turns out to be far from a simple “philosophical doing” and requires an initial discursive restructuring of *Thinking*. In the historical and philosophical review on the subject of analyzing the structure of the “discursive tree” of Western *Thinking* before the emergence of phenomenological description in the works of Husserl at the beginning of the 20th century, we came to the diversification of two contradictory and competing types of discursive microstructural “roots”: ontological and gnoseological. A detailed discursive analysis has shown that

¹⁷⁹ Orlov G. The Tree of Music. St. Petersburg, 1992, pp. 352-354.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. p.355.

¹⁸¹ Emphasizing the phenomenological (self-conscious) essence of the philosophical cognition of man, the founder of phenomenology completed his “Cartesian reflections” with Augustine’s precise aphorism: “Noli foras ire, in te redi, in inferiore homine habitat veritas” (Do not strive for the external, return to yourself, to truth dwells in the inner man).

while ontological-discursive *Thinking* under the power of ontological discourse generates, supports and diligently “protects” from exposure the naive dogmatism of the *natural attitude*, gnoseological discourse and the gnoseological-discursive *Thinking* funded by it, on the contrary, - contain in their microstructure the mechanism of positive doubt (like the Cartesian one) in the “theoretical truths” of *Thinking*, including skepticism in relation to their own gnoseologically discursive “truths”. In other words, if ontologically discursive *Thinking* firmly and forever keeps the subject of cognition in an unconsciously cognitive position of *natural attitude*, then gnoseological-discursive *Thinking* opens up the prospect of reaching the reasonable limit of the competing “game” of *Thinking* on “overtaking” *Consciousness*, namely, to the verge of self-revelation of *Thinking* in a naive claim to the right to receive reliable knowledge: gnoseologically-discursive *Thinking* as a result necessarily comes to the Socratic “knowledge of own ignorance”, which gave birth to Western philosophy, from which a transition to the phenomenological attitude of cognition of apodictic undoubted reliable knowledge of *Consciousness* is possible.

So, before approaching the fundamental “cornerstone” procedure of the phenomenological method of changing the *natural attitude* of *Thinking* to the *phenomenological attitude* of *Consciousness*, a preliminary operation on *Thinking* is necessary, namely, its discursive restructuring from an ontological-discursive structure to a gnoseological-discursive structure.

The phenomenologist, as conceived by Husserl, starts from the predominantly gnoseological-discursive language of *Thinking* to expose the *natural attitude* of cognition and substantiate the need to overcome it and move to the cognitive position of the *phenomenological attitude*. Then, after mastering the “Copernican turn” of the *natural attitude* into the phenomenological attitude by means of a complete phenomenological reduction, he must overcome even the gnoseological-discursive *Thinking* in favor of the new phenomenological rationality of the “consciousness of the reason” (Vernunftbewußtsein). Thus, thanks to the state of the phenomenological epoche, the phenomenologist opens up the prospect of “new thinking” as a kind of eidetic mode of pure *Consciousness*, possible solely on the basis of a special intentional language immanent to the extralinguistic “region of being” of pure *Consciousness*, free from the power of any discourse, including gnoseological discourse.

Consequently, in addition to the two types of discursive structures identified within the limits of *Thinking* (ontological discourse and gnoseological discourse), an extralinguistic (non-discursive) intentional-eidetic “language” of pure noematic meanings, the intentional language “ripens” already in the region of pure *Consciousness*. As an element of the intentional structure of *Consciousness* and the basis of the intentional-intersubjective-communicative reason, the intentional language is funding the so-called by Husserl “phenomenological description” of the *phenomenological attitude* as an extra-discursive “science of essences”, which is an alternative to the captured by the “power of discourse” (Foucault) traditional sciences of *Thinking* (the “sciences of facts” of the *natural attitude*).

Thus, in the course of our study, the following tasks were solved:

Task 1 (first step). Formulation of an additional definition of *natural attitude* (*Thinking*), performed exclusively in the mode of “pure” gnoseological discourse.

Solution. An additional definition of the *natural attitude* is carried out on the basis of gnoseological-discursive stratification of knowledge in terms of its reliability in accordance with the Cartesian principle of methodological doubt, on which, as is well known, Husserl's phenomenology is also based. So, by means of exclusively gnoseological discursive-microstructural clauses, two polar

onto-gnoseological regions were distinguished: the region of problematic (doubtful or plausible) knowledge of *Thinking* and the region of apodictic (undoubted or reliable) knowledge of pure *Consciousness*. Accordingly, it became possible to formulate the following “purely” gnoseological-discursive addition to the general thesis of the *natural attitude*: The subject of the *natural attitude* accepts the “reality” of the dubious data of the experience of the region of problematic knowledge of *Thinking* as an undoubted reality, that is, in the status of reliable knowledge immanent to the region of apodictic knowledge of *Consciousness*. Consequently, the essence of the “naivety” of cognition in a *natural attitude* is the displacement of the true object of reliable cognition from the region of apodictic knowledge of *Consciousness* to the region of problematic knowledge of *Thinking*, which gives rise to the methodology of naive efforts to obtain undoubted knowledge through *Thinking*, that is, in the obviously doubtful subject field of the problematic region.

Task 2 (second step). Gnoseologically discursive concretization of the fundamental procedure of the phenomenological method - phenomenological reduction - with the aim of its gnoseological demarcation from linguistic reduction, which simultaneously solves the problem of a clear demarcation of the ontological boundary of fundamentally different "regions of being": the region of "pure meanings" (eidetic essences) of the intentional subject of *Consciousness* of *phenomenological attitude* and the region of "linguistic meanings" of the discursive *Thinking* of the *natural attitude*. Thus, the desired phenomenological transformation of *Thinking* attitude (*natural attitude*) to the *Consciousness* attitude (*phenomenological attitude*) must be realized.

Solution. As it turned out, an additional gnoseological-discursive distinction is required to a greater extent by the procedure of the second, according to Husserl, transcendental-phenomenological stage of reduction, which (in conjunction with the first eidetic stage) mixes in the acts of its implementation phenomenologically unequal discursive-ontological statuses of the psychophysical, transcendental (according to Kant), linguistic and intentional subjects. The indicated ontological-discursive diversification of the subject of cognition into four possible components corresponding to the four “regions of being” is contrasted with an alternative gnoseological-discursive “reading” in the focus of the cognizability / uncognizability of one or another objecthood, correlative to the identified four subjectivities: *psychophysical, transcendental, linguistic and intentional*. Thanks to the discursive reorientation of the ontological discourse to the gnoseological discourse, it became possible to consistently theoretically single out psychophysical, linguistic and transcendental (according to Kant) subjectivity (the region of problematic knowledge of *Thinking*) with the aim of explicating the phenomenological specificity of intentional subjectivity (the region of apodictic knowledge of *Consciousness*). Thus, the necessary theoretical and methodological “preparation” of the habitual subject for the implementation of the procedures of complete phenomenological reduction was carried out, thanks to which it became obvious that the identified three subjectivities (three modes of *Thinking*), “covering” the intentional subjectivity of *Consciousness* in the *natural attitude*, correspond to three stages of reduction. A complete phenomenological reduction can be represented as a 3-step "switching off" of psychophysical, linguistic and transcendental subjectivities and their corresponding objecthood:

Stage 1 - Psychophysical reduction (corresponding to Husserl's eidetic stage), bracketing the psychophysical "I" and its objecthood, that is the empirically perceived world.

Stage 2 - Linguistic-psychological reduction, bracketing the linguistic subject and its objecthood - linguistic meanings (discursive dynamics of the region of a priori categories of sensibility and understanding of Kant's transcendental subject).

Stage 3 - Transcendental reduction (finally releasing the pure intentional "I", therefore it can also be called intentional-phenomenological reduction), bracketing Kant's transcendental reason and its corresponding objecthood - the principles of the ideas of the soul and the world soul, ethics and noumenal theology.

Task 3 (third step). Clarification of the specifics of intentional language as the basis of the anti-discursive description of pure *Consciousness* and an instrument of phenomenological rationality - the region of functioning of the phenomenological (intentional) reason.

Solution. Choosing the priority of the perspective of "new thinking" "inside" *Consciousness*, set by the founder of phenomenology, our study of the phenomenology of the reason, first of all, distinguished between phenomenological *Thinking* as experiences of the "*Consciousness of reason*" (*Vernunftbewußtsein*) and the traditional discursive "*Thinking*", which, according to Husserl, must be put in quotation marks because of its conditionality due to the "naive" rationality of the *natural attitude*. In the context of the opposition of *Consciousness* and *Thinking*, it is important to emphasize here that "phenomenological thinking" as a "living" intentional eidon of *pure Consciousness* denies the usual "*Thinking*" as a "dead" mechanical game of certain sign systems, including linguistic and semiotic structures. Therefore, the proposed path to a new phenomenologically thinking *Consciousness*, which denies the classical traditional understanding of *Thought* as inner speech, is understood as a break with internal discourse (reduction) and access to the "region of experience before *Thinking*" (*epoche*), consisting exclusively of pure meanings, free from linguistic conditioning (anti-discourse). At the same time, the extralinguistic stream of experiences of the "*Consciousness of reason*" still turns out to be a constituted special, that is, anti-discursive language, designated by us as intentional, which is immanent to the pure *Consciousness* of the phenomenological *epoche* and, as a correlate of the "ordinary" language, is congruent to it in noematic form, however, it is directly opposite in terms of the principle of meaning formation.

Following the aforementioned modern trend in criticizing the "mythologism" and "substantialism" of the transcendental doctrine of the reason of the modern era (Jurgen Habermas and others), it turned out to be appropriate to single out at least two varieties of the subjectivity of thinking: the intentional subject of the "*Consciousness of thinking*" (constituted by the intentional reason of Husserl) and the transcendental subject of *Thinking* (crowning with the transcendental reason of Kant). While intentional reason took its place in the region of apodictic knowledge of Husserl's "*Consciousness of reason*" (the position of the *phenomenological attitude*), Kant's transcendental reason found itself in the region of problematic knowledge of the "substance" of *Thinking* (the position of the a priori *natural attitude*). The emphasis of comparative analysis was deliberately placed on the specifics of the intersubjective correlation of functioning of the intentional reason with the intentional subject (reason) of the *Other*, in direct contrast to the subject-centered attitude of the functions of the transcendental reason. An indication of the communicative subject-de-centered nature of the intentional reason, the essence of which turned out to be completely unrevealed even in the teachings of the founder of phenomenology, set the prospect for solving the most important problem of modern phenomenology - the implementation of a phenomenological description of the phenomenological reason, out of the "incompleteness" of which, as it turned out, Husserl himself experienced "dissatisfaction".

The intentional reason of *Consciousness* was defined as a border structure on the verge of pure meanings of the "lonely soul" (*einsames Seelenleben*) and their sign (linguistic) modes, oriented towards the expression "outside" of the immanent structures of *Consciousness* towards the infinite

communicative space of the Life World (LebensWelt), which retains, which is very important, the status of an intentional existential region (intentional-intersubjective communication in *phenomenological attitude*).

Finally, the final definition of the intentional reason as an intersubjective tool of extralinguistic (anti-discursive) phenomenological description required a radical distinction between the intentional and discursive types of languages in accordance with the directly opposite principles of the meaning-genesis that is funding them. Intentional language as an element of the structure of pure *Consciousness* is phenomenologically different not only from the usual ontological discourse of Foucault and Habermas, but also from the gnoseological discourse of skeptics, Descartes and even Husserl. Husserl's methodology includes both types of languages in terms of means and ends: Discursive language serves as a tool for the implementation of intentional language. Thus, a distinction was made between two types of languages in accordance with two possible ways of the semantic genesis procedure: top-down (from the meanings of pure *Consciousness* to linguistic signs - phenomenological description) and bottom-up (from the linguistic meanings of interpretations to the "meanings of consciousness" of *natural attitude* - a discursive description of *Thinking*). The intentional language ensures the functioning of the intentional reason as a basic element of the structure of the intentional subject of the *phenomenological attitude*, intended to implement the semantic conjugation of the cognizing *Consciousness* and the cognized object through the following phenomenological procedures sequentially implemented. First of all, on the basis of the distinction of intentional and linguistic-discursive methods of meaning genesis, the intentional and discursive types of languages and the two types of rationality (thinking) corresponding to them are directly separated, followed by the reduction of discursive *Thinking* in favor of the description of intentionally thought *Consciousness* (new phenomenological rationality).

The next step is to explicate intersubjective communication, in the acts of which the semantic adjustment of the universal field of apodictic meanings is carried out, followed by the formation of sign forms of the intentional language, conjugating the noetic essences of *Consciousness* with the noematic meanings of objects, using words correlative to the "ordinary" language, regardless of the corresponding to them discursive meanings of the sphere of empirical-linguistic *Thinking* of the *natural attitude*. In parallel with the ongoing exposure of the illusions of naive reflection of the external world, which claims the status of "real" objecthood, the apodictic status of the reality of the objecthood of the intentional Life World of the subject of the *phenomenological attitude* is affirmed. Finally, through the function of testing the valid / invalid in the acts of intentional adjustment, carried out in the general semantic field of intersubjective-communicative "semantic games", the phenomenological Life World of the intentional subject of *Consciousness* is finally formed. Now the phenomenologist becomes qualified to "return" to the natural world without the risk of "falling" into the naive perception of the *natural attitude*: thanks to the universal semantic field of the intentional reason, he begins to realize the surrounding natural world, as it were, "from the inside out." Exposing the illusions of the naive perception of "reality" by *Thinking* (the region of problematic knowledge) and simultaneously correcting the apodictic semantic field in the intersubjective social and communicative life of *Consciousness* (the region of apodictic knowledge), he directly perceives the real essence of particular things, phenomena and the world in general. Thus, the finally formed life world of the intentional subject ensures its subsequent implementation of the "return" to the real external world and full socialization in it on the basis of *Consciousness*, i.e., reliable knowledge of the apodictic meanings (essences) of the surrounding concrete objecthood and the world horizon as a whole, free from the naive perception of *Thinking*.

As one of the most important results should be highlighted the discovered fundamental intersubjectivity (communicative interdependence) of the elements of the intentional structure of *Consciousness*. As it turned out, intentional language, in principle, is not capable of being implemented in a single subject-centered monad: noematic meanings laid down in signs from top to bottom need to be confirmed by joint empathy in acts of correcting the same semantic game. Therefore, based on such a fundamentally subject-de-centered language, the universal intentional reason opens up a priori of the identity of the experiences of one's own *Consciousness* and the *Consciousnesses* of *Others* around the world. Accordingly, the "meaningful game" of the intersubjective intentional reason necessarily gives rise to "a coordinated consciousness of the same world common to all with the same things" (Husserl), the desired real world of real things. So, there is no independent individual functioning of the intentional reason, literally for the same reason that the existence of an individually independent intentional language that is born and acting in the communicative adjustment of the entire human community is unthinkable, regardless of the discreteness of the multi-ethnic language palette of humanity, that is, in the intentional-intersubjective communicative space of the universal phenomenological reason.